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I 
Abstract 
 The European Union has faced a multitude of phases, challenges, and crises in 
the integration process. In every one of these steps, important regulations have 
been discussed and implemented, increasing the policy reach of the Union. In the 
last decade there has been an accumulation of both difficult and controversial 
topics connected to the Eurozone crisis, the refugee issue, terrorism, and 
xenophobia, culminating in unprecedented situations such as the Brexit. These 
dynamics trigger the question: Does the politicisation of European integration 
increase in times of crises? This thesis aims to shed light on the changing 
relevance of European integration on parties, party systems and voting behaviour. 
Does Europe matter more for the evolution of national parties and party systems 
today? Does it have an impact on electoral choices of European citizens?  
 
This thesis investigates the last decade of changes in parties, party systems, and 
voting behaviour in Europe, giving a special focus to economically troubled 
countries—Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—as well as Ireland. In this regard, a 
chapter focusing on the story of the economic crisis will follow the introduction 
and theoretical background. The fourth chapter analyses changes in Western 
European party systems, and the fifth focuses on voting behaviour in European 
Parliament elections. The final chapter provides conclusions and a future 
roadmap. For these analyses, individual-level survey data (European Elections 
Studies), expert surveys (Chapel Hill Expert Survey), and party manifesto data 
(Manifesto Project) have been used. The results suggest that Europe matters more 
in electoral dynamics today; however, this impact is still limited. This thesis finds 
 
 
II 
that EU polarisation has a significant impact on volatility as well as EU distance 
on the vote. These findings open up new avenues for future research, which 
should concentrate on specific party families, variations of Euroscepticism, and 
populism.  
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Resumen 
La Unión Europea (UE) se ha enfrentado a multitud de retos y a numerosas crisis 
en su proceso de integración. En cada uno de estos episodios se han discutido y 
aprobado regulaciones importantes que han incrementado el alcance de las 
políticas de la UE. La última década se ha caracterizado por un cúmulo de 
cuestiones controvertidas y de soluciones complejas, todas ellas conectadas con la 
crisis financiera de la eurozona, el terrorismo yihadista, el problema de los 
refugiados y la xenofobia y antieropeísmo de nuevos partidos populistas que han 
culminado en situaciones sin precedentes como el Brexit. Estos nuevos procesos 
vienen acompañados de muchas preguntas relevantes, algunas de las cuales 
justifican la realización de esta tesis doctoral. ¿Se ha incrementado la politización 
de la UE en tiempos de crisis? ¿Tiene mayor impacto la UE en estas 
circunstancias sobre los partidos nacionales y los sistemas de partidos? ¿En qué 
medida ambas cuestiones repercuten en el comportamiento electoral de los 
ciudadanos europeos? 
 
Esta tesis analiza desde el punto de vista europeo, entendido este en sentido 
amplio, los cambios en los partidos, los sistemas de partidos y el voto a lo largo de 
la última década, prestando especial atención a los países especialmente castigados 
por la Gran Recesión como Grecia, Italia, Portugal y España – así como, en 
menor medida, Irlanda. Tras sendos capítulos dedicados a la introducción de la 
tesis y a los principales enfoques teóricos utilizados, el capítulo tres examina la 
crisis económica y financiera, el cuarto discute los cambios de sistemas de partidos 
europeos desde el punto de vista de la integración europea y el quinto se centra en 
 
 
IV 
el impacto de la UE entendida como un issue en el voto de los ciudadanos para el 
Parlamento Europeo.  Para la realización de estos análisis, se han utilizado datos 
de encuestas a nivel individual (procedentes del European Election Studies), encuestas 
de expertos (integradas por la Chapel Hill Expert Survey) y datos de los programas 
electorales de los partidos (gracias al Manifesto Comparative Project). Los resultados 
sugieren que el tema Europa está ganando en presencia e intensidad en los 
recientes procesos electorales, bien que este impacto sea todavía limitado. 
Además, la polarización existente en torno a la UE tiene un impacto significativo 
en la volatilidad electoral agregada, así como es mayor la relevancia del issue 
europeo en el voto. Estos resultados abren nuevas vías para futuras 
investigaciones que se deberían  concentrar en las familias de partidos específicos, 
en las variaciones de euroescepticismo y en la creciente presencia del populismo 
en las agendas políticas y entre los partidos de los países europeos. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction: Does Europe matter more? 
 
 
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single 
plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which 
first create a de facto solidarity. 
Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950 
 
 
Introduction 
European integration is one of the biggest multi-governance projects this world has ever 
seen. Jean Monnet, aka the “Father of Europe”, and his colleagues dreamed of a united 
Europe. For them, this unification process would secure peace, prevent further wars on 
the continent and contribute to welfare and stability. The plan for further integration was 
ready. It started with only six countries, but soon there were new members in the club. 
Until the late 1980s, the process of integration went rather smoothly, since it was 
perceived as an elite driven process. With the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, 
the character of integration changed and brought many existential discussions with it. 
With the completion of the Single European Market in 1993 and with the agreement on 
an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 - which involved the creation of a 
European Central Bank (ECB) and a common currency (the euro) - the policy influence 
of the European Union was magnified. As already stated with the Maastricht Treaty, 
political integration moved an important step forward “from creating a market to 
 2 
regulating it” (Marks 2004). It was far reaching, not only on economic integration but also 
on a range of areas, including employment, the environment, and foreign and security 
policy. Furthermore, with enlargement waves, different regions of the European 
continent have been covered under the umbrella of the Union; more countries were 
involved within the common market while it was economically and socially changing. As 
Stefano Bartolini suggested in his book, European integration reversed a centuries long 
national boundary construction to a European project (Bartolini 2005). Many challenges 
came with it.  
 
After the Maastricht Treaty, the electorate started to voice its discontent. The main 
reasons behind the critics were the intensification of budgetary regulations, mostly from 
protectionist left wing voters, and the changing nature of integration from just an 
economic project to a political entity. This constituted a threat to the nation-state, which 
attracted reactions from right wing voters as well. In short, citizens started to differentiate 
between a supranational community and their nation-states (Hooghe and Marks 2009). All 
these reactions to European integration led to many public debates on key elements. This 
meant that the “permissive consensus” on European integration was over (Hooghe and 
Marks 2006) and there was the possibility of the politicisation of Europe for electoral 
gain. Afterwards, the politicisation of Europe on different steps of integration was on the 
scholarly agenda. In the meantime, the differences between regions – as a combination of 
nations of the same neighbourhood - also mark the level of politicisation of European 
integration and the future of the project (Kriesi 2016). To be more concrete, the 
European Union, as it is today, is mainly divided into three subgroups (Western, Eastern 
and Southern Europe). Each of these regions has its own conditions that affect the level 
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of politicisation of European integration, the structure of party competition and voting 
behaviour. For this reason, it is important to discriminate between regions of the 
European Union while analysing integration and its politicisation. This thesis aims to 
underline these differences, even for the countries that are grouped together.  
 
A clear discontent has been witnessed with the European Union as a whole, or at least 
regarding some of its policies, since the beginning of the 2000s. Although there have been 
ups and downs in support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007), it is 
clear that today there are stronger sentiments and diversions about the issue. As a result, 
not only are objections to European integration voiced further, but also there are more 
political entrepreneurs who are exploiting these ideas in elections. This situation, both the 
vocalisation of anti-European integration ideas and their exploitation by political 
entrepreneurs, has been catalysed by the economic crisis and had an impact on election 
results (Hernandez and Kriesi 2015). Additionally, the role that the Troika played in the 
economic crisis has changed the understanding of the European Union for some of its 
citizens. The increasing importance of the EU and the impact of its decisions on the daily 
lives of European citizens have increased the level of interaction between supranational 
authorities and the voters. This also prompted national governments to shift the blame 
for the economic crisis from themselves to the EU. For all these reasons, the visibility of 
European integration and possibility of further politicisation increased with the economic 
crisis. This thesis claims that this impact requires further attention for economically 
troubled countries of the Union. The next sections conceptualise this idea even further.  
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Conceptualisation of the idea 
The global financial crisis and its implications significantly marked the last years of 
political science research. Most of the scholars take the beginning of the economic crisis 
as September 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. However, the fall of Bear 
Stearns in spring was a clear early warning of what was going to happen. Then, this 
economic turmoil spread to Europe and converted into a sovereign debt crisis. Members 
of the EU (Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania and Spain) had 
to receive financial help, some in the form of bailout packages, some others as a softer 
touch. All these developments increased the level of politicisation of European 
integration and led to certain changes in the party systems of many countries. Even if it is 
important to underline all the changes Western European democracies have been going 
through in times of crisis, any work should be aware of the fact that all these changes in 
party systems and voting behaviour also date back to decades before. According to Kriesi 
(1999), both the left and the right wing of the political spectrum have been transformed 
by the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Kriesi 1999). This means that 
Western European countries were facing certain changes for decades and major steps of 
European integration, including the crisis management of the Union, have been catalysts 
in this process. In short, even if the implications of the economic crisis are very important 
for Western democracies and European integration, all these changes should be analysed 
with a long-term perspective. 
 
All that being said, this work focuses on party system changes in Western European 
countries, while combining that with analysis regarding the voting behaviour of citizens in 
economically troubled member states. It aims to measure the changes Europe has been 
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going through regarding the party systems and voting behaviour in times of further 
politicisation (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2006, Hooghe and Marks 2009) of the European 
Union. The economic crisis will be taken as a catalyst in this process. In short, this work 
is trying to see the big picture of representation and its relationship with European 
integration.  
 
As has been investigated repeatedly, years of economic and financial crisis created many 
questions regarding European integration, and even put the “euro”, the common 
currency, at risk. In addition, they created a visible division between debtor and creditor 
countries. For this reason, this work aims to add value to the literature by measuring the 
change of relevance of Europe in electoral dynamics. The most innovative part of the 
work is twofold: First of all, it replicates the analysis of Peter Mair claiming that Europe 
has a very limited impact on Western European party systems (Mair 2000) using recent 
data. Secondly, it contributes to the already growing literature of EU issue voting with an 
analysis of the economically troubled countries of Southern Europe and Ireland. As an 
additional contribution to empirical chapters, this work includes a detailed summary of 
the economic crisis that underlines certain differences between countries.  
 
Analysing the impact of European integration: Not that limited anymore? 
For decades it was claimed that citizens also focus on national issues to cast their votes in 
the European arena. In other words, domestic politics define voters’ behaviour in the 
supranational arena as well. These affirmations became questionable with every further 
step in European integration. With the economic crisis, or way before, with the common 
currency Euro, the policy outreach of the European Union had increased significantly. 
 6 
Today, not only because of the economic crisis, but also with the increasing level of 
integration, the EU has been implementing further constraints on national governments’ 
economic policies. Especially for the bailout countries, economic policy depends more on 
decisions of the Troika1 than the internal dynamics of the country. With the realisation of 
a “threat” to the common currency, the EU decided to “cure” these countries with its 
own formula. Keeping all this in mind, this work claims that Europe matters more in 
electoral dynamics today. For this analysis, both the supply side and the demand side of 
the electoral equation will be introduced, aiming to measure the changing impact of 
Europe. Party system polarisation and voting in European Parliament elections will be 
examined with the specific idea of measuring the impact of European integration on these 
dynamics.  
 
The supply side: Party systems in Western Europe 
Peter Mair claimed that Europe has a limited impact on national party systems (Mair 
2000). He checked the format and mechanics of party systems, providing country specific 
information about parties and their vote distribution in national elections. He classified 
them regarding their position on European integration. He concluded that Europe has a 
limited impact on national party systems. Peter Mair himself re-questioned and re-
discussed the same issue after the consequences of the economic crisis became more 
visible in Ireland (Mair 2011). This has been a starting point for this work as well; with all 
the changes Europe has been going through catalysed by the economic crisis, his 
conclusions of 2000 need to be revisited. Chapter IV replicates the analysis of Peter Mair 
and moves it one step further, establishing the link between volatility, which is an 
                                                 
1 Troika is the governing body of the public debt crisis of the Eurozone countries consisting of the European 
Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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important indicator of party system change, and issue polarisation of European 
integration.  
 
Following the literature, the following hypotheses will be tested:  
 
H1.1: The number of political parties is expected to increase in Western Europe in times 
of economic crisis. 
 
H1.2: The number of political parties is expected to increase in Western Europe in a 
period of politicisation of European integration. 
 
H2: In Western Europe, the volatility will increase, if the national party system is more 
polarised on European integration. 
 
The demand side: Voting behaviour in economically troubled countries 
Many studies concluded that voting decisions in European Parliament elections until 2009 
have been focused on national politics (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Schmitt 2005, Hix 
and Marsh 2007, Hix and Marsh 2011) and that political parties have failed to campaign 
over European issues (Weber 2007). They are mostly called second order national 
elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). The 2014 election, being the post-crisis electoral 
contest, was expected to be different. However, the recent paper of Schmitt and Toygür 
demonstrated that European Parliament elections are still second order, qualifying the 
main assumptions of the model (Schmitt and Toygür 2016). Still, even if they proved to 
be second order, the main argument of this work is whether EU issue voting exists in the 
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economically troubled countries of Southern Europe and Ireland. When casting a vote, if 
preferences related to European integration play a role, this process can be called EU 
issue voting. The research shows that the degree of influence of voters’ positions on their 
vote varies cross-nationally depending both on the issue salience and on the availability of 
viable offers from the supply side (Tillman 2004, de Vries 2007, de Vries and Edwards 
2009). This work claims that with the certain catalysing impact of the economic crisis, 
Europe matters more and should play a significant role while casting a vote, at least for 
some member states of the European Union.  
 
So, the main question stands: Is voting behaviour in European Parliament elections 
decided by voters’ attitudes towards European integration (the EU issue-voting)? This 
work builds on the existing literature, mainly testing the following hypotheses:  
 
H1: The distance between voters and parties on the EU integration scale is expected to 
have a greater impact on the EP vote during the crisis and in the post-crisis period than 
before. 
 
H2: The distance between voters and parties on the LR scale is expected to have a 
smaller impact on the EP vote during the crisis and in the post-crisis period than before. 
 
Case selection, research design and data 
The societal context, which includes the current economic situation as well, mostly 
defines the voting behaviour as a common denominator in many countries. On the other 
hand, the reasons behind the supply side mobilisation of potential anti-European 
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integration sentiments differ among member states. These differences can be mainly 
rooted to the existing structure of the national party systems and their recent changes 
(dealignment and realignment structures), the rise of new and challenger parties inside this 
system, the interaction between these parties and already existing mainstream parties, and 
finally, the permissiveness of the system for this competition, which is defined by the 
electoral system of the country. Having all this in mind, several choices regarding this 
work require further clarification. These elements include geographical case selection, the 
time span covered by the study and the data sets used for the analyses. 
 
Geographical case selection for this work has been quite a journey. It started as pan-
European research, and ended up as a Western/Southern European project. The main 
reason behind this transformation is the awareness of each of these regions, cleavage 
structures, and that economic and cultural contexts differ, and matter. For this reason, 
Eastern European countries are left out, since their history of democratisation and party 
system change differs in a significant way from the other regions of the European Union. 
Western European countries are taken for the party system change chapter, while 
economically troubled countries of Southern Europe and Ireland have been taken for the 
voting behaviour chapter.  
 
The time span covered by this work is twofold: The party system analysis dates back to 
World War II (WWII) for 15 Western European countries, while the voting behaviour 
chapter covers elections from the 2004, 2009 and 2014 waves of European Parliament 
elections. The main reason behind all the selections for the party system chapter is the 
idea of replicating the analysis of Peter Mair, so the time span of his paper has been taken 
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as the criterion of the starting point. The idea for the selection of the time span for the 
voting behaviour chapter has been the following: 2004 elections were taken as the pre-
crisis elections, and 2009 elections were the “post-crisis” elections; however, for the 
citizens the economic conditions and their political implications had barely started to 
kick-in. The 2014 elections, on the other hand, were clearly post-crisis with certain 
consequences. Having all three waves of elections provides the possibility of comparison 
for the reader.  
 
The data sets used in this thesis cover an important part of the available data in electoral 
studies and public opinion. For these analyses, individual-level survey data (European 
Election Studies)2, expert surveys (Chapel Hill Expert Surveys)3, and party manifesto data 
(Manifesto Project)4 have been used. For testing the format and mechanics of party 
systems in Western Europe, Gallagher indices5 have been used. This work also includes 
the related data from Eurostat6 and Eurobarometer surveys7 to demonstrate the 
economic crisis with variables and also its political consequences for different member 
                                                 
2 European Election Studies (EES) are pan-European data sets that are about electoral participation and voting 
behaviour in the European Parliament elections. The data have been collected since the 1979 elections (with the 
exception of 1984). The studies have post-electoral surveys in addition to other components of Euromanifestos, elite 
surveys, and content analyses of news and social media. For more information, please visit: http://eeshomepage.net 
3 Chapel Hill expert surveys estimate party positioning on European integration, ideology and policy issues for 
national parties in a variety of European countries since 1999. The number of countries increased from 14 Western 
European countries in 1999 to 24 current or prospective EU members in 2006, and to 31 countries in 2014, 
including the cases of this thesis as well. For more information, please visit: http://chesdata.eu 
4 Manifesto Project provides parties’ policy positions derived from a content analysis of parties’ electoral manifestos. 
It covers over 1000 parties from 1945 until today in over 50 countries on five continents. For more information, 
please visit: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu 
5  Gallagher indices are the least square index (LSq), the effective number of parties (ENEP) and the effective 
number of parties at the parliamentary or legislative level (ENPP) calculated for all the cases that are included in this 
work. For more information, please visit Michael Gallagher’s website: 
http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/ 
6 Eurostat is the statistical unit of the European Commission. For more information, please visit: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat 
7 Eurobarometer surveys are the public opinion analyses of the European Commission. The “Standard 
Eurobarometer” was established in 1974. Each survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per 
country. Reports are published twice yearly. For more information, please visit: 
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/ 
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states. All these data sets enrich the quantitative analysis of this work in different chapters, 
using different methods. The reasons for method selection will be explained in the related 
chapters. 
 
Plan of the study 
This work investigates the last decade of changes in parties, party systems, and voting 
behaviour in Western Europe, giving a special focus to economically troubled countries—
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—as well as Ireland. Keeping all this in mind, the first 
chapter presents the introduction and conceptualises the idea around the question “Does 
Europe matter more?” In chapter 2, the theoretical background for this research is presented. 
To investigate the impact of European integration on electoral dynamics, politicisation 
literature has been used. On the other hand, EU issue voting literature has been revisited 
for the analysis of voting behaviour in economically troubled countries. In addition to 
two main pillars of the theoretical framework, integration theories are also revisited, 
together with all the related literature of party system change. 
 
The main objective of chapter 3 is to put the discussion related to the economic crisis into 
context and perspective. In order to understand the policy influence of the European 
Union in general, and the introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union in 
particular, on electoral dynamics, European sovereign debt crisis is a major incident in the 
history of European integration that is worth analysing. Chapter 3 serves this purpose. It 
starts by introducing the concepts of the government debt crisis and banking crisis, and 
discusses the causes of the crisis in Europe with a specific focus on how a banking crisis 
became a government (public) crisis. It then acknowledges that although the causes of the 
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crisis were the same for the European countries in general, there were additional causes 
and diverse consequences for periphery countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy. Therefore, the situation in these countries is analysed with a case-by-
case review for each of them. Even though the cases were all distinct for each of these 
countries, one thing was common: They all suffered from the austerity measures imposed 
on them, leading to a reduction in public sector employment and wages, cuts in pensions, 
increases in taxes, etc.  
 
Chapter 4 analyses changes in Western European party systems, replicating the analysis of 
Peter Mair. This means re-analysing the format and mechanics of party systems and 
providing all the information regarding individual parties in recent elections. In addition 
to the replication of his 2000 paper with up-to-date data, Chapter 4 continues with a time 
series cross-section (TSCS) analysis establishing the link between volatility and issue 
polarisation of European integration for Western European Member States, and all 
elections since WWII.  
 
Chapter 5 focuses on individual voting behaviour in Southern European countries and 
Ireland. The main hypothesis behind all the analyses is that the impact of European 
integration distance on the vote has increased in the post-crisis period. In other words, 
European integration matters more when citizens cast their vote. For this analysis EU 
issue voting theory has been applied to economically troubled countries using conditional 
logit. The hypotheses have been tested using European Election Studies data. The main 
findings suggest that there are certain differences between countries in the explanatory 
power of the EU distance variable when it is related to the vote. The left/right dimension 
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continues to be the principal explanatory power; however, in some countries it is possible 
to see the impact of European integration in an increasing manner. 
 
The final chapter provides conclusions, remarks and an agenda for the future. To better 
understand the impact of European integration on electoral dynamics, it is important to 
go through all member states and their unique dynamics. A case expansion would be 
useful for comparative reasons, in addition to a conceptual widening to include 
Euroscepticism and populism in the discussion.  
  
 15 
Chapter 2.  
Theoretical framework 
 
 
Europe’s nations should be guided towards the superstate 
without their people understanding what is happening. This 
can be accomplished by successive steps, each disguised as 
having an economic purpose, but which will eventually and 
irreversibly lead to federation. 
Attributed to Jean Monnet 
 
 
Introduction 
The European Union project in a globalising world has been in the research agenda of 
scholars for decades. Summing up with the implications of globalisation, European Union 
became a new channel of political representation, also controlling free movement for 
goods, services, capital, and most importantly, people. Since it was introduced, the 
process of European integration has been going through major changes. From the 1950s 
to the 1990s, it was perceived as a peace building process driven by elites, together with 
the economic cooperation between countries, in which public opinion was mostly 
irrelevant. After the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and once the European Single 
Market was completed in 1993, the agreement on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
was reached in 1999 – which involved the creation of common currency and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) – and the policy reach of the European Union increased 
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significantly (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). It was no longer just an economic 
collaboration and a peace-protector, but also a political entity. With the economic crisis 
shaking European project to its core, all these discussions reached to a whole new level. 
Austerity measures and bailout packages became very important items on the agenda, 
together with anti-immigrant sentiments related to the recent refugee flows to Europe. 
With this increase in politicisation and rising popular dispute over European integration, 
further research has been done on the electoral consequences, both on the demand – 
voter – side, as well as the supply – party – side. What is once called permissive consensus 
turned into a constraining dissensus, and elites faced public contestation over European 
integration. A new era has begun (Hooghe and Marks 2006). Reflections of this change in 
national political space have been two-folded. On one side, it has created political 
mobilization among citizens; while on the other side destabilized European party systems. 
The traditional dimensions of national political space have been reshaped. New cleavages 
have appeared or already-existing issues have been reshuffled between dimensions.  
 
On the party side, a certain division between mainstream parties and non-mainstream 
ones became visible in Western European countries. Extreme left and right, non-
mainstream, challenging parties took their place in the political scene. Traditional party 
families - the socialists, Christian democrats and liberals, mainly lost their structural roots 
and representative power that are coming from the traditional cleavage structure. 
Dealignment became an important concept, also questioning the representative capacity 
of political parties. Indicators of this trend, such as decreasing party membership, 
declining party identification, decreasing turnout, and increasing volatility became visible 
both in national elections and in European Parliament elections. Social movements 
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mobilized new cleavage structures for party competition. Issues related to environment, 
women rights, LGBTI rights, and so on triggered the establishment of green parties in 
some countries. 
 
On the demand side, critics towards European integration increased steadily for the last 
decades. Public opinion manifested itself in referendums, for example in France, the 
Netherlands, Denmark – and most recently - in the United Kingdom. Eurosceptic 
political parties made it to both national Parliaments, and to the European one. Ideas 
against European integration have been taking different forms for different sides of the 
ideological spectrum. Left wing voters are mostly concerned about the neo-liberal 
character of the European project and its impact on the welfare state, while right wingers 
are mostly preoccupied about the social and cultural threat (van Elsas and van der Brug 
2015). Various researches showed that citizens’ support for the European Union is 
responsive to both economic benefits from further integration and its threat to social and 
cultural entity (Gabel 1998, Carey 2002, Tillman 2004, de Vries 2007). This situation shed 
light to further research on the impact of European integration on voting behaviour, also 
known as “EU issue voting” (de Vries 2007). 
 
This work investigates politicisation of European integration for the last decade and the 
impact of it on party systems, and voting behaviour in Western Europe, with a special 
focus on Southern European countries - Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain—as well as 
Ireland. For this reason, the process of politicisation of European integration will be one 
of the most important theoretical pillars of this work. Still, in order to fully understand 
the relationship between European integration and electoral dynamics, different 
 18 
frameworks are necessary. For this reason, this chapter will go through integration 
theories as a starting point for the discussion on permissive consensus/constraining 
dissensus, continue with the literature on politicisation of European integration, and 
finally go through party system change and EU issue voting theories. The conclusion will 
connect pieces for the necessary analysis throughout this thesis. 
 
Revisiting integration theories  
The phases European Union has been going through also changed the level of its policy 
impact. After the Maastricht Treaty was signed and sealed, the elite driven process of 
European integration started to have greater impact on the daily lives of European 
citizens. Partisan entrepreneurs have taken the issue of European integration and 
converted it into a discourse that is relevant to the electorate – which started the 
discussion of Euroscepticism, both on the left and the right side of the political spectrum. 
Eurosceptics have been the main drivers of the politicisation of European integration 
within party competition (Hooghe and Marks 2009, Grande and Kriesi 2016). Before 
going further with the current situation, it is important to have a quick look at changing 
theoretical explanations of European integration. This will provide the necessary 
perspective for a better understanding of the issue through decades. It is always necessary 
to underline the challenges European integration faced throughout years to understand 
that this economic crisis is not the first one, and most probably, it will not be the last one. 
 
The regional integration theories have been going through phases as well. Functionalism 
shaped the idea of political integration for some decades after the First World War. David 
Mitrany, the principal functionalist thinker, believed in the relationship between territorial 
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scale and the need for political authority (Mitrany 1965). Neofunctionalists on the other 
hand, have been defending that the required jurisdictional reforms should be initiated and 
driven by supranational institutions (Haas 1958, Schmitter 1969, Schmitter 2005, 
Niemann and Schmitter 2009). After the “Empty Chair Crisis” of 1965-66 caused by 
Charles de Gaulle, boycotting meetings in European institutions, neofunctionalist 
predictions of integration left their place for intergovernmentalist thinking – which is 
explaining integration as a bargaining process among member states (Milward 1992, 
Moravcsik 1993, Moravcsik 1998). Theories of neofunctionalism and 
intergovernmentalism have been engaging in a long-term debate about the impetus of 
regional integration: national governments or supranational institutions. Their main focus 
has always been economic benefits as an explanatory variable for further integration. They 
became less useful for explaining the situation once European integration went beyond 
economic preferences. For this reason, new theoretical explanations have been needed. In 
this line, Hooghe and Marks claimed that the main theories of European integration, 
namely neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism, mostly focusing on functional and 
rational economic integration is less useful for the research on the European Union 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009). In their cornerstone article titled “A Postfunctionalist Theory 
of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus”, they 
“first theorized public and party preferences over European integration. Secondly, they 
theorized the conditions under which public and party preferences matter. Thirdly, they 
concluded by hypothesizing the consequences of politicisation for the substantive 
character of European integration” (Hooghe and Marks, 2009, p.3). This theoretical 
framework has also been investigated by other scholars at the time (Kriesi 2009, Schmitter 
2009) and also has been challenged afterwards, specifically in times of Euro crisis 
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(Schimmelfennig 2014). Taking it from there, the literature on politicisation of European 
integration, which is the key framework behind this work, has been established. All in all, 
once classical theories of integration started not to cover current developments in the 
Union, mostly because of the increasing policy outreach of the EU, new explanations and 
frameworks became a requirement. 
 
The end of permissive consensus and politicisation of European integration 
As it was already discussed above, once all the decisions regarding integration were given 
by elites and there was almost no dispute over public opinion, it was called permissive 
consensus. However, the 1990s are the turning point for a constraining dissensus among 
European citizens (Hooghe and Marks 2006, Hooghe and Marks 2009). As the 
phenomenon “states monopolize the representation of their citizens in international 
relations” has been challenged (Marks, Hooghe et al. 1996), national and European arenas 
became much more related. With the end of permissive consensus, a concept turned into 
a very important framework in European integration studies: Politicisation. Once European 
integration extended into the domain of national politics, it became way more salient and 
also contested.  
 
One of the earliest definitions of “something like politicisation” came from Philippe 
Schmitter (Schmitter 1969). He defined it as “a process whereby the controversiality of 
joint decision-making goes up” (Schmitter, 1969, p.166). Since the mid-2000s, 
politicisation has become a key concept in European integration (Marks and Steenbergen 
2004, Kriesi 2007, Hooghe and Marks 2009, Koopmans and Statham 2010, de Wilde 
2011, de Wilde and Zürn 2012, Hooghe and Marks 2012, de Wilde, Leupold et al. 2016). 
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These scholars underlined that the public opinion on European integration is more 
contested due to current challenges the integration process has been going through. 
According to Hooghe and Marks, politicisation is a negative consequence of authority 
transfer after the Maastricht Treaty. On the other hand, other scholars claimed that 
increase in politicisation is a result of particular events in time like ratification of a 
constitutional treaty, membership talks with Turkey or introduction of the common 
currency (Börzel and Risse 2009). There are also some authors defining politicisation as a 
necessary precondition for further integration (Delanty and Rumford 2005, Hix 2008, 
Habermas 2012). De Wilde and Zürn refer to politicisation as “making a matter a subject 
of public regulation and/or a subject of public discussion” (de Wilde and Zürn, 2012, 
p.139). Anna Leupold also revisited the concept with a structural approach in times of 
Eurozone crisis (Leupold 2016). On the other hand, it is important to underline that 
politicisation of European integration not necessarily means that the society is more 
Eurosceptic, it means that its impact on voting behaviour becomes significantly more 
important (Hooghe and Marks 2009).  
 
All in all, at this point there is an important question to ask: In terms of this dissertation, 
how do we define and conceptualise politicisation? Here one point should be emphasised: 
a topic is “politicised” if it is introduced in public debates by actors. This is also the case 
for the issue of European integration. If this is not the case, the “sleeping giant” claim will 
continue to be valid (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). In their work, van der Eijk and 
Franklin underlined that full potential of the issue of European integration is not 
exploited because political parties tried not to publicise it. If they did so, its salience would 
have increased, also including a variety of other actors into the debate. According to 
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Green-Pedersen, salience is the most basic dimension of politicisation (Green-Pedersen 
2012). However, it is not the only dimension to research for. Grande and Hutter define 
important questions about the concept itself (Grande and Hutter 2016). They focus on 
three main conceptual dimensions of politicisation: issue salience, actor expansion and actor 
polarisation (Grande and Hutter, 2016, p.8). Still, salience deserves further attention for 
deepening the theoretical framework of politicisation. 
 
Issue salience and Euroscepticism  
Salience has always been an important concept in the political science literature. A 
prerequisite for contestation in any issue, including European integration, is political 
actors’ willingness to debate (Steenbergen and Scott 2004). Derived from the salience 
theory (Budge and Farlie 1983, Klingemann, Hoffebert et al. 1994, Budge, Klingemann et 
al. 2001), it is known that parties strategically manipulate issue salience. They do so for 
various reasons: agenda setting, electoral success and also for inter-party balances. They 
strategically emphasize some issues while de-emphasize others. It is also known that 
parties compete by changing their positions on issues (Downs 1957). The main reason to 
compete over another issue (which is not left/right) is the necessity to find an alternative 
to beat the current winner (Riker 1982). In their paper, Hobolt and de Vries research on 
the subject, “how do issues enter the political arena and come to affect party 
competition?” by taking the literature on issue evolution from the US context and 
claiming that political parties mostly become entrepreneurs for a different issue rather 
than the basis of political competition in the country when they are losers on the 
dominant dimension of contestation (Hobolt and de Vries 2015). The main question to 
ask regarding this work is whether European integration could be such an issue that 
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entrepreneurs would want to exploit. De Vries answers this question with a “yes”, 
claiming that Euroscepticism is ideologically consistent with the criticism of the political – 
economic status quo and public opinion is mainly more Eurosceptic than elites’ opinion 
(de Vries 2007). For example, in case of Greece and Portugal, Freire et al. showed that 
there has been a strong growth in Euroscepticism due to the economic crisis and the 
political response of the EU to it (Freire, Teperoglou et al. 2014). Hobolt and de Vries 
researched on the impact of the crisis on the Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 European 
Parliament using the economic voting literature to explain electoral behaviour (Hobolt 
and de Vries 2016). All in all, this voter potential has been waiting for entrepreneurs to 
exploit. However, not every party’s electoral fortune will change positively with EU issue 
voting. Parties’ positions towards European integration and their strategy will play a key 
role regarding the benefit they will receive from this issue (Kopecky and Mudde 2002, de 
Vries 2010). In the end, issue manipulation converts to issue ownership (Petrocik 1996). 
Eurosceptic parties generally play the issue very well, giving it a central importance. In 
case of mainstream political parties, they are repositioning and realigning themselves with 
new conflicts as well (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2008). It is important to investigate how parties 
position themselves. Following section will go through this question. 
 
How do parties position themselves? 
Parties’ positions vary between countries since they are not only depending on the course 
of European integration, but also on specific contextualization of their own countries. 
Nevertheless, it is known that the mainstream parties mainly do not play the EU issue, 
since they are mostly pro-European integration, with a certain exception of British parties. 
Generally, mainstream parties are perceived as the “owners and sellers” of the European 
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project in Western Europe, which makes them responsible. At least, this has been the 
case until the 2000s. According to the study of Simon Hix between 1976 and 1994, three 
main party families – the Christian democrats, social democrats and liberals – converged 
on moderate pro-European integration positions (Hix 1999). Further research on general 
preferences of mainstream political parties regarding European integration supported this 
claim (Hooghe, Marks et al. 2002, van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). Marks et al. also 
demonstrated that ideological location of a party in a party family is a powerful predictor 
of its position on European integration (Marks, Wilson et al. 2002). Following this logic, 
Eurosceptic parties have the incentive to play the EU issue (Taggart 1998, van der Eijk 
and Franklin 2004). Bonnie Meguid, in her paper on electoral success of niche parties, 
highlights the importance of partisan conflict and issue salience. She claims that niche 
parties are more likely to succeed when mainstream parties compete over their favourite 
issue, increasing its salience (Meguid 2005). Maurits Meijers, on the other hand, claims 
that Eurosceptic challenger party support has the capacity to influence mainstream party 
positions on European integration (Meijers 2015). For this reason, even if it deserves 
further empirical proof, it is safe to claim that political parties have been competing over 
the issue of European integration both on the left and the right side of the political 
spectrum. 
 
Euroscepticism, both for the extreme left and right, has the roots of its partisan ideology 
coming from the left/right dimension. Radical right parties have been opposing the 
European integration with national sovereignty and identity arguments and with anti-
immigration sentiments. The radical left, in contrast, resists it with its neo-liberal character 
(Hooghe, Marks et al. 2002, Kopecky and Muddle 2002). Van Elsas et al. questioned this 
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situation in their paper asking the question: if both left wing and right wing citizens are 
“united against the common foe?” (van Elsas, Hakhverdian et al. 2016). For the last years 
with the economic crisis, the leftist parties mostly present themselves with anti-austerity 
rhetoric, while the right wingers mainly use the anti-immigrant rhetoric. On the other 
hand, the recent work of Christopher Posser demonstrates that the relationship between 
ideology and European integration has changed substantially over the history of 
European integration (Prosser 2015). 
 
As it is stated above, issue salience is very important for party competition. It is also 
crucial to keep an eye on the issue salience for voters, which can be traditionally measured 
by the survey question asking the most important issue/problem of the country.8 As it 
can be seen in Appendix in Chapter 3, the most important issues for the voter are all 
related to the economy. The answers are mostly concentrated on “unemployment” and 
“economic situation”, which are indirectly related to the economic governance of the 
European Union. Even if it is a long shot, it can be claimed that issues related to 
European integration also play an important role. 
 
The impact of European integration on party systems 
Lipset and Rokkan once claimed that party systems are frozen and also defined the 
classical cleavages in European political space (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Following this, 
centre/periphery, rural/urban, state/church and owner/worker cleavages mostly shaped 
Western democracies for a long time (Rokkan 1999). Marks and Wilson claimed that 
political parties respond to the issue of European integration through the traditional 
                                                 
8 The exact wording of the question being “What do you think are the two most important issues facing your 
country at the moment?” 
 26 
cleavages of Western democracies (Marks and Wilson 2000). Since then, there have been 
restructuring among cleavages and various changes that can be called “new politics” 
(Franklin, Mackie et al. 1992). Not only the economic dimension, but also the cultural one 
has been re-shaped. Kriesi et al. claimed that the political space remained two 
dimensional, socio-economic and cultural, and demarcation/integration dimensions are 
embedded in this basic structure (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2006). The authors claimed that 
new political establishments rising from the conflict between “integration” and 
“demarcation”, and re-positioning of the existing ones could definitely be expected. As 
old conflicts leave their places to the new ones, new political actors emerge, while older 
ones either adapt or disappear. In the meantime, voting patterns can change leading to a 
certain transformation in the party system. Teperoglou and Tsatsanis confirmed the 
transformation of the cultural axis, underlining the differences between the cases the 
paper focused on, namely Germany, United Kingdom, Greece and Germany (Teperoglou 
and Tsatsanis 2011). 
 
One of the most important indicators of party system change, in addition to long-term 
dealignment and realignment, is electoral change, which can be measured by volatility. 
The literature suggests that an increase in volatility is mostly the result of voters’ 
dealignment and the decline of party affiliation and membership (Dalton, Flanagan et al. 
1984, van Biezen, Mair et al. 2012). With the decrease of social cleavages, voters started to 
feel free to move from one party to another and they take longer time to decide on their 
vote (Dalton 2002). Franklin et al. also explained this phenomenon with decreasing 
importance of social cleavages – like religion and class for example - in voting, at the same 
time with an increasing importance of issue voting (Franklin, Mackie et al. 1992). Chapter 
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4 tries to establish the link between volatility and polarization on European integration. 
Following the logic, countries with strong cleavages are expected to have more polarised 
party systems in comparison to countries with weak cleavages. In addition, the larger the 
number of political parties; in other words, the more permissive the electoral system is, 
the possibility of issue polarisation also increases.  
 
As a general rule, in proportional systems (PR), the number of political parties tends to be 
higher than in majoritarian systems (Riera 2015). The main reason is that majoritarian 
systems discourage the establishment of new political parties by restraining the number to 
a certain limit. For this reason, political parties are more heterogeneous than they would 
be if they were in a PR system, which means that mainstream parties should adapt and 
restructure themselves much more because of the certain division inside. Electoral 
systems deserve further attention with their relation to party system change.  
 
All has been said; the European economic crisis can be taken as an extraordinary “critical 
juncture” which may catalyse the already existing dealignment process, while punishing all 
mainstream political parties. At this point, it is useful to remember the economic voting 
theory in which voters punish the incumbent depending on their overall perception of the 
economy (Duch and Stevenson 2008). Since the situation in times of crisis is beyond a 
bad management of the economy for a short period of time, the process of punishment 
may lead to a party system change.   
 
In addition to all the changes political parties have been going through, it is crucial to 
keep an eye on the demand side of the equation as well. Voters also go through a 
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transformation with the impact of globalization, and their preferences change as well 
along the way. Kriesi et al. defined the winners of globalization as “entrepreneurs and 
qualified employees in sectors open to international competition as well as all kinds of 
cosmopolitan citizens”, while the losers are defined as  “entrepreneurs and qualified 
employees in traditionally protected sectors, unqualified employees and citizens who 
strongly identify themselves with their national community” (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2006). 
For this reason, not only the party side but also the voter side is needed to complete the 
understanding of politicisation of European integration in times of crisis. Therefore, this 
chapter continues with conceptualisation of EU issue voting, which will be the main pillar 
of the theoretical framework in Chapter 5. 
 
Conceptualisation of EU issue voting  
The concept of EU issue voting has been developed for measuring the impact of 
European integration on the vote. In other words, issue-voting approach suggests that 
what drives voting primarily is voters’ opinions on European integration. Since the 
European integration became more visible in member states in the post-Maastricht era, 
concretely with the creation of the common currency Euro together with the European 
Central Bank (ECB), the EU issue voting literature started to grow in line with these 
developments. European publics have seen the destruction of their national currency and 
a wider policy impact coming from the EU, which made them question further 
integration. Citizens became more divided on the issue and widely dispersed ideas came 
into the stage (Down and Wilson 2008).  
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When casting a vote, if preferences related to European integration play a role, this 
process can be called as EU issue voting. The research shows that the degree of influence 
of voters’ positions on their vote varies cross-nationally depending both on the issue 
salience and the availability of viable offers from the supply side (Tillman 2004, de Vries 
2007, de Vries and Edwards 2009). While conceptualising EU issue voting, de Vries 
investigates four countries’ national elections (UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Germany), concluding the existence of EU issue voting in Denmark and the United 
Kingdom (de Vries 2007). In her paper, she claims that EU issue voting is conditional on 
the degree of salience of European integration among voters and the extent of partisan 
conflict over Europe. Later, she revisits the idea from the supply side this time and 
investigates the impact of EU issue voting on parties’ electoral success (de Vries 2010). 
 
Once, it was asked for which parties EU issue voting is an asset and for which others a 
liability? Analysing political parties, Taggart found that mostly the peripheral parties of the 
political spectrum tend to mobilise Euroscepticism, compared to mainstream parties of 
the centre (Taggart 1998). Different scholars also confirmed what is called “inverted U-
shape” characterisation of the left-right dimension and the European integration 
dimension (Hooghe, Marks et al. 2002, van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). De Vries and 
Edwards proved with a two-level hierarchical model that the growing debate on 
European integration politicised by Eurosceptical elites of both right wing and left wing 
extremes (de Vries and Edwards 2009). When the same question has been asked for 
geographical comparison of the East and the West, de Vries and Tillman found evidence 
of EU issue voting across all countries, while the effect of the EU issue on party 
preference being stronger in East-Central Europe (de Vries and Tillman 2011). Chapter 4 
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and 5 will revisit all these theoretical frameworks before going further with the empirical 
analysis. As it is suggested in the conclusion of this thesis, it is quite beneficial to use the 
framework of politicisation with the literature of Euroscepticism and for different party 
families separately. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The relationship between Euroscepticism and left/right ideology has been evolving 
through years. Since the Maastricht Treaty, Euroscepticism has been increasing 
(Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) and citizens became divided as supporters and opponents 
of further integration. The main reasons behind this change can be grouped in two 
categories (van Elsas and van der Brug 2015). The first one is the change of definition of 
left and right, while the second one is the changing nature of the European Union and the 
coverage of Euroscepticism. Economically protectionist way of Euroscepticism, which is 
based on the socio-economic dimension – very recently also including austerity measures, 
locates itself mostly on the left hand side of the political spectrum while the nationalist 
Euroscepticism, mostly relying on the cultural dimension, locates itself on the right. The 
left wing reaction to the neoliberal character of the EU has been combined with the right 
wing reaction to integration as a perceived threat to national interests and identity. As the 
European Union became more diverse and its reach got widened, so did the amount of 
opposition. This opposition or better-said contestation could be explained further with 
the framework of politicisation of European integration.  
 
According to “postfunctionalist theory of European integration” that was developed by 
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks in 2009, politicisation is a key concept that became 
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important in the post-Maastricht epoch. In their opinion, the steps in European 
integration became controversial and started to be contested in public opinion. This can 
easily be connected to the “sleeping giant” claim of van der Eijk and Franklin (van der 
Eijk and Franklin 2004), assuming that once triggered, the issue will move both public 
debates and political entrepreneurs.  This thesis, using politicisation of European 
integration as the main pillar of its theoretical explanation, empirically tests its impact on 
party system change and voting behaviour. Even if the Euroscepticism has been used 
various times throughout this chapter, politicisation has more explanatory power. The 
main reason behind this conclusion is, politicisation covers both Eurosceptic opinions 
and all the other not-necessarily-Eurosceptic opinions on European integration. As a final 
remark, the duration of the impacts of politicisation is open to discussion. In other words, 
the discussion of if the politicisation will have the power to “structure” political conflict 
in Western Europe (Bartolini 2005) and if so, what will be the impact of this on the future 
of European integration remains.  
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Chapter 3. 
The story of the economic and financial crisis in Europe 
 
 
The aftermath of financial crises tends to be nasty, brutish, 
and long. That is, financial crises are typically followed by 
deep recessions, and these recessions are followed by slow, 
disappointing recoveries. 
Paul Krugman & Robin Wells  
 
 
Introduction 
European integration has been going through major changes for the last decades. Almost 
all major integration steps came with economic consequences, the most historical being 
the common currency Euro. For this reason, politicisation of European integration has 
close ties with economic integration. For understanding the political implications of the 
economic crisis, the process behind it should be analysed further.9 Although European 
sovereign debt crisis has its own dynamics, it has been triggered by the subprime 
mortgage crisis in the United States; therefore, it is worth reviewing how this crisis started 
and then turned into a global crisis that also severely affected European nations. The 
spark of the subprime mortgage crisis was the large decline of home prices after the burst 
of a housing bubble in 2006-2007. This situation led to the devaluation of mortgage-
backed securities, including subprime mortgages that offered attractive interest rates when 
                                                 
9 I would like to thank Federico Steinberg, Real Instituto Elcano and Universidad Autonoma Madrid, for his detailed 
comments on this chapter. 
 34 
the housing market was booming. Major global institutions had bought these securities. 
After the housing bubble collapsed, these institutions reported significant losses, and 
soon the losses and defaults spread to other loan types in other parts of the economy as 
the crisis expanded.  
 
First signs of the crisis appeared in February 2007 when Freddie Mac announced that it 
will no longer buy mortgage-backed securities and risky subprime mortgages. It became 
more apparent in July of the same year after the declaration of the investment bank Bear 
Stearns that two of its hedge funds had imploded. On March 2008, Bear Stearns had 
liquidity problems that were beyond its capacity, so it was sold to JPMorgan Chase. The 
cornerstone of the crisis took place in September 2008. On 14 September, Merrill Lynch 
failed and agreed to be acquired by Bank of America. One day later, Lehman Brothers, 
the fourth-largest investment bank of the United States at the time, filed for bankruptcy. 
This was the biggest bankruptcy in the US history. After these key events, the credit 
markets froze and the American subprime mortgage crisis turned into a global crisis. 
Since the European markets were also dependent on those credit markets, this situation 
triggered a banking crisis, which became the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Since the 
political impact of this economic situation proved itself important, it is beneficial to go 
through the key concepts and main arguments related to the crisis. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the causes of the crisis, while 
section 3 analyses the situation with a special focus on Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
and Italy. Section 4 presents the austerity measures implemented by Southern European 
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countries, the impact of these measures on citizens, and the accompanying political 
landscape. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
What went wrong? Economic and political crises in Europe 
First of all, it is important to underline that the economic crisis in Europe is both a debt 
crisis and a banking crisis. What is a debt crisis and how does it happen? How banking 
crisis is different than a government debt crisis? Debt burden is commonly measured by 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, and debt is considered to be sustainable when this ratio is not 
always in a rising trend. It means that either the debt should be controlled or GDP must 
grow in line with the debt stock. When investors that are borrowing government bonds 
start to lose their confidence in the country’s ability to pay its debts, they may decide to 
sell these bonds to avoid future losses. When that happens, markets increase the interest 
rates to attract investors and this increases the borrowing costs (Baldwin and Gros 2010). 
This is how the debt vortex begins. If markets suspect that government will have funding 
difficulties, they may ask for even higher interest rates to compensate for the higher 
default risk. The government then has to cut its spending (mainly on public sector, health 
and education, in addition to defence expenses) and has to raise taxes to improve its 
budget deficit and to overcome the vortex. However, this attempt might slow down the 
growth of the country and decrease the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio, and thus 
increase the debt burden again. The vortex gets stronger as the risk of the country and so 
the interest rates gets higher, which then leads to further cuts and rises in taxes. However, 
this situation is not sustainable. In the end, there are two ways for the government to stop 
this vortex without a complete bankruptcy. The country might partially default by 
rescheduling its debt or a lender of last resort might hold the debt that private lenders 
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want to leave – in that case the bailout mechanism (Baldwin and Gros 2010). This is how 
the market expectations, in this case suspicions, become a self-fulfilling prophecy and lead 
the country to a default or a bailout in the best case. In the Eurozone, the situation was 
even more complex since European Central Bank (ECB) did not want to perform the role 
of lender of last resort, like Federal Reserve (FED) or Bank of England (BoE) did, until 
the last phase of the crisis, when Mario Draghi gave his famous “whatever it takes” 
speech in July 2012.10 
 
The same vortex conditions are also valid for the banking system with the exception that 
the magnitude of the debt stock is many times larger than governments’ debt stock. For 
example, as average, governments in Eurozone had a debt stock of 64.9 per cent of their 
GDP in the beginning of the crisis in 2007 (Eurostat). In order to compare this number 
with the debt stock in the banking system, the following examples can be given. The bank 
assets as percentage of GDP in 2007, just before the crisis, were between 200-300 per 
cent for Portugal, Italy, Spain; between 300-400 per cent for Germany, France, Austria, 
Netherlands; and 705 per cent for Ireland (Baldwin and Gros 2010). These figures mean 
that banks are too big to bail by only their own nations. This situation is even magnified 
with the fact that banks borrow over the short-term and make long-term loans, which 
means that they can go bankrupt if their short-term funders refuse to continue funding 
them in a crisis situation. For instance, a Eurozone government may need to find new 
loans to cover 10 per cent of its total debt per year, in average; however, a typical bank in 
the Eurozone should be able to find new loans to cover the same percentage of its total 
debt each day. This means that banks need billions of euros on a daily basis. Once market 
                                                 
10 The verbatim of the remarks made by Mario Draghi can be found in the following link: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html 
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expectations go worse and the vortex starts spinning, financial markets might collapse 
very fast (Baldwin, Beck et al. 2015). 
 
Keeping this introduction to debt crisis in mind, the causes of European economic crisis 
can be listed under three main headings: First, entry into a monetary union with a single 
common currency (without a fiscal union) which leads to big capital flows from Eurozone 
core countries to periphery countries (Blyth 2013); secondly, the massive current account 
imbalances between the Eurozone countries along with close links between banks and 
national governments and the sudden stop of cross-border lending; and thirdly, policy 
failures and lack of coordinated adjustment mechanisms to deal with this kind of crisis at 
the supranational level (Baldwin, Beck et al. 2015). In this section the main causes of the 
debt crisis will be discussed with a specific focus on how an almost entirely banking 
system (private sector) problem has been transformed into a sovereign (public sector) 
crisis.  
 
Entry into a monetary union 
Before there was a monetary union in Europe, nations had different currencies and thus 
different exchange rates. This was difficult for people and firms that had to change 
currencies; and it was also difficult for states that had to deal with the currency volatility. 
There were two ways to handle this. First, defending it with foreign exchange reserves so 
that when the currency loses value, the state could sell its foreign currency reserves to 
maintain the desired rate. However, the amount of foreign currency that a national bank 
could hold was limited. The second way was through internal devaluation, which means 
deflating the prices and wages to improve their own competitiveness in the market against 
 38 
their stronger trade partners. The problem with this approach was that it leads to high 
inflation and impoverish the country. One of the targets of the monetary union was to 
solve these problems. In addition, it aimed to converge less integrated economies by using 
a single common currency and making them become more similar and more efficient. For 
this reason, a new independent supranational central bank has been created with the sole 
authority to print money. The Article 127(1) of the Treaty defined the primary objective 
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as: 
 
" The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) shall be 
to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the 
ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union […]".11 
 
What happened after Euro became the single currency is that all countries’ interest rates 
converged to Germany’s interest rates by 2001. For example, ten-year bond yields in 
Greece was 25 per cent in 1993 and by 2001 it became 5.5 per cent, half per cent more 
than German bond yields (Phillips 2015). The same thing happened for Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Ireland as well. The introduction of ECB and its anti-inflationary approach 
gave markets a good reason to believe that exchange rate risk and inflation risk would no 
longer be a problem. Hence, European banks swapped their low yield German or Dutch 
bonds with Southern periphery bonds, which had a small but significant difference in 
yield compared to Northern European sovereigns’ bonds. This meant that credit 
conditions turned to be dramatically easier for Southern periphery countries. Therefore, 
                                                 
11 The full text of the Treaty can be found online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN 
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Northern European banks became full of periphery sovereign debt that was indeed a 
good deal since the yields were higher and, ECB, national governments, or both would 
cover the risk. 
 
Another reason of how European Monetary Union (EMU) accelerated the flow of cheap 
credit to Southern periphery countries was related to the growth strategies that European 
nations pursued. Northern countries that adopted the export-led growth strategy 
depended on the world demand for their economic growth (Hall 2012). This strategy’s 
success lays on national firms’ capacity to remain competitive in international markets. In 
order to be able to pursue this growth strategy, countries should be able to hold their 
labour costs down, produce high value-added goods, and progressively increase their 
productivity and quality over time. The classic example country that followed this strategy 
is Germany, along with Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Finland (Collignon and 
Esposito 2014). For these countries, entry into a monetary union has facilitated export to 
other countries by removing the exchange rate volatility risk and decreasing transaction 
costs. The alternative strategy could be growth led by domestic demand. Since in this 
strategy growth primarily depends on national demand, it requires macroeconomic 
expansion that in turn leads to higher inflation levels. In order for this strategy to be 
successful, currency exchange rate should be periodically devaluated for counteracting the 
effects of inflation and staying competitive in the export markets, while also increasing 
the price of imported goods to balance the budget. Southern European countries pursued 
this growth strategy since the majority of their firms rely on low-cost labour and lack high 
value-added production and progressive improvement capacities (Hall 2012). Since these 
countries have no longer the option to devalue their currency, the entry into monetary 
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union made them disadvantaged against Northern European economies in terms of 
competition in the market. Southern European countries, including Greece, Spain, 
Portugal, and Italy, continued to apply expansionary policies without being able to 
devalue their currencies. This resulted in higher inflation rates for Southern countries than 
for their Northern counterparts. Also, the real cost of borrowing got lower for them over 
time. Meanwhile, Northern countries, which were following export-led growth strategy, 
were generating budget surpluses; it was therefore convenient for Northern banks to lend 
this surplus to Southern countries. This situation also contributed to the cheap credit flow 
from north to south. 
 
Sudden stop of cross-border lending 
While creating the Eurozone, the assumption was that markets were capable of allocating 
capital efficiently and that capital flows would serve to provide growth through 
investments enhancing productivity. This assumption has been proved to be wrong. The 
large capital inflows from north to south increased growth by generating investment on 
non-traded sectors like construction as in the case of Spain (Matthijs and Blyth 2015). 
This meant that capital flows were used to generate money for banks instead of increasing 
productivity or efficiency. In addition, capital inflows raised wages and costs resulting in 
competitiveness loss in the trade market and export earnings. All of these circumstances, 
in turn, led to the creation of bubble-like conditions that will be analysed case-by-case for 
Southern periphery countries and Ireland in the next section. 
 
To summarize, when the Eurozone crisis started, there were massive current account 
imbalances due to large capital flows from Northern European countries to Southern 
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periphery countries. This situation created interconnectedness between all countries in the 
Eurozone and fragility in the banking sector. Moreover, the capital inflows were used in 
non-traded sectors in Southern countries, which further deteriorated the current accounts 
balance. When first the United States subprime mortgage crisis and then the Eurozone 
crisis hit, investors became reluctant to make investments, especially to banks or 
governments in other countries. This led to a sudden stop in cross-border capital flows, 
which meant higher risk premiums and lower growth rates for countries depending on 
foreign lending. This sudden stop of capital flow also raised concerns on how the 
countries running current account deficits would be able to finance themselves. The 
doubts over Eurozone nations relying on foreign capital and rising risk premiums along 
with falling growth rates started a debt vortex, this time in Europe. Funding became 
increasingly difficult for countries that are having current account deficits, and classic 
responses to crisis like devaluation or borrowing from a lender of last resort were not 
possible in this case due to the rules and policies of the monetary union. When the debt 
vortex got deeper, governments had to step up and some of them took over banks’ debt 
burden. Considering how high the assets of banks as a percentage of GDP, taking over 
banks’ debt made the national debt ratios even more unsustainable. This is how the 
banking system crisis became sovereigns’ problem and a private debt crisis has been 
transformed into a public debt crisis. The interconnectedness between countries through 
lending and borrowing relationships also deserves to be underlined since it made possible 
that one failure in a country could trigger other failures and threaten the whole banking 
system in Europe. 
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Policy failures and lack of coordinated adjustment mechanisms 
To begin with, due to the reasons discussed, there was below-average inflation rate in the 
Eurozone core countries and above-average inflation rate in the Southern periphery 
countries. Since ECB had to have a single common monetary policy, it was impossible to 
reduce the inflation in the periphery without affecting growth in the core countries. This 
is understandable; however, there were no supranational mechanisms or policies to 
monitor and control the amount of capital flow between Eurozone countries. Intra-
Eurozone money transfer was cross-border; yet, bailout, supervision and bank resolution 
responsibilities were in the hands of nations (Kouretas and Vlamis 2010). This made 
excessive amounts of current account imbalances and usage of massive bank leverage 
possible; and increased the risk of a crisis a great deal. Additionally, although ECB was the 
central bank of all member states, its responsibility was mostly centred on controlling 
inflation. It did not have the authority to purchase sovereign debt in the primary markets 
or monetize deficits. Therefore, periphery countries could not rely on ECB to stabilize 
their debt markets in case they did not have enough liquidity (Pickford, Steinberg et al. 
2014).  
 
Secondly, there were no coordinated adjustment mechanisms to overcome a crisis in 
EMU. EMU could not respond to the unexpected events in the crisis in a credible, fast 
and efficient way. The decisions taken were often perceived as doing “too little and too 
late” by the markets (Pickford, Steinberg et al. 2014). For example, when it became 
certain that Greece would not be able to cover its banks’ debts alone, European Union 
failed to move fast and take a corrective action, because there were some ambiguities in 
the policy regarding whether bailouts were legal or not, or whether ECB was allowed to 
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buy Greek government bonds to provide liquidity to Greece. Furthermore, it was difficult 
to take collective action because since all Eurozone countries had their own economic 
policies, there were political conflicts of interest in the actions to be taken. In addition, in 
the Council of the European Union most decisions need to be taken by unanimity. Given 
this fact, the decisions made by conflicting parties became short-sighted, only managed to 
resolve short-term troubles without addressing long-term structural problems on time and 
could not prevent the crisis from becoming a contagion. 
 
A case-by-case review  
Although the crisis hit the Southern periphery countries that were having an important 
amount of current account deficit, the causes of how they got there, how the capital 
inflows were used, and the consequences they suffered were all distinct. That is why; it is 
worth to have a special focus on the economically troubled countries case-by-case.  
 
Greece 
After seven years of dictatorship, the Third Republic has been established in Greece in 
1974 as a stable two-party system. The left wing party Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) and the right wing New Democracy (ND) took their place in the political scene 
of the country, structuring the competition and governing for years in alternation. There 
have been some short-term coalitions; however, it was mainly one party or the other with 
their charismatic leaders, like Papandreou, Simitis, Mitsotakis and Karamanlis, for 
decades. Until the early 2000s, these two mainstream parties got more than 80 per cent of 
the votes. In 1980s and 1990s, the socialist government dominated Greek politics and 
implemented expansionary policies that intended to increase the average household 
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income and the public consumption. As with other periphery countries, Greece’s high 
borrowing costs fell after the entry to the European Union, and this helped Greece to 
borrow money more easily and enjoy high growth rates. The spending for the 
expansionary policies was made possible in this way until the emergence of the crisis. 
Surely, consistently rising debts and budget deficits along with the declining 
competitiveness was an important factor leading to the crisis. However, Greece had its 
own structural problems as well. The country had a weak tax collection capacity that 
made tax evasion possible and there was a weak political will to enforce political reforms 
to enhance the fiscal stance and avoid corruption. Moreover, throughout years, parties 
embraced a clientelistic approach. The state budget has been used to recruit new workers 
in order to attract votes for the forthcoming elections. With the economic crisis, this 
mechanism collapsed since the control of the state budget passed to the Troika - 
European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund. With 
measures enforced by the EU and IMF, the country faced public spending cuts while 
taxes were increasing. This situation damaged the patronage relations political parties had 
since the very beginning of the Third Republic.  
 
Furthermore, Greek government’s credibility was heavily undermined after the newly 
elected government announced that the real budget deficit for 2009 was actually estimated 
to be 12.7 per cent of GDP, instead of previously reported 6.7 per cent, (Nelson, Belkin 
et al. 2010). This situation has contributed to repeated downgrade of Greek bonds’ ratings 
from A to BBB- by rating agencies (Smith and Seager 2009), which aggravated the debt 
burden and pushed the country further in the debt vortex. Table 3.1 shows the economic 
indicators in Greece. In 2009 when the crisis hit and its impacts started to be seen, all the 
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economic indicators, especially government debt-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth rate, 
have significantly deteriorated and almost all indicators were still much worse than the 
pre-crisis period in 2015. 
 
Table 3.1: Economic indicators in Greece in times of crisis     
Greece Unemployment 
Youth 
Unemployment 
Government 
debt-to-GDP 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Government 
 deficit-surplus 
Gini 
Coefficient 
2004 10.6 26.5  102.9  5.1  -8.8  33.0  
2005 10 25.8  107.4  0.6  -6.2  33.2  
2006 9 25.0  103.6  5.7  -5.9  34.3  
2007 8.4 22.7  103.1  3.3  -6.7  34.3  
2008 7.8 21.9  109.4  -0.3  -10.2  33.4  
2009 9.6 25.7  126.7  -4.3  -15.2  33.1  
2010 12.7 33.0  146.2  -5.5  -11.2  32.9  
2011 17.9 44.7  172.1  -9.1  -10.2  33.5  
2012 24.5 55.3  159.6  -7.3  -8.8  34.3  
2013 27.5 58.3  177.7  -3.2  -13.0  34.4  
2014 26.5 52.4  180.1  0.7  -3.6  34.5  
2015 24.9 49.8  176.9  -0.2 -7.2  34.2  
Source: Eurostat 
   
In four years period, between May 2010 and May 2014, this debt vortex resulted in two 
bailout packages and nine austerity packages. In these turbulent years a new party, 
SYRIZA, gained power and brought an end to the two-party dominance in Greece in 
January 2015 elections. Neither the bailout and austerity packages nor the new party 
SYRIZA were solutions to economic issues and structural problems in the country. The 
possibility of being forced to exit, or to do so voluntarily, the Eurozone (the so-called 
Grexit) which has been discussed since 2012, increased considerably in 2015. Another 
bailout and numerous austerity measures occurred thereafter. The problems are not fully 
resolved yet. There are on-going talks related to the current situation and further rescue 
packages are on the table. 
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Ireland 
In the period before the crisis, Ireland’s debts and budget deficits were sustainable. They 
could even be considered as in good condition with a debt-to-GDP ratio of only 23.9 per 
cent in 2007 (Eurostat). The main reason of this was its exports to other countries and its 
highly qualified English-speaking workforce that were attracting multinational 
corporations along with low corporate tax rates (Blyth 2013). As a result, wages, 
consumption, and in parallel tax revenues have all increased during 1990s and attracted 
many investors looking for a property in Ireland. 
 
In Ireland’s case, the cheap credit flow with low interest rates created a bubble by 
increasing prices in the property market. Between 2002 and 2006, property prices in 
Ireland rose over 64 per cent (O'Sullivan, Vincent et al. 2011). To be able to continue 
funding the increasing debt, Irish banks kept borrowing money from the wholesale 
funding markets in United States. These were overnight loans, and Irish banks were using 
these loans to fund mortgages over tens of years. When the subprime mortgage crisis in 
the US hit the global markets after the Lehman Brothers’ collapse, short-term funding for 
international markets froze and Irish banks could not continue refinancing themselves. 
This led to the devaluation of Irish property prices and the collapse of the entire banking 
system that were depending on it. In 2008, the Irish government bailed these banks 
worrying that the whole financial system would halt. This action pushed Ireland closer to 
the debt vortex and led to increasingly higher borrowing costs and a bailout agreement in 
2010. It also made the Irish banks’ private debt problem become Irish public’s problem. 
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In line with the developments in Ireland in 2008, Table 2 shows that economic indicators 
in Ireland started to get worse in 2008. After five difficult years involving harsh austerity 
measures and a bailout agreement, economic indicators started to get better after 2013. 
Yet, it seems Ireland needs more time to reach its pre-crisis figures. 
 
Table 3.2: Economic indicators in Ireland in times of crisis     
Ireland Unemployment 
Youth 
Unemployment 
Government 
debt-to-GDP 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Government 
 deficit-surplus 
Gini 
Coefficient 
2004 4.5  8.7  28.2  6.7  1.3  31.5  
2005 4.4  8.7  26.1  5.8  1.6  31.9  
2006 4.5  8.7  23.6  5.9  2.8  31.9  
2007 4.7  9.1  23.9  3.8  0.3  31.3  
2008 6.4  13.3  42.4  -4.4  -7.0  29.9  
2009 12.0  24.0  61.8  -4.6  -13.8  28.8  
2010 13.9  27.6  86.8  2.0  -32.3  30.7  
2011 14.7  29.1  109.1  0.0  -12.6  29.8  
2012 14.7  30.4  120.1  -1.1  -8.0  29.9  
2013 13.1  26.8  120.0  1.1  -5.7  30.0  
2014 11.3  23.9  107.5  8.5  -3.8  30.8  
2015 9.4 20.9  93.8  26.3 -2.3  NA 
Source: Eurostat 
  Note: NA means data is not available 
     
Spain 
The case of Spain resembles to Irish case. Before the crisis, Spain also had a small debt-
to-GDP ratio with a government surplus for three years between 2005 and 2007. 
Similarly, the growth was dependent on the real estate. When the crisis froze the 
interbank capital flow, the bubble in the real estate market burst and threatened the 
stability of the entire banking system, considering both Spain and Ireland had huge 
current account deficits. Apart from these similarities, there are of course other 
conditions that are specific to Spain. Firstly, the magnitude of the bubble in real estate 
sector is not comparable with Ireland’s case since Spanish GDP was nearly six times 
 48 
larger than the Irish GDP.12 The property market is a very important element of Spanish 
economy. Construction sector generated 14 per cent of employment and 16 per cent of 
GDP in Spain. With the related sectors included, these numbers become almost 25 per 
cent of employment and GDP (Blyth 2013). When the crisis made borrowing more 
difficult, property prices started to fall and the construction activity slowed down. As seen 
in Table 3, in just three years, unemployment rose from 8.2 per cent to 19.9 per cent and 
public debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 35.5 per cent to 60.1 per cent between 2007 and 
2010. By 2013, 1.7 million construction workers out of 2.7 million have lost their jobs 
(Buck 2013). 
 
Table 3.3: Economic indicators in Spain in times of crisis     
Spain Unemployment 
Youth 
Unemployment 
Government 
debt-to-GDP 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Government 
 deficit-surplus 
Gini 
Coefficient 
2004 11.0  22.0  45.3  3.2  0.0  31.0  
2005 9.2  19.6  42.3  3.7  1.2  32.2  
2006 8.5  17.9  38.9  4.2  2.2  31.9  
2007 8.2  18.1  35.5  3.8  2.0  31.9  
2008 11.3  24.5  39.4  1.1  -4.4  32.4  
2009 17.9  37.7  52.7  -3.6  -11.0  32.9  
2010 19.9  41.5  60.1  0.0  -9.4  33.5  
2011 21.4  46.2  69.5  -1.0  -9.6  34.0  
2012 24.8  52.9  85.4  -2.6  -10.4  34.2  
2013 26.1  55.5  93.7  -1.7  -6.9  33.7  
2014 24.5  53.2  99.3  1.4  -5.9  34.7  
2015 22.1  48.3  99.2  3.2  -5.1  34.6  
Source: Eurostat 
   
The other condition specific to Spain was that, unlike Irish case, the biggest banks in 
Spain were internationalized and thus protected against domestic instability. However, in 
Spain there was another financial institution, the regional savings banks (cajas de ahorros), 
                                                 
12 According to Eurostat data, in 2008 before the property bubble burst, the GDP of Spain was 1,116,207 and 
Ireland’s GDP was 187,547, the unit of measure being million euro.  
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which constituted almost half of the domestic banking loans. The loans of these regional 
savings banks were non-transparent, like subprime loans in the US. After the real estate 
bubble exploded and property prices started to fall down, the resulting non-performing 
loans were particularly high in the assets of these banks. In the end Bankia, the union of 
seven regional savings banks and the third largest lender of Spain, went bust in 2012 and 
the Spanish government had to nationalize it in May 2012. This was another example of 
banking sector debt becoming government’s (public) problem. 
 
Portugal 
Unlike Greece, Ireland and Spain, that were having high growth rates prior to the crisis, 
Portugal has had a low growth and low productivity economy, already implementing 
austerity measures to counter these problems. Table 3.4 also shows that Portugal had 
higher government debt-to-GDP ratio and higher deficits compared to Ireland and Spain, 
which were having sustainable debts and deficits.  
 
Table 3.4: Economic indicators in Portugal in times of crisis     
Portugal Unemployment 
Youth 
Unemployment 
Government 
debt-to-GDP 
GDP 
Growth 
Rate 
Government 
 deficit-surplus 
Gini 
Coefficient 
2004 7.8  19.7  62.0  1.8  -6.2  37.8  
2005 8.8  20.8  67.4  0.8  -6.2  38.1  
2006 8.9  21.2  69.2  1.6  -4.3  37.7  
2007 9.1  21.4  68.4  2.5  -3.0  36.8  
2008 8.8  21.6  71.7  0.2  -3.8  35.8  
2009 10.7  25.3  83.6  -3.0  -9.8  35.4  
2010 12.0  28.2  96.2  1.9  -11.2  33.7  
2011 12.9  30.2  111.4  -1.8  -7.4  34.2  
2012 15.8  38.0  126.2  -4.0  -5.7  34.5  
2013 16.4  38.1  129.0  -1.1  -4.8  34.2  
2014 14.1  34.7  130.2  0.9  -7.2  34.5  
2015 12.6  32.0  129.0  1.5  -4.4  34.0  
Source: Eurostat 
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There are two main reasons why the increase in capital flows in the period before the 
crisis caused recession in Portugal. First, the credit inflows created a rapid domestic 
growth in the internal market; however, since the credit markets were underdeveloped in 
Portugal, the foreign capital was used in unproductive firms in the services (non-tradable) 
sector instead of investing it to the manufacturing (tradable) sector (Reis 2013). This 
contributed to the low productivity growth of the country. On the other hand, increasing 
investments in the services sector due to the capital inflows raised wages, meaning that 
unit labour costs also increased. 
 
The second reason is that the human capital investments and available skills in the labour 
market were very limited due to under-investment (Portugal 2015). The main export 
industry in the tradable sector in Portugal was manufacturing. However, in the second 
half of the 1990s low cost economies like China and India entered into the world market 
competing in the same labour intensive areas of specialisation as Portugal. In addition, 
enlargement of the EU led to the integration of Eastern European countries into the 
economic system, a change that harmed Portugal’s competitiveness in the same way. Due 
to these reasons, Portugal was already doing structural reforms in 2000s regarding labour 
regulations and implementing austerity programs intended to freezing wages and 
increasing taxes. The crisis hit Portugal under these conditions and at the end led to the 
Portuguese bailout in May 2011. 
 
Italy 
Like Portugal, prior to crisis Italy was also a low productivity, low growth country. 
However, Italy was a giant version of Portugal in terms of the size of its economy and its 
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government debt. It had the third largest bond market after US and Japan (Lauricella, 
Phillips et al. 2011). As seen in Table 3.5, Italy had a massive debt with a debt-to-GDP 
ratio of 102.4 per cent in 2008, being equal to over €1.6 trillion (Eurostat). Additionally, 
similar to Portugal, it had low GDP growth rate and chronic government deficit problem. 
 
Table 3.5: Economic indicators in Italy in times of crisis     
Italy Unemployment 
Youth 
Unemployment 
Government 
debt-to-GDP 
GDP 
Growth Rate 
Government 
 deficit-surplus 
Gini 
Coefficient 
2004 8.0  23.5  100.1  1.6  -3.6  32.9 
2005 7.7  24.1  101.9  0.9  -4.2  32.7  
2006 6.8  21.8  102.6  2.0  -3.6  32.1  
2007 6.1  20.4  99.8  1.5  -1.5  32.0  
2008 6.7  21.2  102.4  -1.1  -2.7  31.2  
2009 7.7  25.3  112.5  -5.5  -5.3  31.8  
2010 8.4  27.9  115.4  1.7  -4.2  31.7  
2011 8.4  29.2  116.5  0.6  -3.5  32.5  
2012 10.7  35.3  123.3  -2.8  -2.9  32.4  
2013 12.1  40.0  129.0  -1.7  -2.9  32.8  
2014 12.7  42.7  132.5  -0.3  -3.0  32.4  
2015 11.9  40.3  132.7  0.8  -2.6  Not Available 
Source: Eurostat 
   
One of the reasons why Italy is a low growth country with a huge debt ratio is that it is 
economically divided into two regions. The Northern part is very industrialized and 
produces high income, competitive commodities in the export market; whereas, in South 
of Italy there is low productivity, small/family firms, and mostly agricultural producers. 
According to the Italian statistics agency ISTAT report, published in September 2015, the 
difference in the level of GDP per capita between South and Centre-north of Italy was so 
sharp that it reaches to 43.7 per cent being lower in the South.13 Therefore, Italian 
governments have to transfer resources from north to south to make up the deficits. 
 
                                                 
13 For more information, please visit ISTAT’s report retrieved at http://www.istat.it/en/archive/174771 
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Another reason of Italy’s high debt is the tradition of tax evasion and underground 
economy in the country. In order to understand the dimensions of tax evasions in Italy, it 
is sufficient to look at the reports of ISTAT, claiming that one out of four Italian citizens, 
meaning approximately 15 million citizens, did not report any taxable income in 2011. 
Even the former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was accused of tax dodging and 
famously said “evasion of high taxes is a God-given right” (Bhatti, Apostolou et al. 2012).  
In parallel to this, the same trend can be observed more clearly in Italy’s underground 
economy statistics. According to ISTAT, the underground economy in Italy was valued 
between 16.3 and 17.5 per cent of GDP, totalling to €275 billion in 2008. This value was 
11.9 per cent, amounting to €190 billion in 2013. The total non-observed economy 
(underground and illegal economy) in the same year was 12.9 per cent of GDP, which 
amounted to €206 billion (ISTAT 2015). 
 
Demography is an additional problem on top of all these issues Italy has an aging 
population. In 2010, 20.4 per cent of the country’s population was over 65 years old as 
compared to 17.5 per cent of EU28 countries. The projected old-age ratio (between the 
projected number of persons aged over 65 and the projected number of persons aged 
between 15 and 64) was 31.2 in the same year and is projected to be 49.9 by 2040 
(Eurostat). This problem raised questions on how Italy will pay the interests of its long-
term bonds when the economically active proportion of the population gets smaller and 
the ratio of the economically dependent population gets increasingly bigger. 
 
As a summary, before the crisis, Italy’s massive debt load was perceived as sustainable 
since Italian governments were traditionally able to reimburse the interest payments. 
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However, with the contagion risk of the crisis from other periphery countries, markets 
reassessed Italy’s internal problems. Markets’ perception of the risk changed due to the 
fear of Italy’s lack of potential growth in near and long term to cover its debts. In 2011, 
Italian 10-year bond yields reached above 7 per cent. That was the same borrowing cost 
that triggered bailouts in Greece, Portugal and Ireland (Henningsen 2012). In Italy’s case, 
it produced a turbulent political environment that resulted in a government change 
encouraged by the European Union to make the necessary policy reforms.  The 
technocratic leader, Mario Monti, was assumed to be a “guarantee in a political system 
characterised by high polarisation and hyper-partisanship” (Verney and Bosco 2013).  
 
Austerity measures and their political consequences 
Mark Blyth (2013) in his book Austerity: the history of a dangerous idea claims that the history 
of austerity thinking dates back to 17th century, to the theories and ideas of John Locke, 
David Hume, and Adam Smith. As states became larger budgetary entities, austerity 
emerged after as a doctrine of neoliberalism in the 20th century. Was austerity really 
needed in the Eurozone crisis? As explained before, the entry into a monetary union 
created conditions that generated large capital flows from Northern to Southern 
European countries and enabled the development of a system of interconnected banks 
that became too large in relation to the GDP of their own countries. These banks became 
so big and so interconnected that sovereigns could not cover the risks generated by their 
own banks. Additionally, sovereign nations, which are members of a monetary union, do 
not have their own printing mechanisms to generate money in order to deal with a 
possible liquidity crisis and they also cannot devalue their currency. In such a system, 
there cannot be any bailouts big enough to save the system and the failure of one of the 
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rings in the chain might trigger other failures and create a systemic failure risk in the 
banking system. The main reasoning behind austerity is that the system cannot be allowed 
to fail; that is why, sovereign budgets should be kept under control and austerity measures 
should be implemented (Blyth 2013). Another economic rational of austerity is 
recuperating confidence in international financial markets so that investors don’t become 
reluctant to make investments and there would be no liquidity problem in the financial 
markets. The discussion whether austerity measures succeed in ameliorating the economic 
situation in the nation or just work for recuperating confidence in markets is beyond the 
scope of this chapter.  
 
All in all, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal got bailed out with economic adjustment 
programmes that imposed them severe austerity policies. Not only these countries, but 
also Spain and Italy, implemented austerity measures to reduce government budget 
deficits. Typical measures included reduction in public sector wages and employment, 
increase in all kinds of taxation, cuts in public sector’s expenses, extension in working 
hours, facilitation of employee dismissals, cuts in pensions, and increase in the retirement 
age.  
 
Citizens’ attitudes towards political institutions 
Citizens’ political trust on representative institutions, including their national government, 
political parties, and national parliament, has decreased significantly during the crisis in 
Southern periphery countries. According to Eurobarometer data in 2013, the ratio of 
citizens who tend not to trust in political parties in their own countries was 84 per cent in 
Ireland, 87 per cent in Italy, 88 per cent in Portugal, 94 per cent in Spain, and 95 per cent 
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in Greece as shown in Table 3.6. All the other tables related to trust can be found in the 
Appendix. 
 
Table 3.6: Citizens' trust in their political parties (in percentages)   
  
EB76     
2011 
EB77-78 
2012 
EB79-80 
2013 
EB81.2-81-82 
2014 
EB83-84 
2015 
Ireland 
     
Tend to trust 13 15 12 14 16 
Tend not to trust 80 80 84 79 78 
Greece 
     
Tend to trust 5 6 4 8 8 
Tend not to trust 94 93 95 92 91 
Spain 
     
Tend to trust 12 8 6 7 7 
Tend not to trust 84 89 94 91 89 
Italy 
     
Tend to trust 9 6 7 7 9 
Tend not to trust 84 88 87 88 83 
Portugal 
     
Tend to trust 14 15 11 10 12 
Tend not to trust 79 81 88 88 86 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys, European Commission Public Opinion Unit        
 
One reason of the political distrust in representative institutions is citizens’ negative 
evaluations of the current economic conditions as they undergo economic recession 
(Torcal 2014). Countries that needed bailout packages, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, 
were the ones that suffered the most from the cuts austerity measures brought in. In 
2011, the average household income was reduced by 14 per cent in Greece and nearly 7 
per cent both in Ireland and Portugal. Spain and Italy followed by reductions of around 5 
per cent and 3 per cent, respectively (Zamora-Kapoor and Coller 2014).  
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Table 3.7: Citizens' agreement with the following statement: "My voice counts in the EU" (in 
percentages) 
  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Greece 
            
Total 'Agree' 36 31 33 26 30 27 22 14 14 12 24 18 
Spain 
            
Total 'Agree' 43 33 31 34 40 44 36 28 23 18 27 32 
Ireland 
            
Total 'Agree' 36 33 37 28 32 39 35 25 31 29 38 47 
Italy 
            
Total 'Agree' 33 30 27 21 17 25 28 18 22 17 21 25 
Portugal 
            
Total 'Agree' 31 31 32 26 26 37 32 24 18 17 31 39 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys, European Commission Public Opinion Unit  
Note: Averages have been taken for existing data points for each year. 
 
 
The other reason for institutional distrust, which is a more important and robust 
indicator, is citizens’ perceived lack of political responsiveness by political representatives. 
Trust in national political institutions has decreased since citizens’ perception was that 
these institutions appeared to be responding more to the demands of the European 
Union directives and regulations, and other international institutions like IMF, instead of 
addressing their needs and demands as citizens. According to Eurobarometer surveys in 
which citizens are asked whether they agree or disagree with the statement that “my voice 
counts in the EU”, the percentage of citizens who agreed was only 14 per cent of the 
respondents in Greece, 28 per cent in Spain, 25 per cent in Ireland, 18 per cent in Italy, 
and 24 per cent in Portugal in 2011. Table 3.7 illustrates the sharp decrease in the 
percentage of citizens who agree with the mentioned statement.  
 
Another factor that amplified this perception is the prevalence of corruption in the 
political system of Southern European nations. According to the 2013 Transparency 
International Global Corruption Barometer, in Greece 90 per cent of respondents felt 
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that political parties were corrupt/extremely corrupt and 83 per cent of respondents felt 
that Parliament was corrupt/extremely corrupt. The same question was responded as 89 
and 77 per cent respectively in Italy, 83 and 67 per cent respectively in Spain, and 73 and 
66 per cent respectively in Portugal. The percentage of respondents who said that the 
level of corruption has increased in their country over the past two years is 55 per cent in 
Greece, 64 per cent in Italy, 67 per cent in Spain and 78 per cent in Portugal 
(International 2013).  
 
Street protests 
The loss of confidence in political institutions, corruption, growing economic and 
political uncertainty, along with the increasingly harming austerity measures have 
increased disaffection towards political parties, and fuelled protest mobilizations in the 
public. Ireland was one of the countries that entered into recession in the Eurozone. The 
Irish government officially declared that the country was in recession in September 2008. 
The protests began in October of the same year. In February 2009, 100,000 people who 
were opposing the pension cuts affecting 350,000 public workers have joined the mass 
protests in Dublin (News 2009). The protests accelerated in 2011 after the government 
had to sign a bailout deal with the Troika on the condition of implementing austerity 
measures. The protests continued in the next years although the government that signed 
the deal collapsed in the 2011 general election. 
 
In Greece, as a reaction to cuts in public spending and tax raises as austerity measures, a 
nationwide strike was called for May 5, 2010. All the measures of transport, flights, ferries, 
and trains in and out of the country, were stopped. Schools, hospitals, and many private 
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businesses were shut. There were also protest marches in Athens and Thessaloniki 
supported by labour unions, the communist party, other left-wing parties, and angry 
citizens who are opposing to the austerity measures. It is estimated that 100,000 people 
marched through Athens in protests in May 2010 (Smith 2010). The protests and strikes 
continued through 2011 and 2012 with more participation, and spread to other major 
Greek cities as a response to deteriorating economic conditions and austerity measures. 
As in the case of Greek protests, the movement continued in 2012 and 2013; reaching to 
a participation of 1 million people across 40 cities and towns in March 2, 2013 protests 
(Carvalho, Almeida Alves et al. 2013).  
 
The anti-austerity movement in Portugal has been characterised by Movimento 12 de 
Março (12 March Movement) that took place in more than ten cities in Portugal in 2010, 
mainly against the freezing of public sector wages. The protests that started in March 12, 
2011 have been the largest public mobilization since the revolution of April 25, 1974 
against the dictatorial regime, and have been organised without the support of political 
parties and labour unions. Around 300,000 people attended the demonstrations only in 
Lisbon (Relea 2011). 
 
In Spain, the anti-austerity movement is referred as Movimiento 15-M (15-M Movement) 
since it started on May 15, 2011. The political movement was sparked by ¡Democracia Real 
Ya! (Real Democracy Now!), a citizens’ organization, calling thousands of people to 
protest against the economic conditions including high unemployment, in addition to 
current political system and corruption among politicians. The aim was to give a voice to 
ordinary people who are angry about the political, economic and social outlook, and to 
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make the political process more responsive to their needs. The movement gained 
widespread support with the participation of civilian platforms and about 200 small 
associations. Demonstrations happened in more than 50 cities throughout Spain (Alcaide 
2011). Protesters occupied the main square of Madrid, Puerta del Sol, and formed camps. 
The 15-M Movement continued throughout the year; however, as the large scale 
demonstrations were not sustainable at a longer period of time, the movement continued 
to manifest itself in the form of “Asambleas de Barrios” holding weekly meetings in public 
spaces to deal with local problems and act on them.  
 
The case of Italy was also similar to the other ones. After Monti government enforced 
severe austerity measures, mass protests started modelling other demonstrations 
happening in different parts of Europe. In October 15, 2011, along with many other 
countries, tens of thousands of people gathered in Rome in Occupy Rome 
demonstrations and protested against the austerity measures and the political influence of 
the Troika. Demonstrations carried on in the following years. Some examples are “No 
Monti Day” in October 2012, with reference to the unpopular measures implemented by 
Mario Monti, and Italian students’ protests against austerity cuts in education funding in 
November 2012. 
 
All the protest movements in each country mentioned, share some characteristic 
properties. In all cases, the target of the mobilizations was the government and politicians 
since they were the ones to blame for accepting the austerity measures imposed by the 
Troika. All the mobilization movements used social media to communicate and organise 
demonstrations. The protesters were ordinary people of all educational backgrounds and 
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ages, and they were generally not considering themselves belonging to a traditional party. 
And finally, citizens became more active in this political process and new actors that 
express their opinions and demands in their collective actions have emerged in the 
political sphere. Chapter V will deepen the understanding of politicisation of European 
integration in times of crisis on the vote further. 
 
The impact on party systems 
The street protests challenged the incumbent governments and at the same time gave way 
to new and different political representations calling for a radical change in the economic 
and political system. 2011 became a turning point for Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Italy, and 
Spain as they have all changed their governments before their period of legislation ended. 
Irish and Portuguese governments resigned. Spanish government called for snap 
elections. In Greece and Italy, Georgios Papandreu and Silvio Berlusconi were led to 
resign and got replaced by caretaker Prime Ministers, Loucas Papademos and Mario 
Monti, respectively. According to Hanspeter Kriesi (2012), depending on the party 
system, dissatisfied voters might have three different options. Firstly, they may choose to 
vote for existing opposition parties that blame the government for the current economic 
situation. In Ireland, the election was in February 2011, three months after the bailout. 
The incumbent party, Fianna Fáil, gained only 17.4 per cent vote share and 20 seats 
compared to the 2007 elections where it had gained 41.56 per cent and 78 seats in the 
parliament. On the contrary, the opposition party, Fine Gael, increased its vote share by 
almost 9 per cent. A similar situation happened in Portugal. The Portuguese election took 
place in June 2011, one month after a bailout agreement was reached between the 
government and the Troïka. The incumbent party, Partido Socialista, gained 28.1 per cent 
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of the vote and 74 seats in the parliament compared to the 2009 elections where it had 
gained 36.6 per cent and 97 seats (Nordsieck 2016). In both cases the incumbents got 
punished and the main alternatives were rewarded; however, the crisis did not change the 
electoral landscape in these countries. In the next national elections (October 2015 in 
Portugal and February 2016 in Ireland) both parties have increased their vote shares 
again.  
 
Secondly, dissatisfied voters may turn their back to all mainstream parties and choose to 
vote for newly established populist parties if such challengers exist in the party system. In 
Greece, before the crisis PASOK and New Democracy were the two pillars of the Greek 
two-party system. They together had 80 per cent of the total votes in 2007 and 77.4 per 
cent in 2009 general election. However, with the empowering of a new political actor, 
SYRIZA, which is a coalition of the left wing in the political system, their total vote share 
dramatically decreased to 32.1 per cent in the election of May 2012 (Nordsieck 2016). 
SYRIZA, in the beginning, has refused all austerity measures imposed by the Troika and 
indicated that it will never form a coalition government with the parties that accept them. 
Its ideology was depending on a fair model of wealth production and distribution, and 
citizens’ participation to the policy-making process. In 2012 election, SYRIZA became 
the second party by gaining 16.8 per cent of the votes. In 2015 its vote share increased to 
36.3 per cent and 35.5 per cent respectively in January and September elections, 
surpassing the sum of total vote share of PASOK and New Democracy together in both 
elections. Dealignment and de-legitimation of the party system in Greece, as stated by 
Teperoglou and Tsatsanis, is the most clear case among Southern European countries 
(Teperogloua and Tsatsanis 2014). After the impact of the economic crisis became visible, 
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Verney defined the situation of the Greek party system as “broken and can’t be fixed” 
(Verney 2014). 
 
As in Greece, Spain was also characterised by its two-party system, Partido Popular (PP) 
being the centre-right party and Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) being the centre-
left party, governing interchangeably since 1982 (Nordsieck 2016). After PSOE lost in 
2011 elections and got the worst results ever in a national election (Martín and Urquizu-
Sancho 2012), it was becoming clear that there was room for competition on the left hand 
side of the political spectrum. Podemos, being a more extreme left wing party, was founded 
in March 2014, right before the European Parliament elections, with the objective of 
converting the anger that gave rise to 15-M Movement into political change. It attacked 
the traditional mainstream parties, calling them la casta (the cast), and addressed them as 
political elites who are corrupt and incapable of solving Spain’s problems. In Spain, in 
2008 and 2011 elections PP and PSOE together got the 83.8 per cent and 73.4 per cent of 
the votes respectively. In 2015 national election, Podemos gained 20.7 per cent of the votes 
and became the third party in the election after PP (28.7 per cent) and PSOE (22 per 
cent). None of the parties won majority to be able to form a government by themselves 
and Spain’s two-party system has been severely challenged. After the election, months of 
negotiations for forming a governing coalition between the parties did not bear any fruits 
and none of the coalition possibilities securing a majority became real, which then led to 
another election in June 2016. In 2016 election, Podemos joined forces with Izquierda Unida 
along with several other small left-wing parties and formed the Unidos Podemos alliance. 
The alliance got 21.1 per cent of the votes, following the social democrat PSOE with 22.7 
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per cent. PP increased its vote share to 33 per cent and also the number of seats. The 
negotiations are still ongoing, a third election is also on the horizon. 
 
Finally, the third option for the disaffected voters is that they can turn against all existing 
political parties and support independents or anti-parties. In Italy, the Movimento Cinque 
Stelle (M5S) has been founded in October 2009 by the popular comedian and blogger 
Beppe Grillo. M5S rejects the ideological labels and claims to be neither on the left or the 
right hand side of the political spectrum. It advocates direct democracy since it claims that 
the state is disengaged from its citizens and the party supports the idea of free internet 
access and online participation to public meetings to make the debate available to all 
citizens as an alternative to representative democracy. In that sense, M5S identifies itself 
as a people’s movement and not as a political party that claims to function as an 
intermediary between citizens and political elites. Italian party system was characterised by 
the traditional coalitions of the left wing, Partito Democratico (PD), and the right wing, Il 
Popolo della Libertà (PdL) until the entry of M5S into the political arena. These two parties 
together got 70.6 per cent of the total votes in 2008 election. In February 2013 election, 
their total vote share decreased to 47 per cent. M5S became the first party with 25.6 per 
cent in front of PD with 25.4 per cent and Forza Italia (formerly PdL) with 21.6 per cent 
(Nordsieck 2016). An important reason behind M5S’s success as an anti-establishment 
party in the political system might be that both PD and PdL supported Monti’s 
technocratic government when it was implementing unpopular reforms and austerity 
measures in the months before the election. As a result, Italian voters might have decided 
that the two main alternatives in Italy’s political system, regardless of their ideology, both 
were sharing the responsibility and they were equally defenceless in front of an economic 
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crisis. Thus, the importance of ideological considerations might have been reduced when 
voters were evaluating parties and this might have helped M5S since it distanced itself 
from the ideological labels (Vegetti, Poletti et al. 2013). 
 
Concluding remarks 
As a summary, the main reasons behind the European sovereign debt crisis were entry 
into the monetary union, the sudden stop of cross-border lending and borrowing, the 
failure of EU policies and lack of coordinated adjustment mechanisms. The entry into a 
monetary union made huge amounts of capital flow possible from Northern European 
countries to Southern periphery. This cheap credit flow generated massive current 
account imbalances for Southern countries and at the same time created 
interconnectedness between European countries through lending and borrowing 
relationships. In such a fragile situation, when the cross-border market suddenly froze due 
to the crisis in the US and deteriorated economic situation in Eurozone, doubts over how 
Southern periphery countries depending on foreign capital will continue to finance 
themselves got raised and the debt vortex started to spin. The policy failures and the lack 
of supranational mechanisms to deal with these problems aggravated the crisis and could 
not prevent it from spreading to other countries in the Eurozone. Although the main 
causes are valid for all Eurozone countries, there are also some additional specific causes 
of the crisis for the periphery countries, which were affected from the crisis the most. 
Greece had structural problems involving high budget deficits, tax evasion, political 
corruption, and clientelism. Both Ireland and Spain experienced the burst of property 
bubbles and the collapse of the banking system depending on it. Portugal and Italy were 
both characterised as low productivity and low growth countries for different reasons. 
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What has been perceived as sustainable once, turned into being perceived very risky and 
triggered turbulence in economic and political conditions. 
 
As a consequence of the economic deterioration due to the crisis, both the countries that 
requested bailouts, namely Greece, Portugal, and Ireland, and the rest of the countries, 
Spain, Ireland and Italy, had to implement severe austerity measures comprising of tax 
increases, cuts in government spending showing itself as cuts in jobs, wages, pensions, 
and social welfare programmes. The harsh consequences of austerity measures that came 
on top of the worsening economic conditions and the prevalence of corruption among 
politicians became the last drop for citizens in these countries. The amount of street 
protests and demonstrations increased as people lost their trust in their governments 
and/or the whole political system. In some countries, like Ireland and Portugal, the 
incumbents were punished; however, basic patterns of electoral behaviour and the 
political landscape stayed stable. In others like Greece, Spain, and Italy, the fundamental 
features of party systems were massively challenged and transformed with the emergence 
of new movements and parties in the political system (Magalhães 2014). All in all, the 
economic crises had various severe consequences for these countries, as well as for 
European integration itself. Chapter 4 and 5 will profoundly investigate the implications 
of politicisation of European integration in times of economic crisis on parties, party 
systems and the vote. 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 3.1: Citizens' trust in their national parliament (in percentages) 
       
  
EB62        
2004 
EB63-64 
2005 
EB65-66 
2006 
EB67-68 
2007 
EB69-70 
2008 
EB71-72 
2009 
EB73-74 
2010 
EB75-76 
2011 
EB77-78 
2012 
EB79-80 
2013 
EB81.2-81-82 
2014 
EB83-84 
2015   
Belgium 
              
Tend to trust 46 49 53 58 44 40 32 44 43 48 42 43 
  
Tend not to trust 49 48 45 40 54 57 66 55 54 50 53 52 
  
Denmark 
              
Tend to trust 70 74 74 80 76 75 69 65 64 59 60 62 
  
Tend not to trust 24 23 24 18 23 23 28 33 35 39 37 33 
  
Germany 
              
Tend to trust 39 36 36 46 41 46 40 44 46 46 49 48 
  
Tend not to trust 54 59 58 48 53 47 53 50 48 47 43 46 
  
Greece 
              
Tend to trust 61 52 55 53 41 40 24 15 11 11 13 20 
  
Tend not to trust 36 47 45 48 60 60 75 84 88 88 86 78 
  
Spain 
              
Tend to trust 48 39 39 50 47 31 22 20 10 8 9 12 
  
Tend not to trust 43 49 47 40 41 64 70 72 84 89 86 80 
  
France 
              
Tend to trust 38 31 29 42 36 31 32 29 37 22 23 21 
  
Tend not to trust 53 58 62 49 56 61 61 63 53 71 69 71 
  
Ireland 
              
Tend to trust 40 40 40 38 39 21 17 30 21 18 22 28 
  
Tend not to trust 48 50 49 49 51 69 76 60 72 76 71 64 
  
67 
 
 
Italy               
Tend to trust 31 36 36 32 22 27 26 20 10 11 14 18 
  
Tend not to trust 59 55 52 57 69 64 64 70 83 81 79 73 
  
Netherlands 
              
Tend to trust 49 52 54 66 60 54 55 57 51 45 54 54 
  
Tend not to trust 47 45 41 31 37 42 41 40 45 52 41 40 
  
Austria 
              
Tend to trust 51 51 54 56 50 57 51 55 49 54 47 42 
  
Tend not to trust 33 40 36 36 41 37 44 39 46 41 45 52 
  
Portugal 
              
Tend to trust 43 41 42 42 39 39 28 24 22 14 16 22 
  
Tend not to trust 49 52 52 51 54 53 68 70 75 84 82 75 
  
Finland 
              
Tend to trust 68 65 67 71 69 57 55 62 63 60 63 63 
  
Tend not to trust 30 33 31 27 30 41 43 35 35 37 33 29 
  
Sweden 
              
Tend to trust 56 48 59 64 62 64 69 72 69 70 69 68 
  
Tend not to trust 37 46 35 31 33 33 28 25 29 28 27 28 
  
United Kingdom 
              
Tend to trust 37 37 33 38 29 18 26 27 25 25 30 36 
  
Tend not to trust 54 53 57 54 63 75 68 67 70 68 63 58 
  
Source: Eurobarometer surveys, European Commission Public Opinion Unit  
 
  
Note: Averages have been taken for existing data points for each year. The numbers sum up to 100 when "Don't know" option is included 
 
  
 
  
68 
 
Appendix Table 3.2: Citizens' trust in the European Union (in percentages) 
 
  
EB61-62 
2004 
EB63-64 
2005 
EB65-66 
2006 
EB67-68 
2007 
EB69-70 
2008 
EB71.1-71-72 
2009 
EB73-74 
2010 
EB75-76 
2011 
EB77-78 
2012 
EB79-80 
2013 
EB81-82 
2014 
EB83-84 
2015      
Belgium 
                 
Tend to trust 56 58 61 69 65 59 58 56 48 49 44 44 
     
Tend not to trust 36 40 36 28 33 38 39 42 50 50 49 50 
     
Denmark 
                 
Tend to trust 43 45 53 62 60 60 59 51 49 48 48 52 
     
Tend not to trust 47 47 41 31 35 34 36 42 46 46 44 37 
     
Germany 
                 
Tend to trust 41 39 40 48 43 45 37 33 30 29 32 34 
     
Tend not to trust 44 52 50 42 45 43 53 56 60 60 56 56 
     
Greece 
                 
Tend to trust 66 60 64 64 59 57 40 31 19 20 24 22 
     
Tend not to trust 29 38 35 36 42 42 58 68 80 79 76 77 
     
Spain 
                 
Tend to trust 60 49 51 62 61 54 43 35 21 19 23 30 
     
Tend not to trust 30 37 31 25 26 35 44 56 72 73 70 58 
     
France 
                 
Tend to trust 46 40 41 51 48 44 39 35 36 31 35 29 
     
Tend not to trust 42 50 49 38 43 46 51 55 56 60 54 57 
     
Ireland 
                 
Tend to trust 57 51 56 55 56 46 42 34 31 32 35 39 
     
Tend not to trust 22 28 25 24 27 34 43 50 57 58 51 46 
     
Italy 
                 
Tend to trust 55 56 52 51 41 47 45 37 27 24 27 34 
     
Tend not to trust 27 33 32 30 42 37 40 45 58 62 55 48 
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Netherlands 
                 
Tend to trust 44 42 46 61 62 61 53 46 41 38 44 45 
     
Tend not to trust 44 52 45 32 30 30 38 46 52 57 47 44 
     
Austria 
                 
Tend to trust 38 42 43 46 40 45 40 40 35 37 37 29 
     
Tend not to trust 48 49 46 43 48 46 54 55 58 54 55 62 
     
Portugal 
                 
Tend to trust 62 60 58 61 54 55 48 38 33 25 34 45 
     
Tend not to trust 25 28 29 27 32 30 44 51 61 70 59 46 
     
Finland 
                 
Tend to trust 43 40 43 52 51 54 50 49 44 44 51 51 
     
Tend not to trust 50 55 52 43 45 40 45 47 52 51 38 35 
     
Sweden 
                 
Tend to trust 31 31 39 48 49 46 45 45 35 38 43 47 
     
Tend not to trust 60 60 49 40 44 44 48 49 61 58 45 42 
     
United Kingdom 
                 
Tend to trust 27 26 29 31 27 23 20 21 18 20 21 26 
     
Tend not to trust 51 54 52 51 57 60 66 68 72 68 61 59 
     
Source: Eurobarometer surveys, European Commission Public Opinion Unit  
Note: Averages have been taken for existing data points for each year. The numbers sum up to 100 when "Don't know" option is included 
 
  
70 
 
Appendix Table 3.3: Citizens' opinion concerning “European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro” (in percentages) 
 
  
EB62      
2004 
EB63-64 
2005 
EB65-66 
2006 
EB67-68 
2007 
EB69-70 
2008 
EB71-72 
2009 
EB73-74 
2010 
EB75-76 
2011 
EB77-78 
2012 
EB79-80 
2013 
EB81-82 
2014 
EB83-84 
2015 
Belgium 
            
For 89 84 84 83 83 81 79 81 72 75 77 77 
Against 10 16 16 16 17 17 20 19 26 24 21 20 
Denmark 
            
For 50 50 52 53 51 53 43 35 29 33 32 31 
Against 45 45 44 44 46 44 54 62 68 66 64 64 
Germany 
            
For 69 63 65 71 70 68 65 65 67 69 75 75 
Against 27 34 32 25 27 28 31 31 28 27 22 22 
Greece 
            
For 62 48 50 49 55 63 64 68 70 61 66 70 
Against 36 51 49 51 46 37 33 28 26 36 32 28 
Spain 
            
For 69 60 62 68 67 64 63 63 59 54 63 64 
Against 26 30 28 24 27 30 31 29 33 37 31 29 
France 
            
For 78 77 73 73 72 71 67 66 69 63 68 68 
Against 19 20 24 23 25 26 29 30 28 33 27 27 
Ireland 
            
For 85 87 86 88 87 86 82 78 73 70 75 78 
Against 10 10 10 9 9 9 13 14 18 22 17 14 
Italy 
            
For 62 66 65 65 60 62 66 62 55 56 54 57 
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Against 28 27 26 25 30 30 24 28 32 33 31 32 
 
 
Netherlands 
            
For 72 71 72 79 82 81 74 73 74 70 76 75 
Against 26 27 26 20 17 17 24 25 24 28 21 21 
Austria 
            
For 73 66 64 68 70 71 66 61 66 65 68 63 
Against 20 28 26 26 25 24 29 34 29 29 27 33 
Portugal 
            
For 67 66 60 62 54 58 55 52 57 51 59 65 
Against 26 27 31 26 33 28 34 36 35 40 35 30 
Finland 
            
For 79 78 77 79 81 82 78 74 75 75 76 76 
Against 20 21 23 20 17 17 19 24 23 22 20 21 
Sweden 
            
For 46 46 51 45 48 52 36 29 25 21 21 24 
Against 48 51 46 50 47 44 62 68 74 77 75 72 
United Kingdom 
            
For 31 28 29 27 27 28 18 18 15 17 18 20 
Against 62 64 63 66 65 66 74 77 80 77 72 73 
Source: Eurobarometer surveys, European Commission Public Opinion Unit  
 Note: Averages have been taken for existing data points for each year. The numbers sum up to 100 when "Don't know" option is included 
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Appendix Table 3.4: Citizens' answers to the following question: "What do you think are the two most important issues facing your country at the moment?" (in percentages) 
  
EB62 
2004 
EB63-64 
2005 
EB65-66 
2006 
EB67-68 
2007 
EB69-70 
2008 
EB71.1-71-72 
2009 
EB73-74 
2010 
EB75-76 
2011 
EB77-78 
2012 
EB79-80 
2013 
EB81-82 
2014 
EB83-84 
2015      
Ireland 
                 
Crime 39 47 55 52 37 21 16 12 13 15 17 18 
     
Economic situation 7 5 6 9 27 50 57 53 49 39 28 15 
     
Rising prices\ inflation\ cost        
of living 
30 32 24 25 25 14 11 13 15 15 13 17 
     
Taxation 5 6 5 4 5 6 6 8 8 13 18 11 
     
Unemployment 10 9 7 9 25 59 64 66 64 66 50 38 
     
Terrorism 6 5 6 4 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 3 
     
Housing 13 12 16 15 8 3 3 3 3 4 13 29 
     
Government debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 13 22 16 17 12 
     
Immigration 7 11 12 13 5 3 3 6 8 8 8 9 
     
Health and social security 58 50 45 48 46 26 20 17 10 13 19 30 
     
The education system 7 4 5 5 6 5 5 4 4 4 6 7 
     
Pensions 4 5 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 5 
     
The environment, climate and 
energy issues 
4 5 5 5 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 
     
Greece 
                 
Crime 19 16 18 18 17 26 16 17 12 12 8 3 
     
Economic situation 39 42 42 36 46 56 67 69 61 51 47 48 
     
Rising prices\ inflation\ cost of 
living 
23 35 32 31 37 25 21 12 11 9 9 11 
     
Taxation 3 8 4 6 7 6 12 10 13 19 21 17 
     
Unemployment 69 62 62 47 38 43 51 58 58 65 62 56 
     
Terrorism 2 2 3 3 1 5 1 1 1 2 2 1 
     
Housing 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
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Government debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 17 20 17 20 25 
     
Immigration 7 5 4 5 5 9 6 5 7 6 6 16 
     
Health and social security 14 8 11 14 12 8 4 3 6 8 12 10 
     
The education system 8 6 7 15 10 8 3 3 3 4 6 4 
     
Pensions 9 10 9 16 15 5 6 4 4 4 5 7 
     
The environment, climate and 
energy issues 
2 1 2 7 6 3 1 1 0 0 1 1 
     
Spain 
                 
Crime 16 15 22 18 12 11 10 7 4 5 6 6 
     
Economic situation 12 10 8 9 31 49 57 56 58 49 43 32 
     
Rising prices\ inflation\ cost of 
living 
11 13 9 15 27 14 9 8 9 8 6 9 
     
Taxation 2 3 4 3 5 6 5 5 6 6 6 6 
     
Unemployment 30 28 23 20 36 64 77 78 77 77 79 72 
     
Terrorism 59 39 33 42 23 14 9 6 1 1 1 5 
     
Housing 15 21 19 25 23 9 6 6 6 6 5 6 
     
Government debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 11 7 9 8 
     
Immigration 24 33 49 30 16 8 8 6 2 2 4 8 
     
Health and social security 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 5 11 12 12 13 
     
The education system 3 3 5 5 4 3 3 3 5 7 8 9 
     
Pensions 5 5 6 6 5 3 6 4 3 5 4 6 
     
The environment, climate and 
energy issues 
2 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 
     
Italy 
                 
Crime 23 24 24 31 16 17 15 9 5 6 7 10 
     
Economic situation 31 34 33 27 36 43 39 47 44 42 40 28 
     
Rising prices\ inflation\ cost of 
living 
29 32 26 28 44 33 24 27 27 22 12 9 
     
Taxation 16 13 15 21 20 14 13 13 29 25 25 18 
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Unemployment 31 34 35 28 28 41 50 45 50 57 63 49 
     
Terrorism 17 9 12 8 3 4 4 2 2 1 3 8 
     
Housing 1 1 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 
     
Government debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 11 15 12 12 12 
     
Immigration 17 15 18 15 9 12 12 14 3 6 17 31 
     
Health and social security 5 6 6 7 7 5 7 5 4 3 5 6 
     
The education system 3 3 2 2 3 3 5 2 2 2 2 4 
     
Pensions 9 9 8 10 7 5 6 6 5 5 8 14 
     
The environment, climate and 
energy issues 
1 3 3 4 2 3 4 3 1 1 2 3 
     
Portugal 
                 
Crime 18 15 14 11 13 15 7 7 6 3 5 4 
     
Economic situation 34 42 39 27 30 34 46 44 40 40 35 32 
     
Rising prices\ inflation\ cost of 
living 
24 29 35 33 43 33 35 31 25 23 21 22 
     
Taxation 7 12 10 14 12 9 15 9 12 14 15 13 
     
Unemployment 58 64 63 54 46 61 57 64 63 72 68 63 
     
Terrorism 4 2 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 
     
Housing 1 1 1 3 4 2 2 5 8 1 1 2 
     
Government debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 13 16 16 20 20 
     
Immigration 1 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 
     
Health and social security 23 13 14 23 14 11 7 6 9 8 12 13 
     
The education system 11 2 4 8 6 3 2 2 2 3 4 5 
     
Pensions 11 10 10 11 9 11 8 7 6 8 9 12 
     
The environment, climate and 
energy issues 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
     
Source: Eurobarometer surveys, European Commission Public Opinion Unit  
Note: Averages have been taken for existing data points for each year. The numbers sum up to 100 when "Other (Spontaneous)", "None (Spontaneous)" and "Don't know" 
options are included 
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Chapter 4. 
The impact of Europe on parties and party systems 
 
 
Party system change occurs when a party system is 
transformed from one class or type of party system 
into another… such an approach also enjoys the 
advantage of enabling us to relate party change to 
party system change… 
Peter Mair, Party System Change, 1997 
 
 
Introduction 
Since Lipset and Rokkan claimed that party systems are frozen in Europe (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967) and then gradually eroded over time, with new parties, 
coalitions and new party families, various questions have been asked both for the 
demand-electorate-side and for the supply-party-side. When Peter Mair 
questioned changes in Western European party systems (Mair 1989), the reasons 
behind this phenomenon required further investigation. European integration, as 
an economic and political project, became a candidate as a reason behind these 
changes, and for its possible impact on party system change. At the beginning of 
the 21st century, an important work was published focusing on the issue. Peter 
Mair claimed that Europe has had a very limited direct impact on national party 
systems (Mair 2000). In his paper, Mair looked at the format and mechanics of 
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party systems of fifteen Western European member states using the party 
positioning data of Leonard Ray (Ray 1999). He provided party specific 
information, including their vote distribution in national elections. In addition, 
Mair discussed the limits of a spillover mechanism, the absence of a European 
party system and competences of different arenas, the European and the national 
arena, as important reasons behind the limited impact. These dimensions will be 
discussed further in the conclusion. Since then, the European Union admitted 
thirteen new members (while one decided to leave), went through Treaty changes 
and suffered eight years of economic and financial crisis – and is still suffering. 
Since last year the refugee crisis has also been on the agenda, being another 
significant test for European integration. In short, there have been various 
important challenges that led to certain changes in the European project. 
 
Peter Mair himself, in his EUI Working Paper in 2011, stated that the national 
level no longer has the adequate resources to deal with the financial crisis, using 
the Irish example (Mair 2011). This gave the reader signals of a possible change of 
his opinion on the impact of Europe on national party systems. In this paper, the 
most important point to underline was that the rules of the game have changed 
with the economic crisis and the EU has been more involved in national 
economies and politics. Clearly, he was not the only one discussing this topic. 
Bartolini was not totally convinced of the limited impact of Europe, and brought 
the topic  to the table for deeper analysis (Bartolini 2005). He looked for the 
possible impact of European integration both on parties and voters. At the same 
time, van der Eijk and Franklin were calling the issue a “sleeping giant”, claiming 
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that there is a conflict potential on European integration among voters, which is 
not fully exploited by any entrepreneur yet, and may lead to the creation of new 
parties (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). There is also relatively new literature on 
globalisation and its effects on national electoral dynamics, establishing the 
concept of the politicisation of European integration, namely the post-
functionalist theory (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2008, Hooghe and Marks 2009, Kriesi, 
Grande et al. 2012). Recent work has already started to compare the economic 
crisis to other challenges of the European project asking if the crisis has been a 
“boost” to the politicisation of European integration (Kriesi and Grande 2016). 
All in all, there have been various scholars asking the same question: Does Europe 
matter more? 
 
This chapter focuses on the impact of “Europe” on national parties and party 
systems. Following the distinction between party change and party system change 
(Mair 1989, Mair 1997), the chapter mostly takes into consideration the national 
party system dynamics. It claims that today Europe has more impact on national 
politics, thanks to further politicisation of European integration. In addition to 
replicating Mair’s analysis, which is checking the format and mechanics of party 
systems, and providing country specific information about parties and their vote 
distribution in national elections, this work is also establishing the link between 
volatility, which is an important indicator of party system change, and issue 
polarisation of European integration, while testing it with an up-to-date volatility 
data set. The results establish a significant relationship between volatility and party 
polarisation on the European integration dimension.  
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This chapter proceeds as follows in order to examine these arguments more 
systematically. The next section will go through the literature on the impact of 
Europe, establishing the research question and the hypotheses. Afterwards, the 
data and its operationalisation will be explored. Then, Mair’s analyses on the 
format and mechanics of party systems will be replicated with up-to-date data. 
Later, it will continue with a time series cross-section (TSCS) analysis for Western 
European Member States and all elections since World War II (WWII), to 
establish the relationship between volatility and polarisation of European 
integration. The final section will provide the concluding remarks. 
 
Does Europe matter more today? 
Since the beginning of European integration and more specifically, since the first 
direct elections to the European Parliament (EP) in 1979, there have been various 
discussions related to the interaction between Europe, national politics and votes 
cast by citizens in different arenas. Many questions related to the effect of 
European issues on party positioning and voting behaviour both in national and 
European Parliament elections have been asked since then. Starting with the 
second-order national elections claim for EP elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980, 
Reif 1984), literature on both voting in the EP and in national elections has been 
growing rapidly (Gabel 2000, Hix and Marsh 2007, Hobolt, Spoon et al. 2009, de 
Vries 2010, de Vries, van der Brug et al. 2011, Hix and Marsh 2011). For over 
thirty years, various methods have been used to model voting behaviour, including 
experimental methods (Hobolt and Wittrock 2011). Some scholars also 
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established a relationship between EP elections and national elections (Marsh and 
Franklin 1996, Clark and Rohrschneider 2009, Somer-Topcu and Zar 2014).  
 
In the meantime, the effect of Europe on national parties and party systems 
stayed comparably less explored. Rohrschneider and Whitefield researched it using 
an original expert survey dataset questioning the response of political parties to 
the growing European Union-scepticism (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2016), 
which is another important question related to this problem. The supply side of 
the equation, political parties, found themselves a place in the literature mostly in 
party manifestos and expert survey research (Castles and Mair 1984, Laver, Benoit 
et al. 2003, Pennings 2006, Bakker, de Vries et al. 2012, Spoon 2012). When 
looking at the research on party systems and the effect of European integration on 
them, it can be stated that the subject is still less explored. As already mentioned 
at the beginning, Lipset and Rokkan claimed that party systems are frozen (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967). A few years later, Rose and Urwin supported this argument for 
Western European countries since WWII (Rose and Urwin 1970). Pedersen, on 
the other hand, defined an increase in volatility in five Western European 
countries in his 1979 paper, which led to the creation of his famous Pedersen 
Index in 1980 (Pedersen 1979, Pedersen 1980). Even if his concept of volatility 
was to be used so frequently in the literature in future, authors like Maguire also 
challenged Pedersen (Maguire 1983), claiming that party systems are still stable 
based on her analysis, at least until the 1960s, but later there were some visible 
changes. All in all, even if the party systems are claimed to be stable until the 
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1960s, afterwards there were different scholars trying to prove that there are 
certain changes.  
 
Before going further, there are two questions that should be asked at this point: i) 
How do we measure party system change? What are the party system indicators to 
measure it? ii) What are the reasons behind this change? Can we identify them? 
There is a significant amount of literature on the description of the main elements 
and types of party systems. Duverger (Duverger 1954) identified two-party and 
multiparty systems as the major types, while Blondel (Blondel 1968) introduced 
new categories. Following that, Rokkan (Rokkan 1970) has shifted the party 
system classification from vote share to seat share, focusing analysis on relative 
strengths of parties instead of absolute strengths. According to the well-known 
definition of Sartori, a party system is a “system of interactions resulting from 
inter-party competition” (Sartori, 1976: 43). Following various descriptions, 
Laakso and Taagepera (Laakso and Taagepera 1979) offered the effective number 
of parties calculations and Pedersen (Pedersen 1980) proposed various indicators 
(the Gini-coefficient, the index of fractionalisation, the fragmentation index etc.). 
Including Mair as well (Bardi and Mair 2008), there has been a certain effort to 
define the parameters of party systems. The book of Gallagher and Mitchell 
(Gallagher and Mitchell 2008)14 and the data set of Gallagher (Gallagher 2015) 
also provide us with widely used party system indices. For the purposes of this 
chapter, ENEP, the effective number of parties at the electoral level, will be used 
                                                 
14 The calculation of the indices and further information can be found in the book.  
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to measure how fragmented the system is. Appendix Table 4.1 provides all the 
election indices for Western European countries before and after the crisis.  
 
Following the literature, the following hypotheses will be tested:  
 
H1.1: The number of political parties is expected to increase in Western Europe 
in times of economic crisis. 
 
H1.2: The number of political parties is expected to increase in Western Europe 
in a period of politicisation of European integration. 
 
As already stated, party system change can be defined as an increase in the 
number of political parties. These newly established parties could mobilise voters 
in some countries and change the distribution of the votes between elections. The 
other way is also possible. Electoral change can cause party system change, 
shifting the system from one type to another (Mair 1997). In other words, 
increasing volatility could lead to party system change as well. The literature 
suggests that an increase in volatility is mostly the result of voters’ dealignment 
and the decline of party affiliation and membership (Dalton, Flanagan et al. 1984, 
van Biezen, Mair et al. 2012). With the decrease of social cleavages, voters started 
to feel free to move from one party to another, they take longer time to decide 
their vote (Dalton 2002) or they start not to vote at all (Franklin, Lyons et al. 
2004). The important link that needs to be established here is between polarisation 
84 
 
of an issue and volatility. This work is trying to test that link with the following 
hypothesis using a time series cross-section (TSCS) model. 
 
H2: In Western Europe, the volatility will increase if the national party system is 
more polarised on European integration. 
 
Data, operationalisation and methods 
Does Europe have an impact on national political parties and party systems today? 
To test this argument, this chapter will follow Peter Mair, checking format, 
operationalised as ENEP as already stated as an indicator of party system change, 
and the mechanics of party systems. The first stage uses Gallagher (Gallagher 2015) 
indices. In addition, the percentages of votes received by newly established parties 
and Eurosceptic parties are also provided for deepening the descriptive analysis, 
using the Parties and Elections Database (Nordsieck 2016). For defining parties’ 
positions on the pro-/anti-European integration dimension, the 2014 Chapel Hill 
data set has been used (Bakker, Edwards et al. 2015), since Mair also used a similar 
dataset (Ray 1999). This part will provide an exact replica of Peter Mair’s analysis, 
regarding the format and mechanics of party systems. 
 
Secondly, moving the analysis one step further, there will be a TSCS estimation of 
electoral volatility in Western Europe. Traditionally, the Pedersen Index (Pedersen 
1979) has been used in volatility calculations while studying Western democracies 
(Bartolini and Mair 1990, Elff 2007) and also Eastern Europe (Lewis 2000, Rose 
and Munro 2003, Tavits 2005, Powell and Tucker 2014). Recent work 
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discriminated between different types of volatility (Type A and B). Volatility that 
is caused by the entry/exit of parties on one side is named as Type A volatility, 
while vote switching between the existing stable ones is called Type B (Powell and 
Tucker 2014, Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2015). This chapter will follow the 
literature, measuring electoral volatility by calculating the Pedersen index.   
 
The Pedersen Index is: 
𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
∑ |𝑝𝑖(𝑡+1) − 𝑝𝑖𝑡|
𝑛
𝑖=1
2
 
where n is the number of parties in the system and Pi is the electoral support in 
percentage for a party i at time t and (t+1). For this work, a new volatility dataset 
will be used (Emanuele 2015). This dataset provides data on electoral volatility in 
nineteen Western European countries for the period 1945 – 2015.15  
 
To test hypothesis 2, polarisation on the left/right dimension and the European 
integration dimension have been calculated from the Comparative Manifesto 
Project Database (Volkens, Lehmann et al. 2015).16 Dalton’s formula of 
polarisation index has been used for left/right and has also been adapted to the 
European integration dimension (Dalton 2008). Then, these indexes are used as 
dependent variables in the models. 
 
                                                 
15 Data for Greece, Portugal and Spain have been collected after their democratisation in the 1970s. 
16 For this part of the analysis, MARPOR data are used. The left/right scale for each party is already 
available in the data set. The position on Europe is also computed with a similar methodology. The dataset 
includes “Europe is positive” and “Europe is negative” for each party. The position on Europe is 
calculated by subtracting these two. 
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EU Score = Europe Positive – Europe Negative 
L/R Score = RILE 
PI = SQRT{Σ (party vote sharei )*([party L/R scorei  – party system 
average L/R score]/100)2} 
PI = SQRT{Σ (party vote sharei )*([party EU scorei  – party system 
average EU score]/100)2} 
 
where i represents individual parties. The second part, which brings a new 
approach to the question, will estimate volatility using TSCS modelling. This is the 
innovative additional part after replicating Peter Mair’s analysis regarding the 
format and mechanics of a party system.  
 
Europe and national party systems: Format and Mechanics 
This section analyses the direct impact of European integration on the format and 
mechanics of national party systems. Format of a party system can be described as 
the number of relevant parties in the electoral arena. The mechanics of a party 
system on the other hand is concerned with the modes of interaction between the 
related parties. Format and mechanics have been key elements of party systems 
since Sartori (Sartori 1976). For this reason, Peter Mair used them to measure 
party system change, as will this work. 
 
Format 
This chapter claims that further politicisation of European integration catalysed by 
the economic crisis might have an effect on the format of party systems, which is 
the number of political parties in the national arena. Table 4.1 shows the newly 
established political parties, their positions on the pro-/anti- European integration 
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dimension and their vote share in national elections.17 For this purpose, data have 
been derived from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker, Edwards 
et al. 2015).  
 
Table 4.1: Newly established political parties in Western Europe (2008-2014) 
Country 
Newly Established Political Parties in the National 
Arena 
Year 
Placement  
Pro-/Anti- 
European  
Integration 
Dimension 
% of the 
Votes in the 
last National 
Election 
(before 2014) 
Austria Team Frank Stronach (FRANK) 2012 2.90 5.7 
 
The New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS) 2012 6.30 5 
Belgium People's Party (PP) 2009 2.50 1.5 
Denmark - - - - 
Finland - - - - 
France Centrist Alliance (AC) 2009 6.60 0.6 
Germany Alternative for Germany (AfD) 2013 1.62 4.7 
Greece Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) 2012 3.44 26.9 
 
Independent Greeks (ANEL) 2012 2.22  7.5 
 
Democratic Left (DIMAR) 2010 5.78  6.3 
Ireland - - - - 
Italy Five Start Movement (M5S) 2009 1.43 25.6 
 
Civic Choice (SC) 2012 6.86  8.3 
 
Brothers of Italy / National Alliance (FDI-AN) 2012 2.17  2 
 
Civic Revolution (RC) 2012 2 2.2 
 
Democratic Centre (CD) 2012 5.80 0.5 
Luxembourg - - - - 
Netherlands Party for the Animals (PvdD) 2009 4.80 1.9 
Portugal - - - - 
Spain Amaiur  2011 4.71 1.4 
 
Podemos 2014 4.44 - 
Sweden - - - - 
United Kingdom - - - - 
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey and Parties and Elections Database for the percentages of votes 
Note: Parties established after 2010 are taken into consideration. The Chapel Hill scale ranging from 1 (strongly opposed) 
to 7 (strongly in favour) has been used. For the purposes of this table, parties scoring 1 or 2 on this scale (rounded figures) 
are categorized as Group 1 (anti-European integration), parties scoring 3, 4 and 5 on this scale (rounded figures) are 
categorised as Group 2 (neither pro nor anti-European integration) and parties scoring 6 and 7 (rounded figures) are 
categorised as Group 3 (pro-European integration). This categorisation is in line with Mair (2000) for comparative 
purposes.  
                                                 
17 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey has been used for the positioning of the political parties on the pro-
/anti-European integration scale. Since the time scope of this entire work is limited to 2014 European 
Parliament elections, national elections before that date are taken into consideration. This means that some 
of the cases here might have more recent elections. 
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The dataset provides expert data on the positioning of 268 political parties on 
European integration and other policy positions in 31 countries. The dataset of 
Ray, which was used by Peter Mair to run the same analysis, can be named as the 
ancestor of Chapel Hill. Looking at Table 4.1, it can be seen that there are fifteen 
new political parties founded in the 2008-2014 period, which can be counted as 
the post crisis term. According to the criteria established by Peter Mair (parties 
scoring 1 and 2 on this scale (rounded figures) are categorised as Group 1 - anti-
European integration), five of these parties are strongly anti-European integration. 
The most important party in this group is the Five Star Movement (M5S) initiated 
by Beppe Grillo, a famous comedian in Italy, with 25.6 per cent of the votes. An 
important point to underline here is that M5S shares the same group – Europe of 
Freedom and Democracy - in the European Parliament with UK Independence 
Party (UKIP), which has been a solid defender of Brexit. M5S and UKIP co-chair 
the group, which is the most Eurosceptic group in the EP. It should also be 
underlined that Italy is the country with the highest number of newly established 
parties in the union and three out of five newly established Eurosceptic parties 
belong to this country. In the case of Germany, Alternative for Germany (AfD) is 
clearly an anti-European party; however, with 4.7 per cent of the votes in 2013 
elections, they are not represented in the Bundestag because of the five per cent 
threshold in the German system. Contrary to the tradition of Germany, which is 
mostly a Europhile country - the main political parties in Germany are pro-
European as a certain heritage from the past - AfD gained power because of the 
current situation in Europe. The party received seven per cent of the votes in the 
European Parliament elections of May 2014 that led to its representation in 
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Brussels and Strasbourg. In addition, the state elections of March and September 
2016 promised them further success in the forthcoming national elections of 
2017. Nowadays, German citizens feel like they are paying for the mistakes of 
other Europeans. Therefore, they feel like “Europeanisation losers” in times of 
crisis.18 This feeling also became visible with the current refugee crisis.  
 
The following comparison here is from the ENEP indices before and “after” the 
crisis – even if it is open to discussion whether the crisis is over yet or not. 
Looking at Figure 1, this index is used to see how the number of parties changed 
through the years. An increase, in some members a small one while for some 
others a very significant one, can be observed for all Western European countries.  
 
Figure 4.1: ENEP indices for the Western European member states 
 
Source: Author's Self Evaluation from Gallagher (2015) 
 
 
                                                 
18 The analogy is created from Kriesi’s description of “globalisation losers” (Kriesi et. al 2008, 2012). 
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When focused on the ones that had specific bailout agreements and/or austerity 
measures implemented by the Troika, one should start with the most severe case 
of all: Greece. The ENEP index of Greece rises to 7.08 in 2012, while it was 3.02 
before the crisis. Ireland shows a one-point increase, from 3.77 to 4.77. Portugal 
and Spain demonstrate slight increases from 3.13 to 3.66 and from 2.79 to 3.34, 
respectively. The same case is also correct for Italy; ENEP rises to 5.33 in 2013, 
while it was 3.82 before the crisis. In Ireland the index rises from 3.77 to 4.77. It 
should be kept in mind that it is also hard to comment on changes on party 
system indicators without knowing each country’s electoral law. Depending on 
how permissive the system is, or how easy to access, there are certain differences 
in the format of party systems.  
 
Mechanics 
The second way Europe might have affected the party systems is the mechanics of 
a party system, which is basically the interaction between the relevant political 
parties.  The most important indicator of a possible impact of European 
integration is a competition over the pro-/anti-European integration dimension. 
According to Peter Mair, this can be observed from “new clustering of party blocs 
or camps” (Mair, 2000: 31). For this reason, political parties in national arenas will 
be investigated to see how they locate themselves in the pro-/anti-European 
integration dimension. This will provide us with the opportunity to observe the 
possible existence of a new clustering. If any new clustering can be observed, this 
can be taken as an indication of the effect of Europe. As in the section above, the 
Chapel Hill expert survey has been used to run these analyses. As already 
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explained in Table 4.1, the Chapel Hill dataset includes scores from 1 to 7 in the 
European integration dimension, 1 being strong opposition while 7 indicates 
strong support. Following Peter Mair, parties scoring 1 or 2 on this scale (rounded 
figures) are categorised as Group 1 (anti-European integration), parties scoring 3, 
4 and 5 on this scale (rounded figures) are categorised as Group 2 (neither pro- 
nor anti-European integration) and parties scoring 6 and 7 (rounded figures) are 
categorised as Group 3 (pro-European integration). 
 
Table 4.2: Vote in the most recent national election (before 2014), by position on European integration 
Country  
National 
Election 
(Year) 
Percentage Votes for 
Strongly Pro-
European 
Integration Parties 
(N of Parties) 
Percentage Votes for 
Strongly Anti-
European 
Integration Parties 
(N of Parties) 
Percentage Votes for 
Parties Neither Strongly 
Pro Nor Strongly Anti-
European Integration 
(N of Parties) 
Austria 2013 68.2 (4) 20.5 (1) 9.2 (2) 
Belgium 2014 66.9 (9) 0 (0) 29.2 (4) 
Denmark 2011 66 (4) 19 (2) 14.2 (2) 
Finland 2011 51 (4) 19 (1) 27.9 (3) 
France 2012 40.1 (5) 15.3 (2) 34 (2) 
Germany 2013 73 (4) 4.7 (1) 16 (2) 
Greece 2012 (II) 48.3 (3) 18.9 (3) 26.9 (1) 
Ireland 2011 72.9 (3) 2.2 (2) 11.7 (2) 
Italy 2013 35.5 (3) 33.9 (4) 24.8 (2) 
Luxembourg 2013 82.4 (4) 0 (0) 11.5 (2) 
Netherlands 2012 18.8 (3) 19.7 (2) 60.2 (6) 
Portugal 2011 78.5 (3) 7.9 (1) 5.2 (1) 
Spain 2011 84.6 (6) 0 (0) 8.3 (2) 
Sweden 2014 33.3 (3) 18.6 (2) 44 (3) 
United 
Kingdom 
2010 53.7 (3) 3.1 (1) 36.1 (1) 
Source: 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey and Parties & Elections Database 
Note: United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is located in the table even if they didn’t win any 
chairs after 2010 elections. 
 
 
Table 4.2 provides this data. The results demonstrate that in Western Europe 
there are way more political parties that are supporting European integration 
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compared to opposing it. Among 118 political parties, the experts named 61 of 
them as pro-European integration, 22 were considered to be strongly opposing 
and the rest (35 political parties) were named as neither pro- nor anti-European 
integration. Here the contribution of right wing extreme movements in the 
Eurosceptic vote should be underlined. In France Front National (FN) increased its 
votes from 4.3 to 13.6 per cent in the last elections. Because of the electoral 
system in France, the party only has two seats in the Parliament. In the case of 
Greece, the strongly anti-European party Golden Dawn should be mentioned. It 
was established in 1993; however, in 2012 it took 6.9 per cent of the votes and 
won 18 seats in the Parliament. The situation got even more severe in 2015II, 
when the party got seven per cent of the votes and 18 seats. In addition to Golden 
Dawn, ANEL also got 3.7 per cent of the votes in the latest elections. Therefore, 
the Greek contribution to the Eurosceptic vote has also been important. Italy, on 
the other hand, has a very sui generis case. There are five new parties since 2008 
and their vote shares are summing up to 40.5 per cent, which is an important sign 
of party system change. The success of the Five Star Movement needs to be 
emphasised. This party, the main leftist Eurosceptic party, and an anti-
establishment movement advocated a referendum to withdraw Italy from the 
Eurozone. On the right hand side of the political spectrum, the main Eurosceptic 
party is the older Lega Nord, which is regionalist and right wing populist. Scelta 
Civica, for its part, is a new party strongly pro-European and founded by the 
former Prime Minister Mario Monti, who has been the technocrat governing Italy 
delegated by the European Union. Austria is the country with the second highest 
Eurosceptic vote. This vote rate belongs to the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), 
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which ended up as the third force in Austrian elections. Looking at the Northern 
European countries, Denmark, Finland and Sweden, they all have around 19 per 
cent Eurosceptic vote and an increase compared to the 2000s. Since Peter Mair 
has done the same analysis, Table 4.3 demonstrates the comparative results of 
political parties and their vote shares with his 2000 article.  
 
Table 4.3: Support for parties in national elections, by position on European integration 
Country 
Percentage Votes for 
Strongly Pro-European 
Integration Parties (N 
of Parties) 
Percentage Votes for 
Strongly Anti-European 
Integration Parties (N 
of Parties) 
Percentage Votes for 
Parties Neither 
Strongly Pro Nor 
Strongly Anti-European 
Integration (N of 
Parties) 
  
2000 
(Mair) 
2016 
(Toygur) 
2000 
(Mair) 
2016 
(Toygur) 
2000 
(Mair) 
2016 
(Toygur) 
Austria 71.9 (3) 68.2 (4) 22.2 (2) 20.5 (1) 4.8 (1) 9.2 (2) 
Belgium 72.8 (7) 66.9 (9) 0(0) 0 (0) 21.0 (5) 29.2 (4) 
Denmark 77.1 (5) 66 (4) 12.5 (3) 19 (2) 10.0 (2) 14.2 (2) 
Finland 49.0 (3) 51 (4) 6.0 (2) 19 (1) 40.6 (3) 27.9 (3) 
France 49.3 (4) 40.1 (5) 16.1 (2) 15.3 (2) 20.2 (2) 34 (2) 
Germany 75.5 (3) 73 (4) 1.8 (1) 4.7 (1) 18.5 (3) 16 (2) 
Greece 92.0 (4) 48.3 (3) 5.6 (1) 18.9 (3) 0 (0) 26.9 (1) 
Ireland 32.7 (2) 72.9 (3) 0(0) 2.2 (2) 58.0 (6) 11.7 (2) 
Italy 39.9 (4) 35.5 (3) 24.3 (2) 33.9 (4) 28.9 (3) 24.8 (2) 
Luxembourg 75 (3) 82.4 (4) 2.6 (1) 0 (0) 19.9 (3) 11.5 (2) 
Netherlands 56.4 (3) 18.8 (3) 0.6 (1) 19.7 (2) 37.1 (5) 60.2 (6) 
Portugal 79.6 (3) 78.5 (3) 9.9 (3) 7.9 (1) 9.3 (2) 5.2 (1) 
Spain 85.9 (10) 84.6 (6) 0(0) 0 (0) 10.7 (1) 8.3 (2) 
Sweden 75.8 (4) 33.3 (3) 16.5 (2) 18.6 (2) 5.1 (1) 44 (3) 
United 
Kingdom 
63.3 (5) 53.7 (3) 2.6 (1) 3.1 (1) 30.7 (1) 36.1 (1) 
Source: Author’s self-evaluation from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and Parties & Elections 
Database, Mair (2000) 
 
Looking at the results, there are some points that deserve special attention. Nine 
out of fifteen countries show an increase in the vote share of the anti-European 
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integration group. The sharpest increase has been noticed in the case of the 
Netherlands. Two anti-EU integration parties got 19.7 per cent of the votes. In 
the case of Greece, which has already been repeated various times in this work, 
political parties are competing over various issues. Austerity measures and 
immigration are in the lead and these issues are very much related to European 
integration. There are political parties that are not against the EU integration as a 
whole, but certainly against the austerity measures. The third extreme increase is in 
Finland, thanks to the success of True Finns. The party keeps on being the third 
electoral force, very closely following the two leading parties. All in all, there is a 
visible change in Western European countries regarding their parties and party 
systems. The reasons behind this momentum are open to discussion. This work 
suggests that further polarisation of European integration can be the explanatory 
factor. The next section aims to establish the relationship between volatility and 
polarisation of European integration using a time series cross-section model, 
taking into consideration all time periods since World War II. 
 
Volatility and polarisation over Europe: Time series cross-section analysis 
As already explained above, electoral change measured with volatility can be taken 
as an indicator of party system change. For this reason, volatility rates in Europe 
have been calculated. Before moving to the model, here are some descriptive 
statistics. Figure 2 shows the volatility rates for Western European countries for 
two periods, 2000-2008 and 2009-2014, which can be named as the post-crisis 
period. Eleven out of fifteen countries show a certain increase in the level of 
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volatility.19 In the case of Austria and Luxembourg there is a slight decrease, while 
in the case of Netherlands and Sweden the decrease is more visible. 
 
Figure 4.2: Comparative volatility index (Pedersen) for Western Europe 
 
Source: Author's calculations from the Emanuele (2015) dataset 
 
The most visible increases can be seen when Southern European countries are 
observed. Italy is the most extreme case, as already underlined various times in 
previous sections. It is followed by Ireland, Greece and Spain, as the highest 
increases in volatility among their Western European counterparts. To better 
explain the relationship between volatility and European integration, a time series 
cross-section analysis (TSCS; country fixed effects) is used. Here, the dependent 
variable (DV) volatility is explained with two main independent variables (IVs), 
which are EU polarisation and LR polarisation. The time interval covers 
                                                 
19 Appendix Figure 1 demonstrates the trend of volatility for each country separately. 
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democratic elections in Western Europe after the Second World War.20 The voter 
turnout is used as the control variable.21   
 
Table 4.4: Establishing the link between EU polarization and volatility 
Parameters Model I Model II Model III   
     EU Polarization  13.79*** 13.83*** 10.24** 
 
 
(3.14) (3.14) (3.20) 
 
     Left/Right Polarization 
 
-0.25 0.12 
 
  
(0.59) (0.58) 
 
     Voter Turnout 
  
-0.26*** 
 
   
(0.070) 
 
     Constant 8.33*** 8.76*** 30.46*** 
 
 
(0.64) (1.18) (5.82) 
 
     R2 0.0772 0.0779 0.13 
 
     F-Test 19.32*** 9.72*** 11.67*** 
 
     N of obs. 246 246 246 
 
     N of groups 15 15 15   
Notes: Cell entries are TSCS estimates with country fixed effects. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. F-test provides the results for all country effects being zero.  
*** significant at p≤ 0.001, ** significant at p≤0.01, * significant at p≤0.05 
 
The main advantage of the country fixed effects model is that cross-sectional 
variance between countries disappears and volatility can be explained with the 
independent variables, following Beck and Katz (Beck and Katz 1995). With this 
analysis, a certain relation between volatility and EU polarisation is found. If the 
polarisation on European integration increases, the volatility also increases. While 
                                                 
20 As expected, all member states run their elections in different years. Depending on the electoral system 
and the current situation in the country, election intervals show variety as well. All the dataset is available 
upon request. 
21 The voter turnouts for the latest national elections are collected from Parties & Elections Database 
http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/countries.html.  
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this is the case, there is no significant relation between the Left/Right polarisation 
and volatility. The main reason is that if an issue is mainly already polarised and 
parties have their positions on the issue, further increase in volatility wouldn’t be 
expected. However, if there are new parties entering the system and mobilising the 
electorate on another issue, the case would be different. To sum up, it is claimed 
that there are new parties in Europe that are mobilising the electorate on the pro-
/anti-European integration dimension and increasing the volatility.  
 
Concluding remarks 
This paper looks at the impact of European integration on national parties and 
party systems. It mainly revisits the analyses of Peter Mair (2000) using the same 
sequence of logic that has been used for comparison. The paper revisited the 
format and mechanics of party systems using the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
and Parties and Elections database. All parties are categorised among strongly pro-
European integration, strongly anti-European integration and neither anti- nor 
pro-European integration groups. In addition, a new volatility dataset and 
Manifesto project dataset have been used for the analysis related to the 
polarisation of the European integration dimension. 
 
This chapter claims that today Europe has more impact on national politics and 
government agendas; hence, more impact on party systems. This is not only 
because of the economic crisis but also thanks to further politicisation of Europe. 
There are certain countries that are affected more by the Troika decisions. 
Southern Europe has been going through an epoch of direct interaction with EU 
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(and IMF) officials and with their austerity measures. Changes their party systems 
are going through deserve special attention.  
 
Also, the link between the national arena and the European arena deserves more 
focus. The eighth European Parliament elections, which were the first elections 
held under the Lisbon Treaty, played an important role. With the mentioned 
Treaty, the legislative power of the EP increased significantly. Today, Europe has 
certain effects on the daily lives of its citizens. By electing the President of the 
European Commission, the will of the European citizens has been reflected in the 
decision-making. Even if it is not the case today, this can play a significant role in 
the future. 
 
Furthermore, immigration is a very important issue in Europe, and is deeply 
connected to integration. Anti-immigration sentiments are direct reactions to 
European integration. This parameter should also be included more directly in the 
EU integration dimension calculations. In other words, measured in a different 
way, the importance of the EU integration dimension can be more visible.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 4.1: Comparative election indices (pre-/post-economic crisis) 
  
Country 
LSq Eff Nv (ENEP) Eff Ns (ENPP) 
  Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Pre-Crisis 
Post-
Crisis 
1 Austria 2.92 3.31 4.79 5.15 4.24 4.59 
2 Belgium 3.37 4.6 9.04 9.62 7.91 7.82 
3 Denmark 0.72 0.73 5.41 5.71 5.33 5.61 
4 Finland 3.2 2.95 5.88 6.47 5.13 5.83 
5 France 13.58 17.66 4.32 5.27 2.49 2.83 
6 Germany 2.16 7.83 4.46 4.81 4.05 3.51 
7 Greece 6.99 11.42 3.02 7.08 2.62 4.3 
8 Ireland 5.85 8.69 3.77 4.77 3.03 3.52 
9 Italy 5.73 17.34 3.82 5.33 3.07 3.47 
10 Luxembourg 3.36 5.2 4.26 4.85 3.81 3.93 
11 Netherlands 1.03 0.99 5.8 5.94 5.54 5.7 
12 Portugal 5.75 5.68 3.13 3.66 2.56 2.93 
13 Spain 4.49 6.93 2.79 3.34 2.36 2.6 
14 Sweden 3.02 2.64 4.66 5.41 4.15 4.99 
15 
United 
Kingdom 
16.73 15.1 3.59 3.71 2.46 2.57 
Source: Author's self calculation from Gallager (2014).     
Note: Austria (2008, 2013), Belgium (2007, 2014), Denmark (2007, 2011), Finland (2007, 2011), France (2007, 2012), 
Germany (2005, 2013), Greece (2007, 2012 I&II), Ireland (2007, 2011), Italy (2008, 2013), Luxembourg (2004, 2013), 
Netherlands (2006, 2012), Portugal (2005, 2011), Spain (2008, 2011), Sweden (2006, 2014), United Kingdom (2005, 
2010). 
Note: Even if there is a discussion on the starting time of the crisis, mainly the elections before 2008 (including 2008) 
are taken as pre-crisis, while the latest ones afterwards are taken as post-crisis, even if the crisis is not over yet. When 
there are two elections, the arithmetic average is taken. 
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Appendix Figure 4.1: Volatility in Western Europe after the WWII 
 
Source: Emanuele (2015) Dataset 
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Appendix Table 4.2: Support for parties in national elections, by position on European integration 
Country Party Name Party Abb. 
EU 
Integration 
Score (1 to 
7) 
Group 
Vote 
(%) 
Austria Social Democratic Party of Austria SPÖ 6 3 26.8 
 
Austrian People's Party ÖVP 6.70 3 24 
 
Freedom Party of Austria FPÖ 1.90 1 20.5 
 
The Greens - The Green Alternative GRÜNE 6.50 3 12.4 
 
Team Frank Stronach FRANK 2.90 2 5.7 
 
The New Austria and Liberal Forum NEOS 6.30 3 5 
  Alliance Future Austria BZÖ 2.70 2 3.5 
Belgium New Flemish Alliance N-VA 5 2 20.3 
 
Christian-Democratic & Flemish CD&V 6.60 3 11.6 
 
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats Open VLD 6.60 3 9.8 
 
Socialist Party. Different SPA 6 3 8.8 
 
The Flemish Greens GROEN 6.20 3 5.3 
 
Flemish Interest VB 2.60 2 3.7 
 
Socialist Party PS 6 3 11.7 
 
Reformist Movement MR 6.40 3 9.6 
 
Humanist Democratic Centre CDH 6.40 3 5 
 
Ecologists ECOLO 6.25 3 3.3 
 
Democratic Federalist Independent DéFI 6.40 3 1.8 
 
People's Party PP 2.5 2 1.5 
  Workers' Party of Belgium PTB-PvdA 3.40 2 3.7 
Denmark Left - Denmark's Liberal Party V 5.82 3 26.7 
 
Social Democracy S 6 3 24.9 
 
Danish People's Party DF 1.91 1 12.3 
 
Radical Left RV 7 3 9.5 
 
Socialist People's Party SF 4.64 2 9.2 
 
Unity List - The Red-Greens EL 1.82 1 6.7 
 
Liberal Alliance LA 3.80 2 5 
  Conservative People's Party KF 5.5 3 4.9 
Finland National Coalition Party KOK 6.60 3 20.4 
 
Social Democratic Party of Finland SDP 5.60 3 19.1 
 
True Finns PS 1.60 1 19 
 
Centre of Finland KESK 4.5 2 15.8 
 
Left Alliance VAS 4.30 2 8.1 
 
Green Alliance VIHR 5.90 3 7.2 
 
Swedish People's Party in Finland SFP 6.40 3 4.3 
  Christian Democrats of Finland KD 3.90 2 4 
France Socialist Party PS 5.76 3 29.4 
 
Union for a Popular Movement (The 
Republicans) 
UMP (LR) 5.43 2 27.1 
 
National Front FN 1.21 1 13.6 
 
Left Front FG 2.64 2 6.9 
 
Europe Ecology The Greens EELV 6.21 3 5.5 
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New Centre NC 6.18 3 2.2 
 
Democratic Movement MoDem 6.62 3 1.8 
 
Radical Party of the Left PRG 2.08 1 1.7 
  Radical Party PR 6 3 1.2 
Germany 
Christian Democratic Union of 
Germany 
CDU  6.38 3 34.1 
 
Social Democratic Party of Germany SPD 6.38 3 25.7 
 
The Left 
DIE 
LINKE 
3 2 8.6 
 
Alliance 90 / The Greens GRÜNE 6.23 3 8.4 
 
Christian Social Union in Bavaria CSU 4.84 2 7.4 
 
Free Democratic Party FDP 5.69 3 4.8 
  Alternative for Germany AfD  1.61 1 4.7 
Greece New Democracy ND 6.55 3 29.7 
 
Coalition of the Radical Left SYRIZA 3.44 2 26.9 
 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK 6.55 3 12.3 
 
Independent Greeks ANEL 2.22 1 7.5 
 
Golden Dawn XA 1.11 1 6.9 
 
Democratic Left DIMAR 5.77 3 6.3 
  Communist Party of Greece KKE 1.11 1 4.5 
Ireland Fine Gael (Family of the Irish) FG 6.44 3 36.1 
 
Labour Party  LAB 5.89 3 19.4 
 
Fianna Fail (Soldiers of Destiny) FF 5.56 3 17.4 
 
Sinn Féin (We ourselves) SF 2.78 2 9.9 
 
Green Party GP 4.38 2 1.8 
 
Socialist Party SP 2.22 1 1.2 
  People Before Profit Alliance PBP 2.25 1 1 
Italy Five Star Movement M5S 1.43 1 25.6 
 
Democratic Party PD 6.57 3 25.4 
 
Forza Italia FI 3.43 2 21.6 
 
Civic Choice  SC 6.86 3 8.3 
 
North League LN 1.14 1 4.1 
 
Left Ecology Freedom SEL 3.14 2 3.2 
 
Italy of Values IDV 2 1 2.2 
 
Brothers of Italy – National Alliance FDI-AN 2.17 1 2 
  Union of the Centre UdC 6.14 3 1.8 
Luxembourg Christian Social People's Party CSV 7 3 33.7 
 
Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party LSAP 6.33 3 20.3 
 
Democratic Party DP 6.33 3 18.3 
 
The Greens GRÉNG 6.33 3 10.1 
 
Alternative Democratic Reform Party ADR 3 2 6.6 
  The Left LÉNK 3.67 2 4.9 
Netherlands 
People's Party for Freedom and 
Democracy 
VVD 5.18 2 26.5 
 
Labour Party PvdA 5.45 2 24.7 
 
Freedom Party PVV 1.09 1 10.1 
 
Socialist Party SP  2.10 1 9.6 
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Christian Democratic Appeal CDA 5.55 3 8.5 
 
Democrats 66 D66 6.82 3 8 
 
Christian Union CU 3.44 2 3.1 
 
Green Left GL 6.55 3 2.3 
 
Reformed Political Party SGP 2.56 2 2.1 
 
50 Plus 50+ 4.80 2 1.9 
  Party for the Animals PvdD 3.71 2 1.9 
Portugal Social Democratic Party PSD 6.88 3 38.7 
 
Socialist Party PS 6.38 3 28.1 
 
People's Party CDS-PP 6.13 3 11.7 
 
Democratic Unity Coalition CDU 1.88 1 7.9 
  Left Bloc BE 3.13 2 5.2 
Spain People's Party PP 6.80 3 44.6 
 
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party PSOE 6.70 3 28.7 
 
United Left  IU 4.60 2 6.9 
 
Union, Progress and Democracy UPyD 6.67 3 4.7 
 
Convergence and Union CiU 6.30 3 4.2 
 
Amaiur AMAIUR 4.71 2 1.4 
 
Basque National Party EAJ-PNV 6.44 3 1.3 
  Republican Left of Catalonia ERC 5.56 3 1.1 
Sweden Social Democratic Workers' Party S 5.27 2 31 
 
Moderate Coalition Party M 6.36 3 23.3 
 
Sweden Democrats SD 1.27 1 12.9 
 
Environment Party The Greens MP 4.41 2 6.9 
 
Centre Party C 5.41 2 6.1 
 
Left Party V 2.14 1 5.7 
 
Liberals L (FP) 6.91 3 5.4 
  Christian Democrats KD 5.86 3 4.6 
United 
Kingdom 
Conservative and Unionist Party CON 3.14 2 36.1 
 
Labour Party LAB 5.57 3 29 
 
Liberal Democrats LD 6.71 3 23 
 
United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP 1.14 1 3.1 
  Scottish National Party SNP 6.29 3 1.7 
Source: 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey and Parties & Elections Database 
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Chapter 5. 
Did economic crisis boost the politicisation of European integration? 
Analysing EU issue voting in European Parliament elections 
 
 
The pro-/anti-EU orientation constitutes 
something of a “sleeping giant” that has the 
potential, if awakened, to impel voters to political 
behaviour that undercuts the bases for party 
mobilisation in many, if not most, European 
polities.  
Cees van der Eijk & Mark Franklin, 2004 
 
 
Introduction 
Does Europe matter more? Do attitudes towards European integration have an 
impact on voters’ choices in European Parliament elections? This time is 
different? Or better said, were European Parliament elections different in the 21st 
century? Have voting patterns changed in some countries with the recent 
economic crisis? The European Union has been going through various changes 
over the last decades. When the Maastricht Treaty was signed and sealed, both 
economic and political integration within the European Union had deepened 
significantly. The most important items in the Treaty, also the most relevant ones 
for this paper, are related to the economy. Since the Single European Act (SEA) 
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founded a single market on 31 December 1992, including an agreement on 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 that established the creation of 
the common currency “Euro” and the European Central Bank (ECB), the policy 
impact of the EU has been magnified. With the expansion of the EU’s authority 
over various new policy areas, European integration reached a whole new level. 
However, not all citizens approved of the increasing involvement of the European 
Union in various policy areas. This situation created the potential for the 
politicisation of European integration. Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin 
described the situation as a “sleeping giant” and underlined the potential for 
public Euroscepticism that could be converted into electoral gains by political 
entrepreneurs (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). The Eurozone crisis has been the 
final catalyst for politicisation of European integration and all the electoral 
consequences that come with it. The crisis itself has been one of the most 
important items on the European agenda for years. Its implications have received 
a lot of attention over the last decade. Since the beginning of the crisis, 
representation dynamics, party competition, and electoral behaviour have been 
researched frequently. As many consider this crisis to be one of the most 
important challenges that European integration has ever faced, it is important to 
understand its outcomes in relation to political behaviour. In this context, what 
has happened specifically in each country, whether a country has received some 
form of financial aid, can have relevant political ramifications. These 
repercussions are valid not only for the national electoral arena, but also for the 
European one. It is important to underline that European Parliament elections are 
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the only way that citizens can directly elect their representatives in the European 
Union.  
 
Various research established in the EU issue voting literature has demonstrated 
that attitudes towards European integration have an impact on national elections 
(Evans 1998, Gabel 2000, Tillman 2004, de Vries 2007, de Vries and Edwards 2009). 
Since the first elections in 1979, European Parliament elections have been often 
described as second-order national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Many 
studies prior to the 2009 elections concluded that voting decisions are primarily 
based on national politics (Schmitt 2005, Hix and Marsh 2007, Hix and Marsh 
2011). There is a certain expectation that the impact of the crisis and the EU 
institutions’ involvement affected the vote choice in the 2014 European elections. 
However, the complex nature of multi-level governance makes it very hard for 
ordinary citizens to attribute responsibility for economic and social policies. In 
other words, citizens may punish the incumbent for increasing taxes and cutting 
social expenditures while the true actors behind these outcomes may be the 
European Union level; it is indeed complicated for citizens to hold political actors 
accountable. Various studies show that the complex institutional structure in the 
European Union makes it very hard to define those who in the final account are 
the responsibles (de Vries, Edwards et al. 2011). However, recent work suggests a 
much stronger relation between European integration (Euro crisis and austerity 
measures most frequently) and voting behaviour (Hobolt, Spoon et al. 2009, de 
Vries, van der Brug et al. 2011, Hobolt and Spoon 2012). This has been explained 
by the fact that voters shifted the perceived responsibility for the economic 
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outcome and a part of the blame to the European Union due to the involvement 
of EU institutions in national politics during the most recent economic crisis 
(Hobolt and Tilley 2014).  
 
Looking at Southern European countries, a similar tendency can be seen. Maria 
Costa Lobo and Michael Lewis-Beck show that the interaction between the 
attribution of responsibility to the EU and economic perception has a significant 
impact on the vote in Southern European countries (Costa Lobo and Lewis-Beck 
2012). It could be assumed that the voters are likely to attribute responsibility to 
the EU for the “deterioration of their individual and national economic 
conditions” (Freire, Teperoglou et al. 2014). The utilitarian theory (Gabel 1998) 
claims that voters’ support for European integration is positively correlated to 
their “gains” from integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). With the economic 
crisis, this phenomenon became even more important. This means that citizens, to 
some extent, hold the EU responsible for economic policies. For this reason, it is 
expected that citizens’ position regarding European integration will have an 
impact on their political choices. 
 
All these considerations raise the following question: Does one’s position on 
European integration influence his or her vote choice? In this paper, this question 
will be assessed using cross-national post-electoral data from the European 
Election Studies (2004, 2009, and 2014). Further information regarding the data 
set will be provided in the following sections. The most economically troubled 
countries of the European Union (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) are 
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taken as case studies. The main reason behind the case selection is twofold: 
Firstly, these countries are the most effected by the economic crisis and the 
regulations set by the Troika. Secondly, research relating attitudes towards 
European integration and the vote in Southern European countries is rather 
limited since there is no major Eurosceptic tendency in this part of the continent. 
For these reasons, five economically troubled countries are taken as case studies in 
this work.  
 
A theoretical conceptualization of the politicisation of European integration and 
EU issue voting will be provided in the next section in order to establish the 
grounds for the research. Then, a short summary of the data used will be given, 
which will be followed by the analysis of the estimations of the models. The 
findings suggest that there are certain differences between countries in the 
explanatory power of the EU distance variable when related to the vote. The 
left/right dimension continues to be the principal explanatory power. However, in 
some countries it is possible to detect the increasing impact of European 
integration. In 2004, the only significant effect can be observed in Italy. However, 
after the crisis began in 2008, the impact became visible in Greece as well. In the 
2014 elections, European integration was a powerful explanatory variable both in 
Greece and Italy. In Portugal the coefficient became borderline significant, thus 
making further research necessary. Spain has remained immune to the impact of 
the EU distance variable, or the impact has been invisible.  
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The economic crisis and the vote 
As a summary of the economic and financial crisis in Europe, most scholars 
consider the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008 as the beginning 
of the economic crisis. However, the fall of Bear Stearns in spring was a clear early 
warning of what was to come. The economic turmoil came to Europe and 
spiralled into a sovereign debt crisis. Some members of the European Union 
(Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, and Spain) received 
financial help. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus had signed bailout 
agreements, Memorandums of Understanding (MoU), with the Troika.22 The 
name “Troika” – which is the governing body of the public debt crisis of the 
Eurozone countries consisting of the European Commission (EC), the European 
Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – began to be 
heard in daily news all around Europe.  
 
Table 5.1: Citizens' trust in their national parliament (in percentages)    
  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015  
Greece              
Tend to trust 61 52 55 53 41 40 24 15 11 11 13 20  
Ireland              
Tend to trust 40 40 40 38 39 21 17 30 21 18 22 28  
Italy              
Tend to trust 31 36 36 32 22 27 26 20 10 11 14 18  
Portugal              
Tend to trust 43 41 42 42 39 39 28 24 22 14 16 22  
Spain              
Tend to trust 48 39 39 50 47 31 22 20 10 8 9 12  
Source: Eurobarometer surveys, European Commission Public Opinion Unit    
Note: Averages have been taken for existing data points for each year.  
 
                                                 
22 Greece signed the first MoU in May 2010; the Irish one was signed in November 2010, followed by the 
Portuguese in June 2011. Greece had other one activated in March 2012, followed by the agreement with 
Cyprus in March 2013. As a final step Greece was rescued again in the summer of 2015. 
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Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 demonstrate the trust levels for economically troubled 
countries. Citizens’ trust in both national and European institutions reached an 
alarmingly low level. The stories of the economic crisis in Southern European 
countries are often linked together because of their similarities. These 
commonalities range from high unemployment rates (especially among young 
people) and high levels of government debt leading to increasing the tax burden 
on citizens and salary cuts on civil servants and pensioners. When the 2014 
European Parliament elections were held, the unemployment level in Southern 
European countries reached a record high in the post-war era. For example, in 
Greece and Spain, unemployment was around 25 per cent, and youth 
unemployment was above 50 per cent. 
 
Table 5.2: Citizens' trust in The European Union (in percentages)  
  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015         
Greece                     
Tend to trust 66 60 64 64 59 57 40 31 19 20 24 22         
Ireland                     
Tend to trust 57 51 56 55 56 46 42 34 31 32 35 39         
Italy                     
Tend to trust 55 56 52 51 41 47 45 37 27 24 27 34         
Portugal                     
Tend to trust 62 60 58 61 54 55 48 38 33 25 34 45         
Spain                     
Tend to trust 60 49 51 62 61 54 43 35 21 19 23 30         
Source: Eurobarometer surveys, European Commission Public Opinion Unit  
Note: Averages have been taken for existing data points for each year.   
 
This environment has led to a rise in the Eurosceptic vote in many countries 
(Treib 2014)23, in addition to voters’ dealignment.. This type of vote is not only, or 
perhaps not primarily, Eurosceptic in its character. Leftist Eurosceptic voters are 
                                                 
23 A list of Eurosceptic parties in Western Europe can be found in the Appendix. Parties with pro-/anti-
integration scores less than five are considered as Eurosceptics.  
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motivated by economic concerns and anti-austerity sentiments, while the right-
wing voters’ position focuses on nationalism and anti-immigration. Even if this is 
the case, there has been a surge of Euroscepticism within some of the most 
Europhile members of the Union (Clements, Nanou et al. 2014).  
 
To provide some examples of this situation, in the 2014 European Parliament 
elections the National Front (FN) in France obtained 24.9 per cent of the vote 
and became the leading party in the EP from France, while the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) received 26.8 per cent of the UK vote. Alternative für 
Deutschland (AfD) in Germany gained 7.1 per cent of German votes and entered 
the EP, even though it could not make it into its own national parliament because 
of the 5 per cent threshold. In the meantime, Southern Europe has received lots 
of attention thanks not only to its economic figures but also to its political 
developments. In Greece, the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) gained 26.6 per 
cent of the vote in EP elections and continued its success in the 2015 Greek 
national elections, obtaining 36.3 and 35.5 per cent, respectively, in January and 
September. It is crucial to underline that European integration held particular 
importance for Greece due to the danger of leaving the Union, a danger that is 
often referred to as “Grexit.” A “Grexit” could have been a new step in European 
(dis)integration. As a final remark, Greece has been the country with the highest 
number of elections in the last decade.  
 
Table 5.3 shows the electoral calendar in Western Europe. As it can be seen there 
is a certain difference between Greece and all other Western European countries. 
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As it can be seen from the table, all Southern European countries had snap 
elections. Why is the number of elections or the existence of snap elections 
important? The number of elections and the electoral change in those elections 
(volatility, to be concrete) are significant indicators of instability in the political 
scene of the country.24 Greece is followed by Spain in terms of number of 
elections. 
 
Table 5.3: National electoral calendar in Western Europe (2004-2016) 
Austria 2013 2008 2006     
Belgium 2014 2010 2007     
Denmark 2015 2011 2007 2005    
Finland 2015 2011 2007     
France 2012 2007      
Germany 2013 2009 2005     
Greece 2015II 2015I 2012II 2012I 2009 2007 2004 
Ireland 2016 2011 2007     
Italy 2013 2008 2006     
Luxembourg 2013 2009 2004     
Netherlands 2012 2010 2006     
Portugal 2015 2011 2009 2005    
Spain 2016 2015 2011 2008 2004   
Sweden 2014 2010 2006     
United Kingdom 2015 2010 2005         
Source: Parties and Elections Database  
 
In the case of Spain, the newly established party Podemos (“We Can”) won 8 per 
cent of the vote and five seats (among 54) in the 2014 EP elections. The success 
of this new party continued in local elections, together with a new rival from the 
right side of the political spectrum, Ciudadanos (Citizens), challenging the two-
party system in Spain. Today, the mayors of Barcelona and Madrid, as well as 
some other relevant cities, come from a coalition led by Podemos. The results of the 
                                                 
24 For more concrete analysis, the differences in electoral systems of all these countries should be taken 
into consideration. The analysis related to volatility and party system change can be found Paper 4. 
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general elections in December 2015 were not so different either. Podemos ended up 
being the third party with 42 seats (12.67 per cent of the vote), followed by 
Ciudadanos with 40 seats (13.93 per cent of the vote), producing the most 
segmented Spanish Parliament of all time. The country could not manage to form 
a government after years of bipolar politics and needed to repeat elections in June 
2016. Snap election benefited the incumbent and the Popular Party increased both 
its vote and seat share. 
 
In Italy, Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S) received 21.2 per cent of the vote in the 
2014 EP elections. There was a similar situation in the 2013 national elections 
when the party received 25.6 per cent of the vote and become the most popular 
party in the country. Today, Democratic Party leader Matteo Renzi governs the 
country. Back then the case of Italy was even more striking since the EU “forced” 
a government change by placing excessive pressure on the Silvio Berlusconi 
government, which finally led to the appointment of a technocrat, Mario Monti, 
as Prime Minister for the 2011 to 2013 period. While no new elections were 
called, there was a certain change in the country’s main economic policies. 
Although Italy seems to be more stable compared to Greece and Spain, it has 
been on edge for a long while. As an example, a recent article in The Economist 
named Italy’s banks as “Europe’s next crisis,” underlining the extensive loan 
burden that, apparently, cannot be handled (Economist 2016). 
 
Through all these developments in Greece, Italy, and Spain, Portugal and Ireland 
remained mostly immune. Portugal’s party system remained stable regardless of 
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the economic turmoil the country has been living. The Social Democratic Party 
(PSD), together with Christian democrats (CDS-PP), has been governing the 
country since 2011, keeping the Socialist Party (PS) as the main opposition. These 
three parties collectively received 64 per cent of the vote in the 2014 EP elections. 
In October 2015, Portugal held national elections, with the coalition PaF (Portugal 
à Frente – Portugal Ahead), formed by the PSD and CDS-PP, leading with 38.6 
per cent of the vote, while the main opposition received 32.3 per cent. 
Additionally, it is interesting to note that the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda – BE) 
received some attention from the political observers during the election period, 
who questioned whether Portugal can be grouped among more extreme 
counterparts in Southern Europe, even if this was far from the reality. The case of 
Ireland is roughly similar. Fianna Fáil (FF) has governed the country for a long 
time in alternation with Fine Gael (FG), another conservative political party, in 
times of crisis. FF faced a dramatic decline in the 2011 elections as a reaction to its 
poor economic management, although it somewhat recovered in 2016. The 
Labour Party and Sinn Féin (SF) also benefited from this period, strengthening 
this multiparty system.  
 
Keeping all these facts in mind, this paper aims to test the impact of European 
integration on voting behaviour. For understanding this phenomena, there is an 
ever-growing literature on the politicisation of European integration and EU issue 
voting, which will be the most helpful to explain this phenomenon. For this 
reason, the following section will establish the literature related to the research 
question of this work.  
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The level of politicisation of European integration in times of crisis 
The level of politicisation of European integration in times of economic crisis is 
an important concept that affects the main arguments behind this work. The cases 
in this paper, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, have been subject to the 
economic crisis and received financial aid in different forms. They have faced 
constant interaction with the Troika. The EU intervention in national politics 
triggered a certain blame shifting (Hobolt and Tilley 2014).  Governing parties 
started to use the European Union as a scapegoat, increasing the salience of the 
issue. For this reason, further politicisation of European integration is expected. It 
is important to underline that there has been various integration debates in the 
history of European integration. The comparative level of politicisation between 
them is an interesting question to ask for the future. Before going further, it is 
important to summarize the theoretical background of the politicisation of 
European integration. 
 
The scholarly literature on the impact of economic crisis on politicisation of 
European integration varies among different schools of thought.  Some scholars 
claim that the economic crisis has created a ‘cosmopolitan moment’ (Beck 2000) 
where national debates and European debates have been integrated (Risse 2014). 
Secondly, it is argued that the Eurozone crisis had led to an extraordinary level of 
politicisation (Statham and Trenz 2013) since many actors have been involved in 
the process and also demonstrations against the process. The third argument 
underlines that the main discussion, which mostly compares the level of 
politicisation in the economic crisis to previous integration debates, is based on 
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the conflict over redistribution both within and across member states (Statham 
and Trenz 2013). Long story short, all theoretical arguments have common 
ground in claiming that the euro crisis had intensely politicized European 
integration. A comparative work done by Hanspeter Kriesi shows that European 
governments, regardless of their ideological stance, have been punished in 
national elections after the crisis (Kriesi 2014). For this paper the main point is the 
theoretical connection between politicisation of European integration and EU 
issue voting. The next section will go through the literature on EU issue voting. It 
is important to establish the link between further politicisation of European 
integration and the vote. 
 
Conceptualization of EU issue voting in Southern Europe and Ireland 
What is the scope of EU issue voting in Southern Europe? To what extent do 
attitudes towards European integration influence the vote in European Parliament 
elections? Even if the vote share of Eurosceptic parties is not as high as in other 
countries, especially looking at the right side of the political spectrum, the impact 
of European integration can still be detected? Here it is important to underline 
that the discussion related to the impact of European integration in electoral 
dynamics did not start with the economic crisis. In the beginning of the 2000s, the 
gap between political elites and citizens had been extended, and European 
societies started to react and push back the elite-driven integration process. The 
Dutch and French referendums on the European Constitutional Treaty were clear 
indicators of the end of permissive consensus (Hooghe and Marks 2006, de Vries 
2007, Hooghe and Marks 2009). Hooghe and Marks (2006) claimed that this 
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permissiveness was converted into a “constraining dissensus.” Because the 
permissive consensus no longer exists, the impact of the EU issue can be 
investigated to explain electoral competition both in national elections and the EP 
elections (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996, Tillman 2004, van der Eijk and Franklin 
2004, de Vries 2007). According to van der Eijk and Franklin, a number of voters 
have preferences related to the EU; however, they do not have the platform to 
express these preferences. In other words, voters think differently about the EU, 
but there is no suitable choice option supplied by existing political parties. It is 
also underlined that voters are ready to voice their preferences concerning pro-
/anti-European integration; nevertheless, political parties prefer to compete over 
the left/right dimension since this dichotomy already exists. In short, for the last 
decade voters were already differentiated in their attitude towards European 
integration. If preferences related to European integration play a role in casting a 
vote, this process can be defined as EU issue voting. This approach suggests that 
voters’ views on European integration drive their vote to some extent. Research 
demonstrates that the degree of influence of voters’ positions on European 
integration on their vote varies cross-nationally depending both on the issue 
salience and on the availability of viable offers from the supply side (Tillman 2004, 
de Vries 2007, de Vries and Edwards 2009). Various scholars have shown that 
attitudes towards European integration can influence party choice in national 
elections (Evans 1998, Gabel 2000, Tillman 2004, de Vries 2007, de Vries and 
Edwards 2009). In her 2007 article, de Vries investigates EU issue voting in four 
countries’ national elections (UK, Denmark, Netherlands, and Germany), 
concluding that EU issue voting is prominent in Denmark and the UK (de Vries 
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2007). In her paper she argues that EU issue voting is conditional on the degree of 
EU salience among voters and the extent of partisan conflict over Europe. Later, 
the same author revisits the idea from the supply side this time and investigates 
the impact of EU issue voting on parties’ electoral success (de Vries 2010). Garry 
et al. on the other hand, asked the question “are referendums on EU treaties 
decided by voters’ attitudes to Europe (issue-voting) or by voters’ attitude to their 
national government?” opening up the discussion to another theoretical 
explanation that is used in elections related to Europe (Garry, Marsh et al. 2005) 
 
A different theory to explain voting behaviour in European Parliament elections 
centers on domestic political dynamics. According to the theory, some elections 
are perceived as second-order national elections since there is less at stake, 
including the EP elections. The distinction between important first-order elections 
(FOEs) and less important second-order elections (SOEs) dates back to Reif and 
Schmitt in the case of European Parliament elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). 
Likewise, the same approach was first proposed and used in the United States for 
midterm elections. “Surge and decline” theory (Campbell 1960), followed by 
“referendum theory” (Tufte 1975) and “cyclical model of presidential popularity” 
(Stimson 1976) were used to explain the first-order theory. In Europe, various 
scholars amended the second-order theory afterwards (Dinkel 1978, Reif 1984, 
Norris and Reif 1997, Marsh 1998, Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004, Hix and Marsh 
2007). According to Schmitt and Toygür, the 2014 European Parliament elections 
are still second-order national elections (Schmitt and Toygür 2016). Following this 
logic, this can be expected to be the case in Southern European elections as well. 
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Even if this assumption holds, the politicisation of European integration will have 
an impact on both national and European elections since they have been 
harmonized in light of current challenges (Risse 2014). 
 
So, the main question stands: Can voting behaviour in European Parliament 
elections be explained by voters’ attitude towards European integration (the EU 
issue-voting)? This work builds on the existing literature, mainly testing the 
following hypotheses:  
 
H1: The distance between voters and parties on the EU integration scale is 
expected to have a greater impact on the EP vote during the crisis and in the post-
crisis period than before. 
 
H2: The distance between voters and parties on the left/right scale is expected to 
have a smaller impact on the EP vote during the crisis and in the post-crisis 
period than before. 
 
As it is already known from the literature, in every election issues, leaders, and 
partisan attachments play an important role while casting a vote. In European 
Parliament elections, leaders do not usually play a significant role.25 For this 
reason no variable related to leadership was introduced in the model. European 
Union integration and left/right dimensions are independent and orthogonal, 
since Hix and Lord claimed the Eurosceptics or Eurocritics exist both on the left 
                                                 
25 With Spitzenkandidaten, candidates for the president of the European Commission, this can change in the 
future. However, for the time being, the impact is limited (Schmitt, H., et al., 2015). 
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and right side of the ideological spectrum based on the study they conducted on 
voting behaviour of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (Hix and 
Lord 1997). For this reason, both left/right and European integration dimensions 
are included in the model.  
 
Methodology and data 
In order to test the relationship between the vote and the distance between voters’ 
positions and average of parties’ positions on a European integration, individual-
level survey data from the 2004, 2009, and 2014 European Election Studies (EES) 
will be employed. EES are post-electoral surveys with representative samples in 
each EU member state (Schmitt, Bartolini et al. 2009, Egmond, van der Brug et al. 
2013, Schmitt, Hobolt et al. 2015). The data provides the opportunity to explore 
the degree of EU issue voting before, during, and after the economic crisis. EES 
data includes information on voters’ self-perceptions and party perceptions of EU 
positions as well as left/right positions. In addition, it has all the socio-economic 
control variables that could be needed. In this regard the dataset provides us the 
opportunity to compare all the cases over time, since it includes more or less the 
same set of questions for each election.   
 
The empirical analysis examines the existence and extent of EU issue voting in 
European Parliament elections, employing a conditional logit (CL) regression 
model. Conditional logit model allows us to use not only case specific 
independent variables but also alternative specific ones. This models the impact of 
the distance between voters’ self-placement and their mean party placement 
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regarding European integration on vote choice for 2004, 2009, and 2014. The data 
set is “stacked,” reshaping the data matrix from wide to long formats for each 
country separately (Van der Eijk 2002, van der Eijk, van der Brug et al. 2006). The 
dependent variable is party choice, which is a categorical variable with multiple 
values. For this reason ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate 
(Alvarez and Nagler 1998, Alvarez and Nagler 2000). As already said, CL 
regression model allows us to introduce both alternative specific and case specific 
variables (McFadden 1974). In this model, what is investigated is how the 
characteristics of political parties (i.e. their positions on European integration 
relative to voter’s position) can influence the vote choice within a spatial 
framework. For this reason, a conditional logit is employed instead of a 
multinomial logit, which focuses on individual voters rather than issue positions 
of political parties.  
 
Following the literature on voting behaviour, the distance between the voter and 
the party on a given issue is expected to have an impact on the vote cast in an 
election if that issue is important for the voter. Table 5.4 provides the descriptions 
of the variables. For the purpose of this paper, the distance between the self-
placement of the voter and average perception of the political party is calculated, 
both for the left/right dimension and the European integration dimension. These 
two variables are the main predictors of the model – controlled for socio-
economic variables such as age, education and gender. Government approval is 
also included to the model since previous research suggests that voting behaviour 
in the European Parliament is based on national considerations (Reif and Schmitt 
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1980). Perception of the economy is also added to the model since this work 
claims politicisation of European integration has been increased with the 
Eurozone crisis.  
 
Table 5.4: Description of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Vote choice Vote choice for a particular party in a given election 
  
Independent 
Variables 
 
Left/right 
distance 
Operationalized by subtracting a respondent's self-placement from the average position of the 
party on an eleven-point ideology scale (where 0 indicates left and 10 indicates right). 
  
EU distance 
Operationalized by subtracting a respondent's self-placement from the average position of the 
party on an eleven-point European integration scale (where 0 stands for "European unification has 
already gone too far" and 10 stands for "European unification should be pushed further"). 
  
Control 
Variables 
 
Age Respondent's age at the time of a specific election 
  
Gender Respondent's gender (0=male, 1=female) 
  
Religiosity 
Respondent's church attendance (0=no church attendance, 3=the most frequent church 
attendance) 
  
Education Respondent's level of education (0=low education, 1=high education) 
  
Union 
membership 
Respondent's union membership (0=not union member, 1=union member) 
  
Government 
approval 
Approval of respondent’s government (0=disapproval, 1=approval) 
  
Perception of 
the economy 
Retrospective and sociotropic perception of the economy. Operationalized by recoding the 
responses from the question: "What do you think about the economy? Compared to 12 months 
ago, do you think that the general economic situation of this country is a lot better (=5) to a lot 
worse (=1).  
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The following section will present the empirical results. Appendix two provides a 
list of all political parties that are included in this analysis for the 2004, 2009, and 
2014 elections. 
 
A comparative analysis of voting behaviour in Southern Europe and Ireland 
The EU issue voting hypothesis, which claims voters will vote for the party that 
resembles their attitude towards European integration (i.e. smallest distance) is 
tested. The existence of EU issue voting can be observed in negative and 
statistically significant conditional logit coefficients for EU distance. In other 
words, a smaller distance should indicate a higher probability to vote for that 
party. Table 5.5 presents the results of full models for three points in time, namely 
the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections.  
 
Table 5.5: Exploring the interaction between the vote and EU distance  
 Greece Ireland 
 2004 2009 2014 2004 2009 2014 
Left/Right distance -0.61*** -0.49*** -0.62*** -0.42*** -0.25*** -0.53*** 
 (-0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (-0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
EU distance -0.08 -0.14*** -0.16** -0.06 -0.14* -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.31) 
 Italy Portugal 
 2004 2009 2014 2004 2009 2014 
Left/Right distance -0.65*** -0.67*** -0.62*** -0.49*** -0.54*** -0.60*** 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
EU distance -0.23*** -0.09 -0.38*** -0.001 -0.09 -0.59* 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.19) 
 Spain    
 2004 2009 2014    
Left/Right distance -1.18*** -0.45*** -0.45***    
 (0.12) (0.05) (0.06)    
EU distance 0.17 0.10 0.15    
  (0.19) (0.13) (0.27)       
Source: European Election Studies 2004, 2009 and 2014. 
Notes: Table entries are conditional logit regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is respondent's vote choice for a particular party in a given election. The coefficients are 
estimated with full models that are already described. 
*** significant at p<0.001, ** significant at p<0.01, * significant at p<0.05  
125 
 
Due to space limitations, the table will provide only CL estimates for EU distance 
(main explanatory variable) and left/right distance. Still, the models are fully 
specified, including socio-economic variables, government approval, and 
perception of the economy. The results provide clear support for the EU issue 
voting hypothesis, with negative and statistically significant coefficients in two 
countries, even when the model is controlled for national considerations, such as 
government approval or perception of the economy. In the case of Greece, there 
are significant results supporting the hypothesis during post-crisis elections, while 
in the case of Italy, EU distance was statistically significant during the 2004 and 
2014 elections. On the contrary, any trace of EU issue voting in Spain cannot be 
found. Ireland and Portugal, both of which only had one election, significantly, 
even if it is borderline significant, show traces of EU issue voting. In all countries 
and elections, left/right distance is negative and statistically significant.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Until very recently, Southern European countries were identified as pro-
European, since the mainstream parties and citizens shared a positive consensus 
on European integration, while anti-European sentiments were mostly 
demonstrated by the radical parties of the right and the left. The situation began 
to be questioned in the post-crisis period since the critical role that the EU played 
during the crisis, with bailout packages and austerity measures, changed the public 
perception of the EU. For Southern European radical left parties, anti-austerity 
positions had positive electoral outcomes. This work questioned this equilibrium 
from the demand side by asking the following question: Can attitudes towards 
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European integration shape voting behaviour in European Parliament elections? 
In this paper this question has been assessed using cross-national data from the 
European Election Studies (2004, 2009, and 2014). Economically troubled 
Southern European countries, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, as well as Ireland 
have been examined as case studies wherein similarities regarding the economic 
crisis and the differences in their electoral context have been discussed. This study 
began with the expectation that party choice in European elections is decided, at 
least to some extent, by attitudes towards European integration. It has been 
operationalized measuring the impact of EU distance on vote choice. The 
expectation was that explanatory power of this variable increased for the post-
crisis period. The empirical model, using a condition logit regression model and 
exploring both case specific and alternative specific variables, demonstrates the 
existence of EU issue voting, at least in some of the selected countries. 
 
The findings suggest that there are certain differences in the explanatory power of 
the EU distance variable when it is related it to the vote. In 2004 the only 
significant impact can be observed in Italy. However, after the crisis began in 
2008, the impact became visible in Greece as well. In the 2014 elections, the EU 
distance was a powerful explanatory variable both in Greece and Italy. In Portugal 
the CL coefficient became borderline significant, which requires further research. 
Spain has remained immune to the impact of the EU distance variable, or the 
impact is invisible throughout these analyses.  
 
127 
 
So, what can be the reason for this immunity? Here are some possible projections. 
First of all, it can be assumed that the issues related to the economic crisis or 
austerity measures were not considered as EU issues but rather left/right issues. 
To be more concrete, regulations related to the economy fit better in the left/right 
spectrum. The second explanation fits the second-order theory, which claims that 
European Parliament elections are second-order national elections, which means 
that national concerns play a role in voting behaviour. Even if they are more 
harmonized than ever, it is still national dynamics that play the most important 
role. For better analysis, issue salience should be introduced.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 5.1: Eurosceptic parties in Western Europe (Voters' Average Placed into EP Groups) 
Country Party Abb. Party Name in English 
EU 
Integration 
Position 
Vote 
2014 
(%) 
Vote 
2009 
(%) 
EP 
Group 
(2014) 
Seats 
(2014) 
AT FPÖ Austrian Freedom Party 3,59 19,72 12,71 NI 4 
 BZÖ Alliance for the Future of Austria 4,06 0,47 4,58 - - 
BE VB Flemish Interest 3,96 4,26 9,85 NI 1 
 PTB-go! Workers Party of Belgium 4,67 2 0,43 - - 
DK 
Dansk 
Folkeparti 
Danish People's Party 4,06 26,6 14,8 ECR 4 
 
Folkebevægels
en mod EU 
People's Movement against the EU 3,62 8,1 7 
GUE/
NGL 
1 
FI PS True Finns 3,32 12,9 
14 
(Coal.) 
ECR 2 
 VAS Left Wing Alliance  4,97 9,3 5,9 
GUE/
NGL 
1 
FR FN National Front 3,65 24,86 6,3 NI 23 
 DLR Arise the Republic 4,61 3,82 1,77 - - 
 NPA New Anticapitalist Party 4,68 0,3 4,9 - - 
DE AfD Alternative for Germany 3,17 7,1 - ECR 7 
 Piraten Pirates 4,63 1,4 0,9 
Greens
/EFA 
1 
EL XA Golden Dawn 4,02 9,39 - NI 3 
 KKE Communist Party of Greece 4,06 6,11 8,35 NI 2 
IE - - - - - - - 
IT M5S Five Star Movement 4,88 21,15 - EFDD 17 
 Lega Nord Northern League 4,64 6,15 10,2 NI 5 
LU ADR 
Alternative Democratic Reform 
Party 
4,21 7,53 7,37 - - 
NL PVV Party of Freedom 2,19 13,32 16,97 NI 4 
 SP Socialist Party 4,71 9,6 7,1 
GUE/
NGL 
2 
PT - - - - - - - 
ES ERC Catalan Republic Left 4,94 
4,01 
(Coal) 
- 
Greens
/EFA 
2 
SE SD Sweden Democrats 2,74 9,67 3,27 EFDD 2 
 VP Left Party 4,12 6,3 5,66 
GUE/
NGL 
1 
UK UKIP 
United Kingdom Independence 
Party 
3,83 26,77 16,09 EFDD 24 
  Con Conservative Party 4,99 23,31 27 ECR 19 
Source: European Election Study 2014 (for EU integration scores) and EP 2014 official results (for votes, groups and 
seats). 
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Appendix Table 5.2: Political parties in included in the analysis (2004, 2009 and 2014) 
Country Abb. Name in English Party Category Founded 
Greece 
ND New Democracy 
Liberal conservatism                     
Christian democracy 
1974 
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement Social democracy 1974 
KKE Communist Party of Greece Communism 1924 
SYN Coalition of Left Radical new left 1991 
LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally Right wing populism 2000 
SYRIZA Coalition of the Radical Left 
Democratic socialism              
Anti-globalisation 
2004 
OP Ecologist Greens Green Politics 2002 
XA Golden Dawn 
Nationalism                    
Far-right politics 
1985 
ELIA Olive Tree Social democracy 2014 
To 
Potami 
The River Social liberalism 2014 
ANEL Independent Greeks 
National conservatism 
Euroscepticism 
2012 
Italy 
L'Ulivo The Olive Tree Centre-left 1995 
FI Forza Italia 
Liberal conservatism                     
Christian democracy 
1991 
AN National Alliance Conservatism  1995 
PRC Communist Refoundation Party Communism 1991 
UdC Union of the Centre Christian democracy 2002 
LN North League 
Regionalism                      
Euroscepticism 
1991 
PdL The People of Freedom Christian democracy 2009 
PD Democratic Party Social Democracy 2007 
IdV Italy of Values Centrism, Anti-corruption 1998 
M5S Five Star Movement 
Anti-establishment                                
Eurosceptic 
2009 
NCD New Centre-Right Christian democracy 2013 
SEL Left Ecology Freedom Democratic socialism 2010 
Ireland 
FF Fianna Fail Conservatism 1926 
FG Fine Gael 
Liberal conservatism                     
Christian democracy 
1933 
GP Green Party Green politics 1981 
Lab Labour Party Social democracy 1912 
SF Sinn Fein 
United Ireland      
Democratic socialism 
1905 
(1970) 
SP Socialist Party Social democracy 1996 
Portugal 
PS Socialist Party Social democracy 1973 
PSD Social Democratic Party Liberal conservatism 1974 
CDS-PP People's Party 
Christian democracy        
National conservatism  
1974 
BE Left Bloc Socialism 1999 
CDU Democratic Unity Coalition 
Communism                   
Eco-socialism 
1987 
PCP Portuguese Communist Party Communism 1921 
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PEV Ecological Party The Greens Eco-socialism 1982 
MPT Earth Party  
Green politics                          
Centre-right 
1993 
Spain 
PP People's Party 
Christian democracy        
National conservatism  
1989 
PSOE Spanish Socialist Workers' Party Social democracy 1979 
IU United Left Socialism, Communism 1986 
CiU Convergence and Union Catalan nationalism 
1978 
(2001) 
ERC Republican Left of Catalonia 
Separatism            
Democratic socialism 
1931 
UpYD Union, Progress and Democracy Centralism 2007 
Podemos We Can Democratic socialism 2014 
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Chapter 6.   
Conclusions 
 
 
There will be no peace in Europe if the States 
rebuild themselves on the basis of national 
sovereignty, with its implications of prestige politics 
and economic protection. They must have larger 
markets. Their prosperity is impossible, unless the 
States of Europe form themselves in a European 
Federation. 
Jean Monnet, 5 August 1943 
 
 
A short summary of the idea 
The establishment of the European Community has been one of the most 
important projects of our time. In addition to securing peace, political elites 
initiated European integration in the 1950s to further economic prosperity in the 
continent. Until the late 1980s, the process of integration was elite-driven and 
rather smooth. When the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992, integration 
turned political, which beget existential discussions. With the completion of the 
Single European Market in 1993 and with the agreement on an Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 - which involved the creation of a European 
Central Bank (ECB) and a common currency (the euro) – the European Union’s 
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influence on member states’ national dynamics increased significantly. For these 
reasons, the European project became an entity expanding beyond the scope of its 
initial reason for creation. Furthermore, with enlargement waves, different regions 
of the European continent were included in the map of the European Union. 
With all this widening and deepening, the politicisation of European integration in 
public debates increased. Throughout this history, politicisation has peaked at 
different moments. These include the introduction of the common currency euro, 
Eastern enlargement, and ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. This work particularly 
focuses on the economic crisis as a catalyser among all these processes and asks, 
does Europe matter more in electoral dynamics today? It investigates the changing 
relevance of European integration both from the supply and the demand side of 
the equation. On the one hand, Western European member states have been 
taken as case studies in party system analyses. On the other, Southern European 
countries were used in voting behaviour models. Similarities, as well as 
differences, among these countries will be underlined. Since regional dynamics, 
political culture, and heritage play an important role in electoral dynamics; the 
analyses have been region-specific in both cases.  
 
Thus, this leads to the following question: What are the electoral consequences of 
the politicisation of European integration in times of economic crisis? To answer 
this question, it is important to interpret politicisation. In general, politicisation 
can be defined as “expansion of the scope of conflict within the political system” 
(Grande and Hutter, 2016, p. 7). Even if the concept has been discussed by 
various scholars in different forms (Schmitter 1969, de Wilde and Zürn 2012), the 
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consensus includes three conceptual dimensions: issue salience, actor expansion, 
and actor polarization (de Wilde, Leupold et al. 2016, Kriesi 2016). It is also 
crucial to link politicisation of European integration to the bigger picture of 
globalisation and transformation of political conflict in Western Europe (Grande 
and Kriesi 2015). This work uses the politicisation of European integration during 
the Eurozone crisis as a framework for measuring the impacts of politicisation on 
electoral dynamics. It is not a coincidence that the concept of politicisation has 
been selected to further explain the intensification of “Europe” on the discourse 
of elections. Integration steps that can be taken as further transfer of authority – 
which in this case is the authority related to economic governance – are the most 
accurate occasions for the politicisation of European integration (Hutter, Grande 
et al. 2016). The main reason behind this selection is the combined impact of all 
major integration steps and the transformation of cleavages in Western Europe 
thanks to further denationalisation and globalisation (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2008, 
Kriesi, Grande et al. 2012). In other words, it is not only Euroscepticism, for 
example, in the narrower sense that affects party systems in member states but 
instead the long-term politicisation of integration together with the general 
globalisation trend in Europe (and in the world). Taking this entire framework 
into account, the following section summarises the main findings of one 
descriptive and two empirical chapters of the thesis. The descriptive chapter deals 
with the story of the economic crisis, while empirical chapters look into detailed 
dynamics of party systems and elections.  
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Main findings 
The research covered in this work began with the assumption that after all major 
integration steps, the impact of “Europe” should matter more in electoral 
dynamics. Even if the time span included in this work mostly focuses on 
explaining pre-/post-Eurozone crisis, all the dynamics that led to European 
Union of today have been acknowledged in the background. For testing the 
hypotheses related to party system change and electoral behaviour in Europe, 
there are two main empirical chapters in this work. The first one deals with the 
changes in Western European party systems, while the other measures the 
possible impact of European integration on the vote. In democratic systems, 
elections are perceived as the most institutionalised opportunity to articulate 
political opinions, both for the voters and for the political parties that mobilise 
these opinions. It is expected that citizens’ attitudes towards European integration 
will be reflected in their vote. Meanwhile, party systems are expected to change 
thanks to further mobilization of these new structural cleavages.  
 
Before going further into the empirical chapters of this work, it is important to 
summarise what has been argued in Chapter 3.  The causes of the economic crisis 
in Europe were discussed, giving special focus to Southern European countries 
and Ireland, and analysing the effects of the crisis on electoral dynamics with 
special reference to European integration. The main reason for the case selection 
is to provide background information for Chapter 5, where voting behaviour in 
these five countries are taken into consideration. Chapter 3 started by explaining 
the differences between a debt crisis and a banking crisis, which is a key issue for 
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exploring the Eurozone crisis, understanding the details of governments’ 
economic management decisions and underlining the differences between the case 
countries. Using this background information, main causes of the European 
sovereign debt crisis are also explored. In this discussion, the first argument for 
the causes of the crisis was entry into a monetary union, which made the flow of 
cheap credit from Northern to Southern European countries possible and created 
massive current account imbalances within the Union. The second argument was 
the sudden stop of cross-border lending due to the economic crisis in the United 
States and the accompanying economic deterioration, which made funding for the 
Southern countries depending on it very difficult. The third argument, which was 
policy failures and lack of coordinated adjustment mechanisms in EMU, worsened 
the crisis and could not prevent it from becoming a contagion. After exploring the 
main reasons of the crisis, Chapter 3 then elaborated on the specific circumstances 
in economically troubled Southern European countries, namely Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain, as well as Ireland, through case-by-case reviews and discussed 
the specific causes and effects of the crisis in these countries. 
 
As a result of the economic crisis, the aforementioned countries had to implement 
austerity measures to reduce their budget deficits. Additionally, Greece, Ireland, 
and Portugal were bailed out, with severe economic adjustment programmes 
imposed on them. In Chapter 3, it was suggested that the austerity measures, 
including tax increases, reduction in public sector wages and employment, 
worsening of working conditions, and increase in the retirement age, gave rise to 
anger and frustration within societies and decreased citizens’ trust of 
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representative institutions. In Ireland and Portugal, in the first elections after the 
austerity measures were imposed, the incumbents were punished, but the political 
system stayed stable. In Greece, Spain, and Italy, new political movements and 
parties emerged in the political sphere. They also affected the discourse of 
traditional mainstream parties and changed the fundamental features of party 
systems in these countries.  
 
Focusing on the already mentioned party systems, Chapter 4 analysed the impact 
of the politicisation of European integration on these systems. This chapter 
revisited the analysis of Peter Mair, comparing format and mechanics of party 
systems within Western European member states. In 2000, Peter Mair looked at 
the format and mechanics of party systems of fifteen Western European countries 
using the party positioning data by Leonard Ray (Ray 1999). As already stated, the 
format of a party system can be described as the number of relevant parties in the 
electoral arena. The mechanics of a party system, on the other hand, are concerned 
with the modes of interaction between the related parties. According to his logic, a 
certain increase in the effective number of parties can be taken as a sign of party 
system change. This work retested all his hypotheses with recent data. He 
concluded that “Europe” has a limited impact on national party systems for 
various reasons. The main causes mentioned in his paper, the limits of the 
spillover effect, the absence of a European party system, and the differences 
between electoral arenas will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
Chapter 4 replicated his analysis with recent Chapel Hill expert survey data 
(Bakker, Edwards et al. 2015), providing electoral information using the same 
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classification among national parties— strongly pro-European integration, 
strongly anti-European integration, and neither strongly pro- nor strongly anti-
European integration—as well as offering the existing literature on party system 
indicators, their change, and the attributed reasons behind this change.  
 
In Chapter 4 there were two main hypotheses replicating Mair’s analysis. The first 
hypothesis anticipated a certain increase in the effective number of parties due to 
the politicisation of European integration in times of economic crisis. The second 
hypothesis aimed to establish the link between issue polarization and volatility. 
The main reason behind this analysis was to measure the impact of issue 
polarization of European integration on party system change. The electoral 
change, measured by volatility, can be taken as an indicator of party system change 
as well (Mair 1997, Pennings 1998, Donovan and Broughton 1999). From this 
point the chapter tested the impact of issue polarization of European integration 
on volatility, finding a positive and significant impact. The analysis could also be 
repeated changing the dependent variable to “Type A” volatility only, which is 
volatility caused by new party entry and old party exit (Powell and Tucker 2014). 
This idea should be developed further in the future. 
 
Chapter 5 examined the impact of European integration on voting behaviour in 
European Parliament (EP) elections using European Elections Studies (EES) 
datasets. Datasets from the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections were used in an 
assessment of the pre-/post-crisis period. Southern European countries and 
Ireland were taken as case studies. The main hypothesis claims that the distance 
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between voters and parties on the EU integration scale is expected to have a 
greater impact on the EP vote in the post-crisis period than before. For testing 
this hypothesis, conditional logit discrete choice models were employed. These 
models allow us to use not only case specific independent variables but also 
alternative specific ones. The impact of the distance between voters’ self-
placement and their mean party placement regarding European integration on 
vote choice has been modelled. The data set is “stacked,” reshaping the data 
matrix from wide to long formats for each country separately (Van der Eijk 2002, 
van der Eijk, van der Brug et al. 2006). When the results were explored, it was 
observed that in some countries the distance variable of European integration had 
a negative and significant coefficient, while in some others, like Spain, the 
left/right dimension was still the main explanatory variable. Further country-
specific research is required to fully understand the situation in these countries. All 
in all, both empirical chapters conclude by demonstrating, at least in some cases, 
the significant impact of European integration on electoral dynamics. Still, further 
discussion on the existence of European integration as an “issue” for citizens is 
needed. This will also enrich the conceptual understanding of EU issue voting. 
 
European integration in the 21st century: What has changed? 
The limits of spillover and the absence of a European party system 
In his 2000 paper, Peter Mair claimed that the main reasons behind the lack of 
European integration’s direct impact on national party systems are the limits of 
spillover and the absence of a European party system. Today, this idea requires 
further discussion. First of all, it is important to highlight that direct election to 
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the EP, starting from 1979, is an important cornerstone of democratic 
representation in the EU. It opened a whole new arena for electoral 
representation and created another incentive for political parties. However, there 
has always been a problem growing deeper throughout the years. The turnout in 
the EP elections has been low, trending downward in all elections.  Many scholars 
have been trying to explain the reasons behind this phenomenon (Franklin 2001, 
Flickinger and Studlar 2007, van der Eijk and van Egmond 2007).  While 
discussing the limited impact of Europe on the national arena, Mair underlined 
two main assumptions. The first claims that national political parties are 
“gatekeepers”. He argued that they “rehearse” national politics once again within 
the European electoral arena. Even the profiles of the EP candidates support this 
claim. National political parties mostly choose people that have been serving in 
the national arena and remain connected to their parties, instead of based on real 
interest, knowledge, and dedication to European politics. Without any doubt, the 
“gatekeeper” claim also comes from the discussion of the second-order character 
of EP elections. As mentioned by Reif and Schmitt (Reif and Schmitt 1980), and 
also restated by Schmitt and Toygur very recently (Schmitt and Toygür 2016), EP 
elections tend to be second-order national elections in which people vote with 
national concerns. In short, he claims that both parties and voters perceive the 
European arena as a repetition of the national arena. 
 
According to the logic of this work, EP elections should become “less” second-
order when the new conjuncture of Europe is taken into consideration in times of 
further politicisation of European integration. Further, there is an alternative way 
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of thinking. Even if EP elections are still second-order, which means that parties 
are competing in national dimensions and also voters are voting in line with that, 
the national arena is including more “Europe” today. This means that in any case, 
Europe should matter more in electoral dynamics, including European Parliament 
elections, even if the second-order elections theory is still valid. The spillover 
effect should support further politicisation of European integration in all 
elections. 
 
The second argument of Mair is the absence of a European party system, which 
he claims is based on the inexistence of competition. According to him, this 
situation makes parties within the EP a “collection” of parties instead of a system 
with stable interactions (Mair, 2000, p. 38). Predictable patterns of competition are 
required for “Europarties” to be called a party system. Today the situation could 
be again discussed within the recent competition for an unofficial executive office. 
The Council has approved the party whose candidate is the winner of the 8th 
European Parliament elections, in the present case the European People’s Party’s 
(EPP) Jean Claude Junker, to be the president of the European Commission (EC). 
Therefore, for the first time in the EP’s history, party candidates indirectly 
competed for the presidency, were elected by the votes of citizens, and were 
approved by head of states. Even if the citizens are not so aware of the fact that 
they can elect the EC President, future elections could be different (Schmitt, 
Hobolt et al. 2015).  
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Different arenas, different competences? 
In his article, Peter Mair pointed out the necessity of distinction between different 
electoral arenas, the local/regional arena, the national arena, and the European 
arena. He also claimed that the division of issue responsibility did not emerge in 
the case of Europe like it did between regional and national arenas. In addition, he 
discussed the role of the EP, which changed with the Lisbon Treaty, in European 
decision-making in comparison to the effect of national governments through the 
Council(s). Mair stated that individual voters could transmit their preferences for 
European decision-making through the national governments, which is still valid 
today. However, he maintained his argument over the distinction of “issues” 
decided by the national arena and the European arena, which has been changing 
over the years. Today, national policy making has the influence of Europe, and it is 
not fully in the control of inter-governmental institutions, especially when it 
comes to economic policies. In short, with the economic crisis, the impact of 
European institutions on national policy making has been increased. The 
distinction between “national” issues and “European” issues has blurred in some 
specific areas. All in all, it is still true that as long as the intergovernmental 
dimension dominates (or at least has the same influence with) the supranational 
one, political parties will keep focusing on competing in the national arena, since 
they can control it better. However, it is also true that Europe increasingly 
restricts the policy manoeuvre of member state governments, which should be 
accepted by the political parties that would like to rule their countries.  
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Today, Europe itself is also way more visible in the national arena because of the 
blame-shifting attitude of national governments. In other words, discussions on 
European integration – mostly related to economic governance – are not removed 
from the national arena and depoliticized anymore, as Mair claimed in his paper. 
Today, Europe has a say that is also acknowledged by political leadership in 
domestic politics and often used for blame-shifting in the national arena (Vegetti, 
Poletti et al. 2013, Bellucci 2014, Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou et al. 2014). This 
claim that blame-shifting increases the level of politicisation of European 
integration should be investigated further in the future. 
 
Future research agenda 
European integration in times of crises has been a very popular topic for political 
scientists. Every major step taken has brought many existential questions with it. 
This time it was the Eurozone crisis that brought the future of European 
integration into question for scholars. One of the most important discussions here 
is the consequence of politicisation and its link to the future of European 
integration. It is clear that politicisation of European integration is part of a bigger 
discussion related to representative democracy in Western Europe. Kriesi et al. 
defined politicisation of European integration as a part of globalisation and a new 
cleavage that is called “integration-demarcation” (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2006, 
Kriesi, Grande et al. 2008, Kriesi, Grande et al. 2012). According to research 
related to globalisation or the process of denationalisation, as a result of 
globalisation there will be issues related to economic competition, cultural 
diversity, and political integration that require common reaction (Grande and 
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Kriesi 2015). According to Grande and Kriesi, Eurosceptic parties of the extreme 
right further exploit this cleavage. For this reason, all this research would be 
enriched if the literature on Euroscepticism were also included, mainly 
discriminating between different types of Euroscepticism, from the extreme left 
and from the populist right. In this regard, for the radical left, the main reaction to 
opening up borders relies on opposition to economic liberalisation. Meanwhile, 
the response of the right side of the political spectrum is mainly based on 
xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiments. Non-mainstream political parties 
challenge three mainstream party families, namely Christian democrats, socialists, 
and liberals. For this reason, replicating the same analysis with different types of 
party families will enrich the study. 
 
As for future research, a case expansion would be useful for comparative reasons. 
Attitudes towards European integration are not only shaped by economic interests 
but also cultural perceptions (Diez Medrano 2003). They are not only defined by 
national culture but also regional experiences rooted in history (Hooghe and 
Marks 2004). For this reason, including different countries from different regions 
of the European Union into the analysis would be enlightening.  
 
Last but not least, studying the populism literature and including populist appeal 
of anti-immigration sentiments into the analysis will be very important for the 
future research of European integration. It is clear that populist discourse is more 
visible than ever and will definitely hold a certain place in the future comparative 
research agenda of scholars. Therefore, prospective future works should include 
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theoretical thinking about the relationship between Euroscepticism, populism, and 
further politicisation of European integration. This attempt would enlighten the 
future understanding of the importance of “Europe” in national electoral 
dynamics; both at the supply level and the demand level.   
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Conclusiones en Castellano 
 
 
No habrá paz en Europa si los estados se reconstruyen 
en base a su soberanía nacional, lo cual tendrá 
implicaciones tanto en su prestigio político como en su 
protección económica. Los estados europeos deben contar 
con un gran mercado. No prosperarán a menos que creen 
una Federación Europea. 
Jean Monnet, 5 Agosto 1943 
 
 
Un breve resumen 
La creación de la Unión Europea ha sido uno de los proyectos más importantes 
de nuestro tiempo. Además de asegurar la paz, la integración europea se inició por 
parte de las elites en la década de 1950 para promover la prosperidad económica 
en el continente. Hasta finales de 1980, el proceso de integración era 
eminentemente económico y manejado por las elites. Cuando se firmó el Tratado 
de Maastricht en 1992, el proceso de integración europeo dio un salto cualitativo 
hacia una integración política, lo que implicó que surgieran discusiones de mayor 
profundidad. Posteriormente, la construcción del mercado único europeo en 1993 
y el acuerdo sobre una Unión Económica y Monetaria (UEM) en 1999 trajeron 
consigo la creación de un Banco Central Europeo (BCE) y de una moneda común 
(el euro), lo que provocó que la influencia de la Unión Europea en la dinámica 
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nacional de los estados miembros aumentase significativamente. Por todo ello, el 
proyecto europeo se transformó en una realidad que iba mucho más allá de sus 
propósitos originales. Por otra parte, a través de las sucesivas olas de ampliación, 
los diferentes estados que conforman el continente europeo se han ido incluyendo 
dentro del mapa de la Unión Europea. Con esta ampliación y profundización, la 
politización de la integración europea en los debates públicos se ha incrementado. 
A lo largo de la historia se han producido diversos momentos álgidos en esta 
politización de naturaleza europea. Destacan la introducción del euro, la moneda 
común, la ampliación hacia los países del Este europeo y la ratificación del 
Tratado de Lisboa. Esta investigación se centra especialmente en la crisis 
económica como catalizador de todos estos procesos y se hace la siguiente 
pregunta: ¿importa más Europa hoy en las dinámicas electorales? Se investiga la relevancia 
relativa de la integración europea en las elecciones, tanto desde la oferta como 
desde la demanda de la ecuación. Los estados miembros de Europa occidental han 
sido tomados como casos de estudio en el análisis de los sistemas de partidos. Por 
otro lado, los países del sur de Europa son utilizados en los modelos de 
comportamiento de voto. Se subrayarán no solo las similitudes, sino también las 
diferencias significativas entre todos estos países. Dado que la dinámica regional, 
la cultura política y la herencia juegan un papel importante en la dinámica 
electoral; los análisis se han hecho específicamente por región en ambos casos. 
 
Entonces la pregunta es: ¿Cuáles son las consecuencias electorales de la 
politización de la integración europea en tiempos de crisis económica? Para 
responder a esta pregunta, es importante definir qué es la politización. En 
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términos generales, la politización se puede definir como “la expansión del alcance 
de los conflictos dentro del sistema político” (Grande y Hutter, 2016, p. 7). Aún 
cuando el concepto ha sido discutido por varios estudiosos de diferentes formas 
(Schmitter 1969, de Wilde and Zürn 2012), el consenso incluye tres dimensiones 
conceptuales: issue salience, actor expansion y actor polarization (Schmitter 1969, de 
Wilde and Zürn 2012). También es crucial establecer un vínculo entre la 
politización de la integración europea con el proceso de globalización y la 
transformación de los conflictos políticos en Europa occidental (Grande and 
Kriesi 2015). Este trabajo utiliza el marco de la politización de la integración 
europea en tiempos de crisis de la eurozona y mide el impacto de esta politización 
en las dinámicas electorales. No es una coincidencia que el concepto de 
politización haya sido seleccionado para explicar de un mejor modo la 
intensificación de “Europa” en los mensajes electorales. Los diferentes pasos en el 
proceso de integración, que se pueden entender como más y mayores 
transferencias de cotas de poder – las cuales en este caso se identifican con la 
autoridad relativa a la gestión económica – son situaciones perfectas para la 
politización de la integración europea (Hutter, Grande et al. 2016). La razón 
principal detrás de esta selección es un efecto combinado de todos los principales 
pasos de integración y la transformación de los cleveages en Europa Occidental 
debido a una profunda desnacionalización y a la globalización (Kriesi, Grande et 
al. 2008, Kriesi, Grande et al. 2012). En otras palabras, no sólo es el 
euroescepticismo, por ejemplo, en el sentido más estricto, lo que afecta al sistema 
de partidos en los estados miembros, sino que también una politización a largo 
plazo de la integración junto con la tendencia general de la globalización en 
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Europa (y del mundo). Teniendo todo esto en cuenta, en la siguiente sección se 
resumen las principales conclusiones de un capítulo descriptivo y dos capítulos 
empíricos de la tesis. El capítulo descriptivo trata la historia de la crisis económica 
mientras que los capítulos empíricos analizan en detalle la dinámica de los 
sistemas de partidos y las elecciones. 
 
Hallazgos principales 
Este trabajo comenzó con la idea de que teniendo en cuenta los importantes pasos  
que se han dado en el proceso de integración,  “Europa” debería tener un impacto 
mayor en las dinámicas electorales de los Estados miembros. A pesar de que el 
intervalo de tiempo tratado en este trabajo se centra principalmente en la 
explicación pre-/post-crisis de la zona euro, también se han tenido en cuenta 
todas las dinámicas (históricas) que condujeron a la actual Unión Europea. Se han 
dedicado dos capítulos empíricos a discutir las hipótesis relacionadas con el 
cambio del sistema de partidos y del comportamiento electoral en Europa. El 
primero se ocupa de los cambios que se han estado produciendo en los sistemas 
de partidos de Europa occidental, mientras que el otro se centra en medir el 
posible impacto de la integración europea en el voto. En los sistemas 
democráticos, las elecciones son percibidas como la oportunidad de articular 
opiniones políticas, tanto para los electores como para los partidos políticos que 
movilizan estas opiniones. Se espera que las actitudes de los ciudadanos hacia la 
integración europea se reflejen en su voto, y al mismo tiempo se espera que los 
sistemas de partidos estén cambiando gracias a una mayor movilización de estos 
nuevos clivajes estructurales. 
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Antes de seguir adelante con los capítulos empíricos de este trabajo, es importante 
resumir lo que se ha discutido en el capítulo 3. Se expusieron las causas de la crisis 
económica en Europa, pero centrándose especialmente en los países del sur de 
Europa, y también se analizaron los efectos de la crisis en la dinámica electoral, 
con una referencia especial a la integración europea. La razón principal para la 
selección de los casos ha sido obtener información de base para el capítulo 5, 
donde se analiza el comportamiento de voto de estos cinco países. El capítulo 3 
comenzó explicando las diferencias entre una crisis de deuda y una crisis bancaria, 
cuestiones que han sido clave para la exploración de la crisis de la zona euro, la 
comprensión de los detalles de las decisiones sobre gestión económica de los 
gobiernos y también para subrayar las diferencias entre los países estudiados. Toda 
esta información también se ha utilizado para analizar las principales causas de la 
crisis de deuda soberana europea. En esta discusión, el primer argumento fue la 
creación de una unión monetaria, lo que provocó que se facilitase el flujo de 
crédito barato desde los países del norte a los países del sur de Europa, lo que 
derivó en enormes desequilibrios en la cuenta corriente dentro de la unión. El 
segundo argumento fue la parada repentina del crédito transfronterizo debido a la 
crisis económica en los EE.UU. y el deterioro económico consecuente, lo que 
dificultó la financiación de los países del Sur al ser tremendamente dependiente de 
estos fondos. El tercer argumento, centrado en el fracaso de las políticas y la falta 
de mecanismos de ajuste coordinados dentro de  la UEM, agravó la crisis y no 
pudo evitar el contagio. Después de explorar las principales razones de la crisis, el 
capítulo 3 se centra en analizar caso por caso, además de revisar y discutir, las 
circunstancias y efectos específicos de la crisis en los países con dificultades 
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económicas del sur de Europa, a saber, Grecia, España, Italia, Portugal, además de 
Irlanda que, pese a no estar geográficamente situado en el sur europeo, sí que 
padeció la crisis económica de igual manera que sus socios europeos del sur 
 
Como resultado de la crisis económica, todos los países mencionados tuvieron 
que aplicar medidas de austeridad para reducir su déficit presupuestario. Además, 
Grecia, Irlanda y Portugal han sido rescatados a través de la imposición de severos 
programas de ajuste económico. En el capítulo 3, se sugirió que las medidas de 
austeridad, incluyendo aumentos de impuestos, reducción de los salarios y de 
empleo en el sector público, el empeoramiento de las condiciones de trabajo y el 
aumento en la edad de jubilación, provocaron el incremento de la ira y la 
frustración en la sociedad, lo que ha implicado un grave deterioro de la confianza 
política ciudadana en las instituciones representativas. Después de las primeras 
elecciones que se celebraron en Irlanda y Portugal, una vez se habían impuesto las 
medidas de austeridad, los  partidos en el gobierno fueron castigados 
electoralmente, pero el sistema político se mantuvo estable. Por el contrario, en 
Grecia, España e Italia, surgieron nuevos movimientos y partidos políticos. Estos 
ejercieron un impacto en el discurso de los partidos tradicionales y provocaron un 
cambio en las características fundamentales de los sistemas de partidos en estos 
países. 
 
Centrándonos en los sistemas de partidos ya mencionados, el capítulo 4 analiza el 
impacto que la politización de la integración europea ha tenido sobre ellos. A 
través del mismo se ha revisado el análisis de Peter Mair comprobando el formato 
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y mecánica del sistema de partidos de los estados miembros de Europa occidental. 
En el año 2000, Peter Mair analizaba el formato y la mecánica de los sistemas de 
partidos de quince países de Europa occidental utilizando los datos de 
posicionamiento de partido de Leonard Ray (Ray 1999). Como ya se ha indicado, 
el formato de un sistema de partidos puede ser descrito como el número de 
partidos relevantes en el ámbito electoral. La mecánica de un sistema de partidos, 
por otra parte, tiene que ver con los modos de interacción entre partidos. De 
acuerdo con su lógica, un cierto aumento en el número efectivo de partidos puede 
ser entendido como una señal de cambio del sistema de partidos. Mair llegó a la 
conclusión de que ”Europa” tiene un impacto limitado en los sistemas nacionales 
de los partidos por diversas razones: los límites del efecto spillover, la ausencia de 
un sistema europeo de partidos y las diferencias entre las arenas electorales. Este 
investigación pretende testar la vigencia de los argumentos de Mair con datos más 
recientes. En el capítulo 4 hemos replicado el análisis utilizando los últimos datos 
de la encuesta de expertos en Chapel Hill (Bakker, Edwards et al. 2015), la cual 
proporciona información electoral usando la misma clasificación de partidos 
nacionales (fuertemente pro-integración europea, fuertemente anti-integración 
europea y ni fuertemente pro- ni fuertemente contrario a la integración europea), 
además en el capítulo también se revisa la literatura existente sobre los indicadores 
del sistema de partidos, el cambio y las razones atribuidas detrás de este cambio. 
 
En el capítulo 4 hay dos hipótesis principales, las cuales replican el análisis de 
Mair. La primera hipótesis sugiere que cuanto mayor es la politización de la 
integración europea en tiempos de crisis económica, mayor es el aumento en el 
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número efectivo de partidos. El segundo objetivo es el de establecer el vínculo 
entre el issue polarization y la volatilidad. La razón principal detrás de este análisis es 
medir el impacto del issue polarization de la integración europea sobre el cambio del 
sistema de partidos. El cambio electoral, medido en base a la volatilidad, puede ser 
tomado como un indicador de cambio de sistema de partidos (Mair 1997, 
Pennings 1998, Donovan and Broughton 1999). Partiendo de este punto, este 
capítulo ha testado el impacto del issue polarization de la integración europea en la 
volatilidad y ha encontrado un impacto positivo y significativo. El análisis también 
se podría repetir cambiando la variable dependiente a “Tipo A” volatilidad, que es 
la volatilidad causada por la entrada de nuevos partidos y la salida de viejos 
partidos (Powell and Tucker 2014). Esta idea se desarrollará en futuras 
investigaciones.. 
 
El capítulo 5 examina el impacto de la integración europea sobre el 
comportamiento electoral en las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo. Se han 
utilizado las bases de datos de la European Election Studies (EES). Con el ánimo de 
cubrir el espacio temporal pre-/post-crisis se ha centrado en las elecciones de 
2004, 2009 y 2014. Además, se ha tomado como casos de estudio los países del 
sur de Europa e Irlanda. En el capítulo 5 se plantea una hipótesis principal: se 
espera que la distancia entre los votantes y los partidos en la escala de integración 
de la UE tenga un mayor impacto en el voto al PE en el período posterior a la 
crisis que en el anterior a la misma. Para testar esta hipótesis, se emplean modelos 
logísticos condicionales de elección discreta. Estos modelos nos permiten utilizar 
no sólo las variables específicas a los casos como, por ejemplo,. el impacto de la 
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distancia entre la auto-colocación de los votantes y su colocación media a los 
partidos en relación con la integración europea en la elección del voto. Cuando se 
analizaron los resultados, se observó que en algunos países la variable “distancia 
de la integración europea” tuvo un coeficiente negativo y significativo, mientras 
que en algunos otros, como España, la dimensión izquierda/derecha sigue siendo 
la principal variable explicativa. Son necesarios más estudios específicos para 
entender completamente la situación en estos países. Con todo, ambos capítulos 
empíricos confirman , al menos en algunos casos, el impacto significativo de la 
integración europea en la dinámica electoral. Todavía se necesita discutir más en 
torno a que la integración europea se haya convertido en un “issue” de relevancia  
para los ciudadanos, lo que también enriquecerá en un futuro la comprensión 
conceptual del voto temático de la UE. 
 
La integración Europea en el siglo 21: ¿Qué ha cambiado? 
Los límites del spillover y la ausencia de un sistema de partidos europeo 
En su artículo de 2000, Peter Mair afirmó que las principales razones de la falta de 
un impacto directo de la integración europea en los sistemas nacionales de los 
partidos son los límites del spillover y la ausencia de un sistema de partidos 
europeo. Hoy  esta idea requiere ser revisada. En primer lugar, es importante 
destacar que las elecciones directas al Parlamento Europeo, a partir de 1979, son 
una importante piedra angular en la representación democrática de la UE. Las 
elecciones han provocado la apertura de un escenario completamente nuevo para 
la representación electoral y han creado un incentivo para los partidos políticos. 
Sin embargo, siempre ha habido un problema que se ha ido haciendo más 
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profundo a lo largo de años. La participación en las elecciones al Parlamento 
Europeo ha sido baja; siguiendo la tendencia de baja participación en todas las 
elecciones no obstante. Muchos estudios han tratado de explicar las razones de 
este fenómeno (Franklin 2001, Flickinger and Studlar 2007, van der Eijk and van 
Egmond 2007); mientras se discute el impacto limitado de Europa en el ámbito 
nacional, Mair subrayó dos hipótesis principales. La primera de ellas afirma que 
los partidos políticos nacionales son "gatekeepers": los partidos ”ensayan” la política 
nacional dentro de la arena electoral europea. Incluso los perfiles de candidatos al 
Parlamento Europeo apoyan esta afirmación. Los partidos políticos nacionales 
eligen mayoritariamente a personas que ya han ocupado previamente posiciones 
en sus partidos en el ámbito nacional y que van a permanecer siempre conectados 
a los mismos, en vez de elegir a candidatos que muestran un verdadero interés, 
conocimiento y dedicación a la política europea. Sin lugar a dudas, el término 
“gatekeeper” hace referencia también a la discusión sobre el carácter de segundo 
orden de las elecciones al PE. Como han mencionado Reif y Schmitt (Reif and 
Schmitt 1980), y también Schmitt y Toygur recientemente (Schmitt and Toygür 
2016), las elecciones al PE tienden a ser entendidas como elecciones nacionales de 
segundo orden en las que las personas votan reflejando las preocupaciones 
nacionales. En pocas palabras, las dos partes, votantes y partidos, perciben el 
ámbito europeo como una repetición del ámbito nacional. 
 
De acuerdo con la lógica de este trabajo, la interpretación de las elecciones al PE  
como de segundo orden debe reducirse cuando se tiene en cuenta la nueva 
coyuntura europea en tiempos de mayor politización de la integración europea. 
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Además, existe una forma alternativa de plantearlo. Incluso si las elecciones al PE 
siguen siendo de segundo orden, lo que significa que los partidos están 
compitiendo según dimensiones nacionales, y  que también los votantes están 
votando de acuerdo a referencias nacionales, en la actualidad la arena nacional está 
incluyendo más “Europa”. Esto significa que, en cualquier caso, Europa debe ser 
más importante en la dinámica electoral, incluyendo las elecciones al Parlamento 
Europeo, incluso si la teoría de las elecciones de segundo orden sigue siendo 
válida. El efecto de spillover debe apoyar una mayor politización de la integración 
europea en todas las elecciones. 
 
El segundo argumento de Mair es la ausencia de un sistema de partidos europeo, 
que, según él, está basado en la inexistencia de estructura de competencia. Esta 
situación los convierte en una “colección” de partidos en lugar de un sistema con 
interacciones estables (Mair, 2000, p. 38). Para que se pudiera configurar un 
verdadero sistema de partidos europeo se requerirían patrones predecibles de 
competencia a nivel europeo. Hoy en día la situación podría volver a discutirse 
con la reciente competencia por una oficina ejecutiva no oficial. El Consejo ha 
aprobado que el candidato del partido ganador de las elecciones del 8º Parlamento 
Europeo, el Partido Popular Europeo (PPE), Jean Claude Junker, fuese investido 
como presidente de la Comisión Europea (CE). Por lo tanto, por primera vez en 
la historia, los candidatos de los partidos compitieron indirectamente por la 
presidencia, el presidente fue elegido por los votos de los ciudadanos, y más tarde 
fue aprobado por los jefes de estado. Incluso si los ciudadanos no son tan 
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conscientes del hecho de que pueden elegir al presidente de la CE, las futuras 
elecciones podrían ser diferentes (Schmitt, Hobolt et al. 2015). 
 
Escenarios diferentes, ¿Competencias diferentes? 
En su artículo, Peter Mair señaló la necesidad de distinguir entre diferentes 
escenarios electorales tales como el ámbito local/regional, el ámbito nacional y el 
ámbito europeo. También afirmó que la división del issue “responsabilidad” no 
surgió en el caso de Europa, como sí lo hizo entre los ámbitos regional y nacional. 
Además, analizó el papel del Parlamento Europeo, que ha cambiado con el 
Tratado de Lisboa, en relación a la toma de decisiones en Europa y en 
comparación con el efecto de los gobiernos nacionales a través del Consejo(s). 
Mair indicó que los votantes individuales podían transmitir sus preferencias en la 
toma de decisiones en Europa a través de los gobiernos nacionales, lo que sigue 
siendo válido en la actualidad. Sin embargo, mantuvo su argumento sobre la 
distinción de los "issues" que se influyen en el ámbito nacional y los que lo hacen 
en el ámbito europeo, que han ido cambiando con los años. Hoy en día, la política 
nacional está influenciada por Europa y no cuenta con control pleno de las 
instituciones intergubernamentales, especialmente cuando se trata de políticas 
económicas. En resumen, con la crisis económica, el impacto de las instituciones 
europeas en la formulación de políticas nacionales se ha incrementado. La 
distinción entre cuestiones "nacionales" y los temas "europeos" se ha difuminado 
en algunas áreas específicas. Con todo, sigue siendo cierto que, siempre y cuando 
la dimensión intergubernamental domina (o al menos tiene la misma influencia) la 
dimensión supranacional, los partidos políticos seguirán centrando la competencia 
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en el ámbito nacional, ya que la pueden controlar mejor. Sin embargo, también es 
cierto que Europa restringe cada vez más el margen de maniobra política de los 
gobiernos de los estados europeos; los partidos políticos que quieran gobernar sus 
países deben aceptarlo. 
 
La propia Europa es mucho más visible en la arena nacional debido a la actitud 
blame-shifting de los gobiernos nacionales. Las discusiones sobre la integración 
europea –en su mayoría relacionadas con la gobernanza económica– ya no se 
pueden eliminar de la arena nacional ni despolitizarse, como Mair afirmó en su 
artículo. Europa tiene algo que decir en el ámbito nacional ya que sus proclamas 
son también reconocidas por los líderes de la política interna y, a menudo 
utilizadas en el ámbito nacional para culpar a otros (Vegetti, Poletti et al. 2013, 
Bellucci 2014, Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou et al. 2014). Esta afirmación, relativa a 
que el blame-shifting aumenta el nivel de politización de la integración europea, debe 
investigarse más en el futuro. 
 
Agenda de investigación futura 
La integración europea en tiempos de crisis ha sido un tema muy popular para la 
ciencia política. Cada paso importante que se ha dado ha traído al mismo tiempo 
muchas preguntas . Esta vez fue la crisis de la zona euro la que ha puesto el futuro 
de la integración europea en riesgo según los académicos. Una de las discusiones 
más importantes aquí es la consecuencia de la politización y su relación con el 
futuro de la integración europea. Está claro que la politización de la integración 
europea es parte de una discusión más grande en relación con la democracia 
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representativa en Europa Occidental. Kriesi et al. han definido la politización de la 
integración europea como parte de la globalización, generando así  un nuevo 
clivaje llamado "integración-demarcación" (Kriesi, Grande et al. 2006, Kriesi, 
Grande et al. 2008, Kriesi, Grande et al. 2012). Como resultado de la globalización 
habrá cuestiones relacionadas con la competencia económica, la diversidad 
cultural y la integración política que requieren una reacción común (Grande and 
Kriesi 2015). Según Grande y Kriesi, los partidos euroescépticos de la extrema 
derecha son los que más se aprovechan de esta división. Por esta razón, toda esta 
investigación se enriquecería si se hubiera incluido también la literatura relativa al 
euroescepticismo, principalmente aquella que discrimina entre diferentes tipos de 
euroescepticismo, desde la extrema izquierda a la derecha populista. Para la 
izquierda radical, la reacción principal a la apertura de las fronteras se basa en la 
oposición a la liberalización económica; mientras que la extrema derecha se basa 
principalmente en la xenofobia y los sentimientos anti-inmigración. Los partidos 
políticos no convencionales desafían tres familias principales de partidos, a saber: 
cristianos demócratas, socialistas y liberales. Por esta razón, el hecho de replicar el 
mismo análisis con diferentes tipos de familias de partidos enriquecerá el estudio. 
 
Pensando en futuras investigaciones, aumentar el número de estudios de caso 
sería útil por razones comparativas. Las actitudes hacia la integración europea no 
sólo están determinadas por intereses económicos, sino también por percepciones 
culturales (Diez Medrano 2003). Estas no sólo son definidas por la cultura 
nacional, sino también por las experiencias regionales que están arraigadas en su 
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historia (Hooghe and Marks 2004). Por esta razón, será revelador el incluir en el 
análisis los diferentes países de diferentes zonas de la Unión Europea. 
 
Por último, pero no menos importante, el estudio de la literatura del populismo 
incluyendo el reclamo populista de los sentimientos anti-inmigración en el análisis 
va a ser muy importante para la futura investigación de la integración europea. 
Está claro que el discurso populista es más visible que nunca y sin duda va a 
conservar un lugar destacado en un futuro proyecto de investigación comparativa 
de los distintos estudiosos. Lo que los futuros posibles trabajos deben incluir es 
una reflexión teórica sobre la relación entre el euroescepticismo, el populismo, y 
una mayor politización de la integración europea. Este intento clarificará la futura 
comprensión de la importancia de "Europa" en las dinámicas electorales 
nacionales; tanto en el nivel de la oferta como en el nivel de la demanda. 
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